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Abstract 
 
This thesis offers an in-depth analysis of the political project of ‘food sovereignty’ 
within the Latin American regional institution of ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para 
los Pueblos de Nuestra América: Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America). 
As a means of navigating ALBA’s agrarian transformation, the thesis employs a 
broadly historical materialist approach to the analysis of class struggle and socio-
political change in the context of realizing a new food sovereignty regime. Drawing 
primarily on a neo-Poulantzian perspective, the analysis opens up the question of the 
bureaucratic state itself – as a condensation of class relations and hegemonic 
discourses – through the tripartite lens of rights, territory and sovereignty. Such 
coordinates are key areas of contestation for food sovereignty protagonists, who not 
only struggle against the power of landed capital but also the concentrated force of 
state power. To ground these theoretical parameters, the empirical data draws upon 
fieldwork carried out in Venezuela (the economic and ideological center of the ALBA 
bloc). Through an examination of social movements, peasant producers and activists, 
educational/pedagogical institutions promoting the practices of food sovereignty, and 
workers within ALBA’s rice producing factory network, the study offers a 
multifaceted account of the complex and contradictory transition away from capitalist 
agriculture and towards a new food regime embedded within structures of popular 
empowerment. From this analysis, the thesis uncovers a number of critical findings 
that are not often acknowledged within the ALBA literature; namely, that while the 
role of the ‘post-liberal’ state has been a key actor in the improvement of social 
wellbeing, popular classes find their greatest challenge in the form of the strong, 
bureaucratic state. Such a contradiction – between state-as-ally and state-as-nemesis – 
speaks directly to the Poulantzian problematic of ‘democratic socialism’, and the 
challenge of engaging with state institutions in order to dissolve their very logic. The 
study therefore offers important lessons with respect to the limits and prospects of 
building ‘socialism in the 21st century’. 
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1 Introduction 
On December 14, 2004, during an international meeting in Havana between the heads 
of state for Cuba and Venezuela – Fidel Castro Ruz and Hugo Chávez Frías – a new 
diplomatic declaration was announced that would perhaps come to represent the 
culmination of Latin America’s long road towards sovereign independence. This 
meeting forged the first official declaration for the new regional institution of ALBA 
(Alternativa Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América: Bolivarian Alternative 
for the Peoples of Our America).1 This regional cooperation agreement, far more so 
than any other regional formation in the history of the continent, explicitly positioned 
its rationale as an alternative to the destructive tendencies of global capitalism, and its 
US-led regional form (Free Trade Area of the Americas), which according to the joint 
declaration, “is the most accomplished expression of the appetites of domination over 
the region and that would constitute a deepening of neo-liberalism and would create 
levels of dependence and subordination without precedence” (ALBA, 2004).  
 The declaration was far from a pure form of rejectionism; its distinct regional 
critique of neoliberal capitalism rested on a strategic understanding that the road ahead 
required a new kind of regional integration: 
 “[I]ntegration is, for the countries of the Latin American and the 
Caribbean, an indispensable condition to aspire to the development 
amidst the increasing formation of big regional blocs that occupy 
predominant positions in the world economy, and that only an 
integration, based on cooperation, solidarity and common will to move 
all kinds of consumption towards higher levels of development, could 
satisfy the needs and longings of the Latin-American and Caribbean 
countries and, at the same time, preserve their independence, 
sovereignty and identity” (ALBA, 2004). 
Thus was born the ALBA regional integration project, which was imagined as 
constituting the arch of Latin America’s long history of independence struggles: from 
“the glorious victory of Ayacucho and of the Convocation of the ‘Anfictiónico’ 
Congress of Panama, which was an attempt to open the way for a real process of 
integration of our countries”, the ALBA process is envisaged as a means by which 
																																								 																				
1 The acronym of ALBA means ‘dawn’ (alba) in Castilian. This regional initiative would go on to be 
renamed the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America. Later, in 2006, the name was expanded 
to include TCP (Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos: Peoples’ Trade Treaty). 
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“the Latin-American and Caribbean peoples are finally on the way to their second and 
real independence” (ALBA, 2004).  
 With now a decade past, and growing to eleven member states, ALBA has 
come to occupy an increasingly noticeable position within the academic literature on 
contemporary Latin American integration. This thesis therefore aims as a contribution 
towards this growing body of ALBA scholarship by enquiring into the origins, nature, 
significance and possible future for what is perhaps the most ambitious and radical 
regional institution in the world today. And while the extant literature on ALBA has 
broached a number of in-depth analyses on a range of policy areas – from the 
development of higher education (Muhr, 2011a), to counter-trade (Pearce, 2013), or 
as a new model of regional development (Aponte-García, 2014) – the topic of 
agricultural development has received little substantial investigation. The present 
thesis therefore offers a comprehensive account of ALBA’s approach to food policy, 
encapsulated by its recent turn to food sovereignty. The philosophy and practice of 
food sovereignty first emerged through the autonomous organisation of Latin 
American peasant groups during the 1980s in response to the onslaught of neoliberal 
adjustment in the countryside. In time, this cluster of groups would go on to form a 
global peasant movement – La Vía Campesina (‘The peasant way’) – struggling 
against the power of transnational capital’s control over the global food regime, by 
promoting and practicing alternative methods of agriculture (principally agroecology), 
a re-orientation towards small farmers, ecologically sustainable production methods, 
and the radical re-empowerment of rural actors as a key vector in the overall 
transformation in social relations. The ALBA thus appeared to offer an institutional 
structure in which peasant movements might be able to consolidate their demands: the 
Council of Social Movements recognises the participation of non-state actors in the 
crafting of regional policy; in 2008 ALBA implemented a Food Security and 
Sovereignty accord, the establishment of an ALBA Food Fund (with a capital of $100 
million dollars) and the formation of a region-wide Grandnational Enterprise 
spearheading the agrarian integration of member states (ALBA-TCP, 2008a; ALBA-
TCP, 2009a). As such, ALBA’s developmental approach similarly seeks to form 
cooperative geopolitical relations among member states, as well as the promotion of 
popular power at the grassroots level among a variety of stakeholders. 
Such an investigation of ALBA’s approach to food sovereignty is made all the 
more significant given the current conjuncture of the Latin American left, which by 
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many accounts is entering into a severe socio-economic crisis and facing a significant 
challenge from a resurgent neoliberal-right, particularly with the recent ‘constitutional 
coup’ in Brazil (pushing out the centre-left president Dilma Rousseff) and the 2015 
election of Mauricio Marci to the Argentinean presidency.2 Such events are therefore 
particularly relevant to the current context of the ALBA, especially in light of the now 
all-too familiar social, economic and political crisis facing the sovereign epicentre of 
this regional space, Venezuela.  
With the passing of the Land Law in 2001, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela had officially proclaimed the goal of achieving food security, defined as 
guaranteeing sufficient and stable access to food for the national population, yet with 
a renewed focus on peasant rights. As such, by 2011, 1 million peasants (out of a total 
rural population of 1.7 million) had benefited from the land reform, with 5.8 million 
hectares ‘rescued’ from large private landholdings (deemed un- or under-productive) 
(Wilpert, 2014: 6, 8). Despite the often-inconsistent usages of ‘food security’ 
(seguridad alimentaria) and ‘food sovereignty’ (soberanía agroalimentaria), it was 
clear from early on that Venezuela’s agrarian transformation would focus on the core 
premises of food sovereignty: elevation of peasant rights, access to and security within 
their agrarian territories, and thus establishing a truly popular regime of sovereign 
independence. These political coordinates were, moreover, finally couched within an 
explicit call for ‘food sovereignty’ in Venezuela’s national legislation passed in 2008.  
And yet, Venezuela’s agrarian transformation has produced highly ambiguous 
results: patterns of landholdings have changed little (resembling the original agrarian 
reform of 1960); total surface area under cultivation is lower than in 1988 (when the 
notion of agrarian reform was absent); levels of production could not keep up with the 
general expansion of consumption and population growth; dependence on imports 
substantially increased, made possible through Venezuela’s extraordinary oil wealth, 
yet which has now come under increasing strain with a recent drop in world oil prices 
(Purcell, 2017). When finally viewed in the context of Venezuela’s unique fiscal and 
monetary regime (which we will see further in Chapter 4), the overall macro-economic 
picture is one that is wracked with inflationary pressures and shortages in key 
consumables, particularly the food sector. As a result, even casual observers have 
become accustomed to images of ordinary Venezuelans standing in long lines around 
																																								 																				
2 See, for example, Watts (2015). 
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the block for hours on end to obtain even basic food goods and other necessities, 
leading to the first significant electoral setback experienced by Chávez’s United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, PSUV), with the 
opposition Roundtable for Democratic Unity (Mesa Unida Democrática, MUD) 
securing a majority of seats in the National Assembly in 2015 (Neuman, 2015). This 
development re-ignited the previously simmering debate between supporters and 
detractors of the ‘Bolivarian Republic’, which at the most immediate level takes place 
across the Left-Right spectrum, and largely in narrow terms of whether the crisis is 
the fault of opposition forces or government incompetence. However, more thoughtful 
observers highlight the relative complexity involved in disentangling the nature of the 
Venezuelan crisis, “[not] because some of the causes, and potential solutions, to the 
crisis are quite technical. The difficulty lies, rather, in the challenge, and perhaps 
impossibility, of disentangling the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of the crisis” 
(Hetland, 2016). In fact, no account of Venezuela’s crisis tendencies would be 
complete without both external and internal factors: for the former, the continued 
dependence on oil rents (and in combination with Washington’s close collaboration 
with opposition forces throughout the country) makes Venezuelan politics beholden 
to a number of geopolitical pressures, while for the latter a complex combination of 
state corruption and incompetence, along with the now everyday practice of the 
“bachaqueo” (reselling price-controlled goods in the black market at vastly inflated 
prices), all lead to artificial shortages and consumer price inflation (Telesur English, 
2016). 
Regardless of these political debates and complexities, it is clear that 
Venezuela’s food crisis exerts a significant challenge to the implementation of food 
sovereignty as a substantial developmental transformation within ALBA. After all, the 
socio-agricultural indicators listed above all seem to point in the opposite direction of 
what a successful case of food sovereignty reform might look like, which would 
suggest a more consolidated level of food security for the population, yet refracted 
through the substantial democratisation in ownership and control over strategic sites 
of production, marketing and distribution channels. So intense has this divergence 
between rhetoric and reality become that last year it was decreed the Venezuelan 
workforce would be subject to ‘obligatory’ rural labour for up to 60 days, a startling 
move that quickly led to accusations of ‘forced labour’ (Figueroa, 2016). Only days 
later, the minister of work, Francisco Torrealba, sought to clarify the situation by 
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reference to a “typo”, in which the word ‘obligatory’ should have been ‘voluntary’, 
and duly amending said ‘mistake’ in the final legislation (Peñaloza, 2016).  
Remarkably, the legacy of chavismo has not yet taken its last, dying breath; 
earlier this year (February, 2017), 79 percent of the Venezuelan population named 
Chávez as their most popular president (with Carlos Andrés Peréz coming in at a 
distant second with 13 percent), while 77 percent of respondents did not agree with 
the opposition-controlled National Assembly’s attempt to ouster Nicolás Maduro from 
the presidency (Boothroyd Rojas, 2017a). Added to this, 71 percent of the population 
believe that the opposition parties have no real plan for resolving the country’s 
problems (Mallett-Outtrim, 2017). Thus, the specific mode of politics fostered by 
Chávez’s ‘Bolivarian revolution’ (which we might call the politics of inclusion) has 
severely blunted traditional means of counter-revolutionary power, from direct protest 
waves throughout urban centres to indirect ideological and media-based pressures and 
tactics (Burges et al., 2017). For the radical social forces that have made the Bolivarian 
turn what it is today, reclaiming Chávez’s politics is their “greatest homage” – as one 
of the leading Venezuelan peasant groups, the Corriente Revolucionaria Bolívar y 
Zamora, recently proclaimed: “it’s no secret that macro politics have become distant 
from the politics of the day to day, from the politics of the people. The official 
discourse does not register in the language of the commons” (CRBZ, 2017).  
This, then, sets the general problematique for the present analysis of food 
sovereignty within the ALBA regional space, in terms of shedding a critical light on 
the conspicuous gap between the officialdom of sovereign state power and the 
everyday politics and struggles for the (agrarian) commons. The aim of this research 
project is to assess the successes, challenges, failures and potential pathways towards 
a food sovereignty regime in the regional institution of ALBA. In doing so, the 
analysis proceeds on the following research questions: 
1. To what degree is the agricultural base of the ALBA region being transformed 
from one dominated by capitalist agriculture, to a regime of production and 
exchange oriented around use-value and ecological sustainability, as per the 
requirements of ‘food sovereignty’? How, and on what basis, is this 
transformative process taking place, and what are the specific effects produced 
by the strategies used for this transformation? 
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2. Who are the main protagonists of this transformation, and what are the sources 
of their repertoires of action and contention?  
3. To what extent do these different groups of actors pursue convergent, divergent 
or contradictory strategies, and why?  
These questions provide an analytical basis for critically engaging with the many 
actors, processes and policies that forge the political project of food sovereignty in 
ALBA, taking account of its own stated aims, the particular stakeholders involved in 
its elaboration, as well as the crucial moments of divergence and contestation that 
arises from any substantial process of socio-political transformation. As such, the 
proceeding analysis will demonstrate that, despite many declarations and scattered 
initiatives, the formation of a region-wide food sovereignty regime has barely 
progressed, remaining entrapped within a mere cluster of states pursuing largely 
independent modes of agrarian development. As I contend, and will demonstrate 
throughout the remainder of the thesis, it is the overbearing presence of state 
sovereignty – as a socially congealed institutional ensemble of power relations – that 
continues to frustrate the decentralisation and democratisation of political power and 
agency.  
 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
As a corollary to the empirical context above, the thesis aims to address a fundamental 
puzzle at the heart of ALBA’s food sovereignty policy, namely: why has ALBA’s food 
sovereignty project reproduced the power of the bureaucratic, patrimonial state? In 
the context of this research problem, the thesis is primarily concerned with unravelling 
the politics of food sovereignty, and the power relations stitching together a wide 
number of social actors and political stakeholders. Instead of an overarching focus on 
the technicalities of agro-ecological practice or the more long-standing debates about 
industrial models vs. small-holder approaches to agriculture, the analysis enquires into 
the key political coordinates of food sovereignty’s philosophy and practice: rights, 
territory, and sovereignty. Such a framework provides a useful foundation for 
constructing a general theoretical framework of food sovereignty, given that these 
coordinates enjoy a universal presence throughout the literature, despite its wide-
ranging empirical referents. Yet precisely because of the nature of these dimensions, 
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whenever we speak of food sovereignty, we are implicitly invoking deeply political 
questions concerning a deeper set of determinations that articulate the sinews of social 
power: law, space and politics. In this way, rights are the formal expression of juridical 
norms/discourse, territory is the spatial extension of techniques of governance, and 
sovereignty constitutes a condensed expression of political power. With these 
analytical vectors in mind, I aim to deconstruct the problem of ALBA’s food 
sovereignty project ultimately revolves around the problem of the state, which, as 
Bernstein (2014) points out, remains “the elephant in the room” for food sovereignty 
scholarship.  
 In order to ground the rights/territory/sovereignty triad, I draw upon the work 
of Marxian theorist Nicos Poulantzas (2014) and his underlying framework that 
deconstructs law, space and politics through a set of distinctly Marxian categories: 
relations of production/division of labour, hegemony, and a relational theory of the 
capitalist state. This underlying framework, which forms the basis of a sociologically 
grounded explanation of rights/territory/sovereignty, therefore reveals the social 
sources of agents’ power, and the complex fields of force that permeate the entirety of 
the social formation. I will also make use of the many subsequent innovations in neo-
Poulantzian theory in order to enrich our understanding of the multi-scalar and 
material determinations of social space, which in turn will form a bridge between the 
two thematic wings of the thesis (the ALBA region and the politics of food 
sovereignty).  
This Marxian approach thus seeks to extend and enrich the two predominant 
frameworks of ALBA studies (Realism and neo-Gramscianism). As we will see 
further below, between these two approaches we are left wanting for a systematic 
explanation capable of analytically linking distinct political geographies with any kind 
of sociological basis in which power relations obtain their valence. Rather, only by 
problematising the capitalist state as such can we gain a better handle on the contours 
of contestation and power relations that permeate the multidimensional terrain of 21st 
century socialism, and indeed food sovereignty.  
Despite the decidedly regional problematic of this thesis, the proceeding 
analysis will largely focus on the case of Venezuela, in order to draw out several 
analytical and empirical insights with respect to the regional institution as a whole. 
This is for two reasons:  firstly, Venezuela remains the undisputed material centre of 
the entire regional space, in terms of both absolute Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as 
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well as the primary role played by petroleum as both the source of cheap (subsidised) 
energy inputs for member states and a significant source of hard currency through the 
extraction of ground rent. Secondly, ALBA’s food sovereignty initiatives, particularly 
in the form of state-run industrial centres of production formed through ALBA’s 
articles of agreement, reside within the Venezuelan territory. Hence, Venezuela 
constitutes a central case study that permits a critical comparison between the 
discourse/rhetoric of ALBA and the concrete practices of actors at the heart of its food 
sovereignty project.  
As a result of this theoretical framework, and the empirical justifications for 
focusing on Venezuela, the thesis will not substantially draw upon the mainstream 
literature on regional integration. As the next section will show, regionalism theory 
tends to oscillate between a rationalist or constructivist approach, each of which 
provides little traction with respect to agent-specific strategies of reproduction and 
transformation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to delineate the nature of regionalism 
theory and its relative limits, which tend to be reproduced within the extant literature 
on ALBA.  
 
1.2 Explaining and Understanding the Rise of Regions 
The ‘rise of regions’ has been a common notion among scholars of International 
Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) in recent decades. Within 
the world’s geographically situated regions (Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas) we 
find a daunting number of regional institutions, which between them possess variable 
degrees of functionality, depth, or ‘regionness’ (Hettne and Söderbaum, 2000). In 
Latin America alone, the proliferation of regional institutions, cooperation agreements 
and common markets has led some observers to claim that the process of 
regionalization has now “peaked” (Malamud and Gardini, 2012). The fuzziness of 
regionalism(s), their complexity and (quite often) superficiality may lead some to 
question why the rise of inter-state regions is of interest at all. But despite the 
enormous variation among the world’s regionalization projects, it cannot be disputed 
that there exists a general trend throughout the spatial terrain of the world system. 
Indeed, as Postel-Vinay (2007: 558) suggests, “the actual establishment of a general 
theory of regional integration… was in fact justified by the simultaneous emergence 
of regional groupings in other parts of the world” throughout the post-WWII order. 
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Though no such general theory yet exists, Malamud and Gardini (2012: 118) re-state 
the most general understanding among regionalism scholars as to the origins of these 
spatialisation schemes, which amount to “attempt[s] to rebuild the eroded national 
boundaries at a higher level… as a protective manoeuver by states that cannot by 
themselves secure their own interests.” It would seem, then, that the route to 
uncovering the origins of regionalism lies in (1) deciphering the social forces that form 
agent-specific responses to the general conditions of insecurity pushing states to band 
together, and (2) unravelling the structural contours that produce these forces of 
insecurity and social disjuncture in the first place.  
 The word “region” itself is a particularly malleable one, such that the 
sociologist, or perhaps political economist, will naturally use the term in different 
ways (cf. Massey, 1995; Scott, 2000), or at a multiplicity of spatial scales (Agnew, 
2013). For IR theorists, the scale at which a “region” becomes meaningful is that 
which obtains between sovereign states, and therefore constitutes international 
regional formations.3 As with the broader development of the IR/IPE disciplines, 
which formed out of the concrete struggles that made the ‘modern’ world order (cf. 
van der Pijl, 2014), the evolution of ‘region studies’ as a relatively distinct discipline 
arose in response to the socio-spatial transitions that marked the post-war European 
state-system. 
 
1.2.1 Rationalism 
The ‘first wave’ of region theory, or ‘functionalist integration theory’, emerged from 
the initial European experiment, containing a specific separation between politics and 
economics in which technocratic planning would functionally entail specific political 
forms for its survival (Mitrany, 1944, 1975; Deutsch, 1957). Latterly, Hass (and 
others) shifted into a type of ‘neo-functionalism’, which understood purely 
technocratic and economic decision-making as shot through with politics, thus 
reintroducing political economy back into the picture (Haas, 1958, 1961; Nye, 1965). 
Nevertheless, functionalism and neo-functionalism failed the test of durable theory, as 
it could not easily translate its generalisations of the European sphere to other 
																																								 																				
3 As such, the term “region” will, unless stated otherwise, refer to sub-global, inter-state politico-
economic spaces. 
	 	 10	
geographical instances of regional cooperation (Haas, 1975; cf. Hurrell, 2007; Postel-
Vinay, 2007).  
‘Second wave’ region theory was oriented around questions concerning the 
potential rise of malevolent protectionism and the mechanisms necessary to achieve 
inter-state cooperation under anarchy (Keohane and Martin, 1995; Moravcsik, 1998). 
Within this broader IPE approach, regionalism was understood as a multifaceted 
policy array that was formed in response to the onset of globalization (Stallings, 1995; 
Keohane, 2002: 210), exemplified by such integration projects as NAFTA, 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SADC, and EU. New regional spaces, in keeping with the 
broader neoliberal discourse of the 1990s, were initially referred to as ‘open 
regionalism’ schemes that could somehow reconcile the oppositional forces of 
regional blocs with multilateral trade. While the concept first originated from the 
APEC declaration of 1989, which sought to implement an ‘open regionalism’ regime, 
in fact “neither APEC nor any other official body has defined ‘open regionalism’” 
(Bergsten, 1997: 545). As two World Bank researchers later went on to note, “‘open 
regionalism’ is a slogan rather than an analytical term. It is defined in so many 
different ways that it conveys no information about an RIA [Regional Integration 
Agreement] other than that its members are embarrassed to be thought of as 
protectionist” (Schiff and Winters, 2003: 244). Methodologically speaking, this 
institutionalist turn in IR theory – which was supposedly in opposition to the dominant 
Realist approach – shares with Realism the central fixation on states as the main actors 
in world politics (even with the occasional nod towards the role of multi-national 
firms). Such conceptual blinders therefore produce an impoverished view of how and 
by whom socio-economic policy is made, and thus obscuring from view the 
sociological texture of international politics and economics.  
 
1.2.2 Constructivism 
Part of the confusion surrounding the ‘open regionalism’ label was due to its quick 
subsuming and consequent synonymising with another term that soon became the 
standard term within academic circles. Under the ‘new regionalism’ paradigm, 
scholars viewed regional institutions as not just ‘open’, but open-ended social 
processes encompassing broader constructions of identity formation and norm 
diffusion within security communities and other regional initiatives on behalf of a 
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variety of social actors beyond the state (see Adler and Barnett, 1998; Checkel, 1999; 
Hettne and Soderbaum, 2000; Sidaway, 2003; Acharya, 2004; Oelsner, 2005). Yet this 
open-ended, constructivist approach to region building is as indeterminate as 
rationalist varieties are restrictive. In attempting to move beyond the limited 
explanatory power of both functionalism and liberal institutionalism, constructivist 
accounts of region building work well when norms are adhered to, but do not contain 
an explanatory mechanism that accounts for the social origins of regional regimes, for 
state behaviour that diverges from these norms under formal conditions of institutional 
convergence, nor for the unforeseen crises that tend to precipitate social 
transformation and thus the possibility for the establishment of new normative regimes 
(cf. Strange, 1982; Gale, 1998; Teschke and Heine, 2002).  
Thus, the rapidly expanding discipline of ‘region studies’ (which straddles the 
IR/IPE divide) remains relatively dominated by the two traditional approaches of 
rationalism (Lombaerde, 2006; Lombaerde et al., 2008; Khan, 2009), or 
constructivism (Langenhove, 2011; Riggirozzi, 2012; Duina, 2013). As Postel-Vinay 
(2007: 557) points out, “The focus on the regionalist IR literature has tended to be 
around the region – ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’ – than about it.” And yet, even 
Postel-Vinay’s own ‘critical geopolitics’ approach is, like so many others within this 
theoretical tradition (e.g., Ó Tuathail, 1996; Agnew, 1998), more focused on the social 
construction of the regional ‘imagination’, and is therefore entirely divorced from any 
kind of historically specific social content accompanying this new political geography 
of world politics. As a result, the ‘critical geopolitics’ approach tends to view the 
international region in much the same way as other constructivist accounts, insofar as 
they amount to the mere projection of ideas and norms – or, to use a favoured 
expression from the critical geopolitics tradition, the mere “writing of space” (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996). Alternatively, and in paraphrasing Dönmez and Sutton (2016: 13), 
region theory requires thinking in and through the nature of regional institutions and 
spaces, rather than thinking merely around or about them. It requires, in short, the 
concrete analysis of the materialities and socially embedded discourses that 
contextualises the differential agency exhibited by a variety of actors in the process of 
region building.  
 
What we find from this review of contemporary region studies is the same theoretical 
divide in IR that was identified some 15 years ago by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith. 
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As the authors noted in their Explaining and Understanding International Relations 
(1991), there is a tendency for IR scholars to veer towards either an ‘outside’ or 
‘inside’ story of the international. The former seeks to apply an ‘objective’, scientific 
explanation of social dynamics by focusing on the structural determinants of human 
action, while the latter pays more attention to the thoughts, words and intentions of 
social agents that attempt to change the world around them. This dilemma between the 
‘outside’ (explaining) and the ‘inside’ (understanding) represents the ongoing 
‘agency-structure’ debate within IR (see, Wendt, 1987; Friedman and Starr, 1997; 
Wight 2006). However, I find more convincing Samuel Knafo’s approach to social 
science methodology that places greater emphasis on “social change as a systemic 
focus” of critical analysis (Knafo, 2013: 513). Thus, various methodological 
approaches struggle to achieve precisely the solution they purport to offer: by positing 
‘structure’ a priori, positivism robs us of the political and thus socially contested 
nature of structures, which forecloses any substantive explanation of them qua 
constructions; agent/structure dualisms (such as Giddens’ ‘sturcturation’ framework) 
necessarily ‘explain’ agency according to structure, or vice versa, but in turn cannot 
congeal into an organic whole; and the turn to ontology in critical realism, while 
framing a more open-ended approach to empirical specificity, makes the assumption 
that structure and agency can be unproblematically identified in all cases (Knafo, 
2013: 496, 498-9, 500). The remaining problem thus seems to support Hollis and 
Smith’s original scepticism concerning the logical possibility of making 
agency/structures occupy the same space at the same time.   
 Knafo proposes to jail-break the problem altogether by bringing agency to the 
forefront of critical analysis. In proposing this move, Knafo does not throw out the 
idea of structures but rather shifts the ways in which we conceive them. While 
‘structures’ create certain pressures, a specific agent strategy cannot be read off from 
such imperatives (ibid: 504). Hence, “the significance of social dynamics is not given 
by the structures themselves, but by what people do with them” (ibid). As a corollary, 
rather than looking at agency/structure in terms of a dual relation, the premium is on 
looking at many agents embedded within social relations: “structural constraints do 
not materialize as imperatives for one agent if there is no other agent who threatens to 
act upon these constraints” (ibid). If, then, structures are but the ‘shadow’ cast by 
differential agency, and in turn do not possess any powers of causality on their own 
(because they do not exist on their own), then the entire problem of ‘structural cause’ 
	 	 13	
disappears. While this may seem like a thinning of social theory, it remains possible 
to arrive at “abstract and general conclusions”, only this time through specifying agent 
strategies rather than positing static structural models (ibid: 511).   
This methodological wager speaks directly to both the theoretical as well as 
empirical commitments of this thesis. While the adoption of Poulantzian framework 
involves its share of abstraction – particularly around the classical Marxist parameters 
of relations of production, social division of labour, capitalist state, etc. – it maintains 
the process of class struggle as the determinate force in the last instance. Through a 
broader elaboration of Jessop’s neo-Poulantzian approach to ‘strategic selectivity’ in 
Chapter 2, we arrive at a methodological approach that fits well with a commitment to 
agential readings of structural pressures. Empirically, the multi-dimensional nature of 
food sovereignty (within ALBA or elsewhere) necessarily requires a more fluid 
approach to empirical analysis. How, after all, are we supposed to find common 
ground between peasant movements, pedagogical spaces, industrial workers, and so 
on? The trick, rather, is not to force generalisations between these disparate social 
forces, but rather to emphasis their specificity even when different actors speak with 
a common discourse (food sovereignty). The methodological foundation of this thesis, 
then, is situated on the understanding that explanation can never be meaningful outside 
of the agent-specific strategies used within a given context. Thus, to explain social 
change is to give more credence to those at the helm of change, and in so doing, 
allowing people to help refine our theories, rather than shoving people into theoretical 
frameworks.  
As we will see below, the current state of the art of ALBA studies tends to 
replicate the same theoretical tensions seen within the wider literature on international 
regions in general. In order to approach both the idea and reality of the ALBA region, 
we will examine the ‘first generation’ of ALBA studies in order to discern the 
potentials and limits of this extant literature, and the degree to which it replicates the 
same theoretical drawbacks as the dominant approaches to regionalism. 
 
1.3 What Kind of ‘Post-Hegemonic’ Region is ALBA? A Critical Literature 
Review 
Despite the relative theoretical variety across the corpus of ALBA studies, virtually 
all academics situate the rise of this regional formation within the broader context of 
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Latin America’s contemporary shift into an era of ‘post-hegemonic regionalism’, 
which according to Riggirozzi and Tussie is: 
“characterised by hybrid practices as a result of a partial displacement 
of dominant forms of US-led neoliberal governance in the 
acknowledgement of other political forms of organization and 
economic management of regional (common) goods” (Riggirozzi and 
Tussie, 2012: 12). 
The following analysis will thus enquire into exactly what kind of post-hegemonic 
region ALBA is thought to be (and how it is constituted) according to the extant 
literature. 
 
1.3.1 ALBA as a State-led Anti-Neoliberal Regime 
The most dominant fraction of ALBA studies tends on average to converge around the 
theoretical priorities as those seen within the more traditional region studies literatures, 
focused most heavily on state-led initiatives and policies with little in the way of in-
depth sociological explanation for the rise of this radical from of post-hegemonic 
regionalism. Rosalba Linares, for instance, notes that ALBA “suggests options for the 
management and control of the market by the State oriented to satisfy the necessities 
and demands of society within the international economic context” (Linares, 2007: 
35). Paul Kellog similarly argues that ALBA “represents an attempt to return to that 
earlier, Keynesian era”, forming a new system of inter-state trade based on 
“equalization payments on a hemispheric basis, transcending national borders, and 
imbued with a distrust of traditional trade deals – equalization on anti-neoliberal 
steroids” (Kellog, 2007: 205, 202). For José Briceño Ruiz (2015) on the other hand, 
this radical region amounts to a form of geopolitical ‘soft balancing’ against the 
neoliberal hegemon. Meanwhile, Maribel Aponte-García’s volume, El Nuevo 
Regionalismo Estratégico (2014), which constitutes one of the few book-length 
studies on this regional organisation, approaches the topic (as the title would suggest) 
through the lens of “strategic regionalism”, a policy array that seeks to internalise 
benefits through “endogenous development”. And while her analysis is also unique in 
offering a distinctly political economy account of ALBA’s functioning, the real 
substance of the analysis (which we will return to again in Chapter 4) does not fully 
consider the concrete actors that fundamentally breathe life into these politico-
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economic projects, nor the potentially conflict-ridden processes that complicate their 
execution. Rather, the state – as the key strategic actor – remains dominant. 
 Hence, time and again, we find the overbearing presence of the state sitting 
front and centre of the analysis of ALBA (e.g. Al Attar and Miller, 2010; Riggirozzi, 
2012; Chodor and McCarthy-Jones, 2013; Espinosa, 2013; Aponte-García, 2015; 
Medina, 2016). There are, however, a small number of works with a more 
constructivist lean that offer an insightful picture of the discourses and ideologies that 
go into constructing an alternative, anti-hegemonic and anti-neoliberal ‘common 
sense’ (Marchand, 2005; Gürcan, 2010; Cole, 2010; McCarthy-Jones and Greig, 2011; 
Emerson, 2013; 2014). Yet these discursive parameters are, like regime theory in 
general, a poor indicator of regime consolidation, while more substantially, these 
approaches do not address the class differentiations and concrete social fissures that 
permeate these state/civil society processes of identity formation and regime 
construction.4 While others working from the ‘bottom up’ perspective of civil 
society’s role in the formation of ALBA have begun to open up this avenue of research 
(e.g., Martínez, 2013; Cutler and Brien, 2013; Berron et al., 2013; Schaposnik and 
Pardo, 2015), they are more cursory than comprehensive.5  
 
1.3.2 ALBA as a Bolivarian State-Society Regional Complex 
Mapping the various actors, social forces and class projects that animate the ALBA 
space has been principally, and persuasively, charted in the work of Thomas Muhr 
(e.g., 2010a, b; 2011a, b; 2012a, b), whose approach goes significantly beyond those 
analyses that view ALBA as merely an inter-state institution. Due to the breadth and 
depth of Muhr’s work, as well as the theoretical/normative overlap shared with this 
thesis, it is necessary to give much greater length to unpacking the conceptual 
ingredients of his framework. 
Muhr offers a variegated neo-Gramscian reading to the formation of ALBA, 
through a multifaceted analysis of spatial scale, sites of struggle, varieties of actors, 
																																								 																				
4 Indeed, as the contested ideological invocation of Bolívar demonstrates, this “floating signifier” 
(Laclau, 1996), has been variably integrated into different hegemonic projects, such as the early state-
building process of Juan Vincente Gómez, or in the subaltern populism of chavismo (Coronil, 1997: 
88-9; Bray, 2014; Kingsbury, 2015). 
5 Ambar García Márquez’s (2013) chapter on the genesis of ALBA’s Council of Social Movements is, 
however, highly instructive in light of her insider’s perspective.  
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and areas of social transformation. From this neo-Gramscian/neo-Coxian perspective,6 
the multiple scales across which capital operates in today’s global order necessitates 
the pursuit of a “counter hegemonic pluriscalar war of position”, understood as a 
specific counter hegemonic spatialisation strategy that “recognizes the reconfiguration 
of socio-political power geometries associated with ‘meta-governance’, through 
which regional and global capitalist institutions actively remake state apparatuses, 
governmental practices and societal institutions” (Muhr, 2013). Thus, the strategy 
undertaken by those actors forging the ALBA space reflects the diffuse and deep-
seated character of capitalist globalism, embodied not merely within the state system 
and its attendant institutions, but throughout ‘commercial society’ as it extends across 
the world. Invoking Gramsci’s military analogies ‘war of position’ and ‘war of 
movement’ – the first designating the frontal assault against, and capture of, the state 
apparatus, while the second refers to the fomenting of alternative ideas and institutions 
within civil society itself – Muhr highlights the strategic necessity of pursuing both 
strategies simultaneously, “as a multidimensional struggle over minds and strategic 
places at and across different interlocking scales simultaneously in the construction of 
a historic bloc” (ibid). 
 This multidimensional strategy is conceptualised by Muhr through two inter-
related forms of organisation: the ‘state-in-revolution’ and ‘organised society’. These 
forms counteract the liberal fetishisation of social life under capitalism, in its formal 
separation of politics and economics (state and civil society) (see Wood, 1981). In 
contrast, the state-in revolution represents “the emancipatory activation of state power 
– that is, the state-promoted organization of the popular classes and the reconfiguration 
of state power by progressive forces within the state as well as from outside” (Muhr, 
2012c: 20). This ‘Bolivarian’ state/civil society complex forms an organic link 
between those in the state apparatus and those comprising the popular classes. But it 
is this latter group that perhaps provides the most dynamic element, constituting the 
organised society that fundamentally realises itself through self-organisation, 
autonomy and thus sovereignty (at multiple scales).  
However, these two elements – state-in-revolution and organised society – as 
a distinct state/society complex is not simply contained within the national territory,  
																																								 																				
6 ‘Neo-Coxian’ refers to perhaps the first mainstream usage of Gramsci within IR/IPE by Robert W. 
Cox (1981). 
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  Figure 1: Institutional Architecture of ALBA (as of 2009).  
  Source: Muhr, 2011a: 280. 
 
but is necessarily scaled-up as per the requirements of a pluriscalar struggle. Thus, 
Muhr conceives the ALBA bloc as more than a mere collection of states and inter-
state agreements; it is an international ‘state-in-revolution’ (Muhr, 2010b: 29). As with 
the national-level, the multi- (or trans-) national ‘state-in-revolution’ acquires its 
revolutionary character through its organic connection to ‘organised society’: at the 
regional (ALBA) level this component forms a “transnational organized society” (ibid: 
37). From an institutional perspective, ALBA’s state-in-revolution is composed of the 
Council of Presidents, which “derive their legitimacy from representative democratic 
mechanisms and procedures” (ibid: 43); the organised society at the regional level is 
formally represented by the Council of Social Movements, as “the direct democratic 
embodiment of the transnational organized society” (ibid) (see Figure 1).  
 Muhr is also careful to consider the contours of power that permeate these 
social relationships. As he notes, the making of ALBA “is not free from conflict: both 
state and society actors may be co-opted and/or repressed by ruling individuals and 
parties, counter-revolutionary forces and constraints (individual power, selfish 
interests, corruption, consumerism, and so forth)” (Muhr, 2012a: 237). Particularly 
with respect to the most innovative and radical aspect of the ALBA institution (the 
Council of Social Movements), the analysis:  
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reproduced in some respects, [but] it is also resisted and transformed as an alternative configuration of 
forces – a rival structure” that responds to specific social contradictions that must be resolved in one 
manner or another (Muhr, 2013). Such considerations lead Muhr to the conclusion that: 
“resistance in the form of the construction of a counter-structure within the framework 
for action, and the multiple forces, dimensions and levels that compose it, can never be 
at once, full-scale, as if occurring in a ‘vacuum’… Rather, certain forces will have to be 
challenged at certain points in time, which makes structural transfor ation not only a 
lengthy and gradual process, but also one that contains inevitable trade-offs and 
potential contradictions” (Muhr, 2010a: 39).  
In the case of Venezuela, as the organic nucleus of the ALBA project, these contradictions are most 
fully visible in the nature of its productive base and its institutional consequences, as it is “tightly 
integrated in hegemonic globalisation through its membership in the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (which however is also used as a counter-hegemonic tool) and the 
monopoly rent extraction from il exports” (Muhr, 2011b: 7). And et, as Muhr goe  on to state, his 
purpose “is not to explor  such c t adictions at great le gth” ( b ). This ultimately signals the 
inherent limit of Muhr’s otherwise val able an lysi . F r we cannot truly understand the social origins 
of these contradictions – e.g., the asymmetrical decision-making power between the Council of 
Presidents and the Council of Social Movements, or the continuing power of resource extraction and oil 
rent circulation – and thus the very nature, scope (and potential) of ALBA’s achievements without 
deconstructing the origins and dynamics of the contradictions and the social struggles they entail. Such 
an endeavour is necessary in order to tease reveal some of the hidden or understated implications of 
his approach to the contested project of building ‘Socialism in the 21st century’. 
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“…should not suggest that there are no power asymmetries, i.e. that 
both [the Council of Presidents and Council of Social Movements] 
necessarily have the same decision-making power… [rather] 
constituted power derived from representative democratic mechanisms 
(Council of Presidents) is complemented by constituent power 
grounded in the direct democratic structure of the Council of Social 
Movements” (Muhr, 2011a: 109).  
As the nuance of Muhr’s analysis demonstrates, the construction of ALBA is not an 
uncomplicated affair. The Bolivarian regional project remains marked by power 
asymmetries and social struggles, which ultimately reveal the contradictory unity of 
‘push and pull’ factors whereby, “the prevailing historical structure may be reproduced 
in some respects, [but] it is also resisted and transformed as an alternative 
configuration of forces – a rival structure” that responds to specific social 
contradictions that must be resolved in one manner or another (Muhr, 2013). Such 
considerations lead Muhr to the conclusion that: 
“resistance in the form of the construction of a counter-structure within 
the framework for action, and the multiple forces, dimensions and 
levels that compose it, can never be at once, full-scale, as if occurring 
in a ‘vacuum’… Rather, certain forces will have to be challenged at 
certain points in time, which makes structural transformation not only 
a lengthy and gradual process, but also one that contains inevitable 
trade-offs and potential contradictions” (Muhr, 2010b: 39).  
In the case of Venezuela, as the organic nucleus of the ALBA project, these 
contradictions are most fully visible in the nature of its productive base and its 
institutional consequences, as it is “tightly integrated in hegemonic globalisation 
through its membership in the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) (which however is also used as a counter-hegemonic tool) and the monopoly 
rent extraction from oil exports” (Muhr, 2011a: 7). And yet, as Muhr goes on to state, 
his purpose “is not to explore such contradictions at great length” (ibid). This 
ultimately signals the inherent limit of Muhr’s otherwise valuable analysis. For we 
cannot truly understand the social origins of these contradictions – e.g., the 
asymmetrical decision-making power between the Council of Presidents and the 
Council of Social Movements, or the continuing power of resource extraction and oil 
rent circulation – and thus the very nature, scope (and potential) of ALBA’s 
achievements without deconstructing the origins and dynamics of the contradictions 
and social struggles they entail. Such an endeavour is necessary in order to reveal some 
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of the hidden or understated implications of his approach to the contested project of 
building ‘Socialism in the 21st century’. 
 
1.4 Beyond the State of the Art of ALBA Studies: Problem-Solving From Below 
Ultimately, both the state-centric and neo-Gramscian approaches to ALBA fail to 
uncover the contradictory determinations of socio-political power between actors and 
groups, and the attendant effects emerging from these inter- and intra-group conflicts. 
For the more dominant branch of ALBA studies, this is perhaps expected, given that 
‘the state’ remains a black box within which we have no insight into the nature of 
social agents, nor to their repertoires of political power. It is from this limit point that 
Muhr’s richer critical theory approach extends the insights of state-centred 
perspectives by highlighting not only the role of the ‘state-in-revolution’ (as an organic 
combination of social forces constituting a new, radical form of state and law), but 
also the various spatial scales across which we find the substantially autonomous 
organisation of civil society actors within the ‘organized society’ concept. However, 
even here we encounter a specific limit point that is encapsulated through two 
occlusions. Firstly, concrete class dynamics are absent from Muhr’s portrayal of the 
ALBA space. This is not to deny the inherently classed-based discourse of Muhr’s 
neo-Gramscian framework, which devotes some space to discussions of class 
formation (Muhr, 2011a: 39-41). However, these considerations never make any 
critical impact upon the concrete empirical referents of Muhr’s analysis. As a result, 
the social forces within the Bolivarian project (both nationally and regionally) are 
lumped under the rubric of ‘revolutionary class’ (ibid: 82-3), without enquiring into 
the internal composition of (and possible fractures within) this class.  
The second occlusion, which actually explains the first, is Muhr’s resistance to 
examining the real efficacy of political processes. In a recent publication on the 
emancipatory potential of South-South cooperation, Muhr in fact turns this tendency 
into an explicit virtue. In critiquing approaches that interrogate the concrete 
consequences of social agency involved in South-South geopolitics, Muhr simply 
retorts that such analysis “sweepingly discredits governments (and/or sectors thereof) 
that actually may seek a transformation of the global power geographies towards a 
more democratic, multi-polar world order, against the (historical) structural 
constraints within which they are operating” (Muhr, 2016: 631-2). This therefore 
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reflects the tendency in Muhr’s work to adopt a more interpretivist viewpoint that takes 
the legal proclamations and discursive components of the Bolivarian project as 
autonomous determinants that somehow provide a positive valence to our 
understanding of the politics of ALBA. Though I fully agree with Muhr on the 
constitutive nature of discourse, the entire point of critical theory, which seems to be 
absent in his analysis here, is to critically explain why the intellectual content, or 
intention, of actors often diverges so radically from the social consequences these 
intentions generate.  
In my view, this discursive/interpretivist streak is primarily due to Muhr’s 
overtly normative commitment to the Bolivarian project, as well as a slightly 
ambiguous interpretation of Cox’s core principle. As he writes:  
“my analysis… is less concerned with a problem-solving evaluation of 
the effectiveness with which policies are operationalised. Rather, as a 
kind of ‘moral evaluation’ in solidarity with the revolutionary process 
and their actors [my work] aims to contribute to the ‘battle of ideas’ by 
demonstrating that there is an alternative to the neoliberal dogma” 
(Muhr, 2011a: 8, emphasis in original).  
The above clearly references Cox’s famous distinction between “problem-solving” 
and “critical” approaches to IR theory (Cox, 1981), in which the former refers to the 
analysis of ‘perennial’ regularities that require no critical deconstruction or 
historicisation, whereas the latter seeks to reveal the social forces and transformative 
processes that go into the making of historical orders. Indeed, it is precisely upon 
Cox’s critique of ‘value-neutral’ observations in problem-solving theory that Muhr 
rests so heavily his “moral evaluation”. Yet Cox did not simply rule out ‘problem-
solving’ theory tout court; rather:  
“Regularities in human activities may indeed be observed within 
particular eras, and thus the positivist approach can be fruitful within 
defined historical limits, though not with the universal pretensions it 
aspires to. The research program of historicism is to reveal the historical 
structures characteristic of particular eras within which such 
regularities prevail” (Cox, 1986: 244). 
So long as the “universal pretensions” of problem-solving theory are jettisoned, it 
becomes possible for critical approaches to sufficiently grapple with precisely those 
aspects earlier highlighted by Muhr, in which “the prevailing historical structure may 
be reproduced in some respects”, and thus come out the other side with a “critical 
problem-solving theory”, which “relates directly to real-world problems but 
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approaches them from the perspective of the underdog” (Brown, 2013: 483; see also 
Andrews, 2013; Sinclair, 2016). Hence, contra Muhr, without a sufficient focus on 
real-world problems such as the effectiveness of specific policies and their concrete 
social consequences we are in danger of slipping from “moral evaluation” to 
monotonic evaluation.  
In moving towards a more ‘critical problem-solving’ approach to the formation 
and function of ALBA, the thesis does not seek to necessarily reject or overturn the 
state-led or neo-Coxian approaches – for each in their own bounded framework 
highlight a concrete dimension to this regional space. Rather, the aim here is to 
cumulatively build upon, and critically extend, the limits inherent in each perspective. 
In reference to the limits of Muhr’s analysis, the focus here will concentrate more 
heavily upon the uneven structures of power and decision making between specific 
agents, institutions and spatialities, and the ways in which these asymmetries emerge 
from particular class relations. Such theoretical commitments, which in my view 
constitutes a distinctly Marxist sociological approach to ALBA, are quite limited 
within the range of ALBA studies and therefore constitute a potentially valuable route 
to critically analysing its developmental patterns. As Regueiro Bello points out, “the 
pattern of accumulation defines the nature of integration processes” (2008: 293; see 
also Seabra 2013; Katz, 2006: 70-4). Yet as is often the case, these studies offer scant 
empirical data, let alone on the ground insights that might help to reveal how these 
conceptual parameters play out. The thesis therefore shares the theoretical 
commitments of these Marxian analyses with respect to the transformation of ALBA’s 
political economy and its relations of production and exchange, yet grounds them 
within a quantitative and qualitative framework. Only through this type of empirically 
informed class analysis will it be possible to delineate the social and geopolitical 
tensions contained within ALBA’s model of alternative development. 
 
1.5 Methodology: Poulantzas in Venezuela 
This thesis is primarily a work of historical materialism, broadly defined. As 
previously stated, it rests heavily upon the work of Nicos Poulantzas’ theory of the 
capitalist state, but the analysis certainly cannot stop at this limit. As the thesis 
proceeds, other insights will be introduced as a matter of necessity in order to bring 
the heterogeneous sets of data into alignment. Yet suturing all of this together will be 
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the basic methodological commitments of a Marxist research programme. In this way, 
the fundamental methodological approach is not one based around the principles of 
pure induction or deduction, but rather informed by Imre Lakatos’ notion of a 
theoretical ‘hard core’ – a set of theoretical postulates that are protected from 
anomalous sets of data by progressively incorporating new postulates into the 
“protective belt” surrounding (and guarding) the hard core of the research program. 
This “positive heuristic” method, as Lakatos called it, “sets out a programme which 
lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality” (Lakatos, 1989: 50). 
But what exactly is the hard core of the Marxist research programme? 
 
1.5.1 Historical Materialism’s ‘Hard Core’ and the Question of ‘the Political’ 
In analysing the work of the Leon Trotsky, Michael Burawoy writes that historical 
materialism’s ‘hard core’, or as he calls it “the Marxist problem-solving machinery”, 
revolves around the idea that “history is the history of class struggle” (Burawoy, 2009: 
177). A few pages earlier, Burawoy notes that, beyond the prism of social classes and 
their periodic conflicts, Trotsky took fully on board one of Marx’s most concise 
statements on the hard core of the historical materialist approach, which points towards 
the contradictory interaction between the forces and relations of production, or 
between the near-continuous development of the tools wielded by social agents in the 
process of production, and the socio-institutional structures (of which “class” is 
primary) that undergird the socio-political power of agents. Burawoy also suggests 
that “[t]his is obviously not the only way of constructing the hard core of a Marxist 
research program” (Burawoy, 2009: 174). And this is indeed true, for the “long 
twentieth century” of Marxian theory has seen an enormous expansion in critical 
approaches to history and society, from the classical theories of imperialism to the 
theorisation of gendered and racialized forms of oppression (see Bidet and Kouvelakis, 
2009).  
In contrast, I intend to pursue a more nuanced understanding with respect to 
the materiality of the political, in so far as the matrix of social relations constitutive of 
a social formation cannot be adequately captured without recourse to uncovering the 
co-constitutive relations between the political and the economic under capitalism. By 
invoking this co-constitution, I do not intent to re-posit the structural separation of ‘the 
economy’ from the ‘political state’. Rather, it is to recognise that capitalist relations 
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of production, based as they are on exploitation and domination, are inextricably 
bound up with struggles for political power. In this way, to “reveal the political face 
of the economy”, as Wood (1995: 20) puts it, becomes possible only through revealing 
the economic face of the state. With respect to this latter move, I argue that state power 
is not simply a pristine realm of political power – the great Leviathan whose monopoly 
of force permits orderly relations in civil society. Rather, state power is grounded 
within a specific political technology that encapsulates the ways in which certain 
technical, managerial and bureaucratic state practices constitute the production of 
knowledge/power in bourgeois society and hence the concrete management of the 
social formation itself. There is, then, a certain economy of force that guides the micro-
foundational aspects of state power, the consequence of which is the reproduction of 
the capitalist class’s political force within the economy.  
The real upshot of this reading, then, is to complicate our understandings of 
where ‘the state’ begins and ends and, in the process, opens up a more fluid and 
processual understanding of how sovereignty comes to be constituted. The central 
coordinates under consideration throughout the thesis, namely rights, territory and 
sovereignty – as they apply to both the politics of space within the ALBA, as well as 
the spaces of agrarian struggle constituting the terrain of food sovereignty – are thus 
inherently sites of political struggle (even if they are articulated by ‘economic’ 
struggles). As a result, this type of methodological commitment offers a different take 
on the ‘hard core’ of a Marxist research program by focusing on the co-constituted 
nature of the economic and political ‘moments’ in order to reveal the immanent 
contradictions inherent within a social formation like ALBA, which is self-
consciously attempting to move beyond the bourgeois notions of ‘economy’ and 
‘sovereignty’. By bringing in Poulantzas’ critique of the capitalist state, the struggle 
for food sovereignty within ALBA (and especially with respect to untangling 
convergent and divergent agential strategies within the Venezuelan example) provides 
a key theoretical register that helps clarify the surface nomenclature of ‘liberal-
capitalist’ or ‘post-liberal/socialist’ societies by grounding our critique within the class 
nature of the state, as well as the condensation of political power within the ‘economic’ 
realm.  
Yet even this ‘hard core’ of the research program does not lend itself to a 
general theory of the state. Instead, Poulantzas carries forth the classical ‘hard core’ 
of the Marxist research program with a general theory of modes of production, which 
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allows for a generalised theoretical exposition on the nature and function of the 
capitalist state. And yet, Poulantzas further specifies that, like that of the state in 
general, there can be no general theory of a transition between different types of states 
– even a transition from a capitalist to a socialist state. The reason for this apparent 
non-correspondence between the generalisability of the theory of capitalist states and 
that of its transition towards a socialist one is that the theoretical elements comprising 
a theory of the capitalist state can only ever be “applied theoretical-strategic notions” 
(Poulantzas, 2014: 22), and thus enjoying an entirely different status under an enquiry 
into a state-in-transition. This is ultimately due to the fact that the very motor of this 
transition is given by the raw creativity animating the process itself: the vital 
compulsion to create anew the ordering principles of society, which itself can never 
be captured entirely by a theory that explains its previous form. As Poulantzas argues: 
“one cannot ask any theory, however scientific it may be, to give more than it 
possesses – not even Marxism, which remains a genuine theory of action. There is 
always a structural distance between theory and practice, between theory and the real” 
(ibid). It is for this reason that the struggle for food sovereignty in ALBA and its study 
is supplemented through the use of field-work based methods (specifically the use of 
semi-structured interviews) in order to allow the real-world praxis of actors involved 
in this struggle to articulate and enrich the ‘hard core’ of the research program offered 
here. All such interviews were conducted in Spanish, while those participants whose 
full name is revealed opted to waver their anonymity.  
 
1.5.2 Interview Methodologies: Battling Gatekeepers, Chasing Leads 
Interviewing techniques, as Rathbun (2008) tells us, are often met with scepticism 
among political scientists. Any analysis informed by the two dominant wings of 
political science (behaviouralism and rationalism) would, of course, naturally find this 
type of methodology somewhat disdainful given that the very act of interviewing 
reveals a certain assumption about the social world: namely, that agents possess the 
ability to alter the course (and logic) of social processes. Thus, given that both 
rationalism (resting on deduction of theoretical claims that are then located in the 
empirical world) and behaviouralism (in which the empirical landscape provides the 
raw material for the induction of theoretical premises) are fundamentally based on 
structured repetition and regularity, there can be no real allowance for the place of 
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subjectively constituted data (interview testimonies) into the explanatory fold (cf. Hay, 
2002: 53-4).  
 And yet, as Rathbun contends, “Interviewing, despite its flaws, is often the best 
tool for establishing how subjective factors influence decision-making, the 
motivations of those involved, and the role of agency in events of interest” (Rathbun, 
2008: 686). At the same time, interviewing can provide insights not only into the 
specific agency of participants but also the structural contexts in which they operate. 
Thus:  
“Strategic circumstances might be found by a model to provide the best 
account for particular action, but are only empirically useful if the 
model reflects more or less the actual circumstances that decision-
makers found themselves in. Interviewing is one, although certainly not 
the only, way of identifying that situation” (ibid: 691). 
However, it should certainly not be forgotten that there are specific weaknesses (or 
flaws) pertaining to the interview technique. One can never know, for instance, of the 
validity or veracity of a participant’s testimony, or if it amounts to a true representation 
of the opinions within the wider group to which the agent belongs. However, if such 
drawbacks are taken sufficiently into account, it is possible to avoid the negative 
consequences of these weaknesses through appropriate counter measures.  
 Firstly, the researcher must vigilantly compare and contrast the content of the 
participant’s testimony against the known facts of a particular issue or case. This can 
be achieved easily enough, provided that the facts of the case are effectively available 
(i.e., that the testimony is not referring to something that is completely unverifiable). 
Secondly, one must understand the specific ‘field’ into which one is entering in order 
to ascertain the ‘sufficient’ number of interview samples (Seidman, 2006: 54-5). In 
this case, there are two fields of research: the Latin American University Institute of 
Agroecology ‘Paulo Freire’ (IALA), and the ALBA-Arroz network of rice producing 
factories. These two sites were chosen as a means of connecting the two ‘ends’ of food 
sovereignty: small-scale agroecology and large-scale industrial processing. Yet each 
field carries with it its own specific composition of key actors. For the former, it is 
peasants and small farmers, peasant-teachers, students and university management; 
while for the latter we have the workforce as such, comprised of various grades of 
workers, mid-level managers, administrators, factory presidents, as well as those at 
the highest ministerial level under which these factories are institutionally subsumed. 
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In each case, interviewees were sampled across each of these positionalities as much 
as possible.  
 Nevertheless, there are certain limits to the interview samples presented in this 
thesis, which must be fully accounted for. With respect to the IALA field site, there is 
a woeful lack of female participants. Although the original research plan intended to 
interview female students in order to gain insight into the highly gendered terrain of 
peasant life, several attempts to arrange interviews with them never materialised. 
Some of this can be put down to the contingent clash of personal schedules, and partly 
to the restricted time frame spent among the school (10 days).7 Indeed, the intention 
was always to return to IALA for follow up investigations, yet due to research 
contingencies, this was never made possible. Nevertheless, as other interview data 
from peasant movement leaders demonstrates, the issue of women’s rights in the 
countryside and the aspect of gendered structures of power represent major fault lines 
within the struggle for food sovereignty. Thus, the IALA sample is limited by this 
lacuna.  
 In terms of the ALBA-Arroz site, the major absence is at the factory-
presidential level and the ministerial level. Yet these limits each have their own story, 
which actually helps to colour the overall quality of the research problem. Gaining 
access to the spaces of production within Venezuela that were formed under the ALBA 
agreement (i.e., the Empresas Mixtas Socialistas del ALBA) was by far the most 
challenging aspect of the entire research process. Having encountered great difficulties 
in accessing personnel at the ALBA factories, it was only by chance that workers at 
ALBA-Arroz had taken the factories under occupation, and ejecting the high 
managerial strata. Thus, all interviews at these research sites are within the workforce 
proper (though some of these workers are charged with coordinator-type roles). 
Taking stock of the difficulties faced during fieldwork in Venezuela provides much 
insight into the nature of bureaucratic structures and the problem of ‘state secrets’ 
when attempting to access state-run research sites. Additionally, the very fact that the 
workers were perfectly happy to allow me access to their factories also indicates a 
very real divide between the worker and managerial segments, which was revealed by 
																																								 																				
7 Though upon reflection, other factors come into play. Firstly, the female portion of the student body 
is only 40% of the male population. Additionally, when I initially met with the administration of the 
school, it was the faculty that chose which ‘key’ students to introduce me to, whom they thought would 
be suitable initial interlocutors, perhaps based on their knowledge or amicability. All of these 
interlocutors were also male. 
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the differential access offered by these two groups. This divide will be further analysed 
and reflected upon throughout the thesis.  
 
1.6 Thesis Outline 
Having reviewed the relevant ALBA literature in this Introduction, Chapter 2 will seek 
to unravel the basic parameters of ‘food sovereignty’ (FS) in both its academic and 
activist guises. This alone poses a considerable challenge, given the enormous scope 
of FS literature and the many projects and practices that constitutes its everyday 
politics. As such, I frame the approach to FS through three inter-related lenses: rights, 
territory and sovereignty. In doing so, I aim to reveal how we think about these 
dimensions intellectually and politically, as well as posing a series of questions that 
further unpack some of the ambiguities and contradictions found within them. With a 
few exceptions, FS scholarship does not enquire into the specific class basis of 
struggles in the countryside. Yet while I do not offer a comprehensive study of class 
differentiation in the Venezuelan countryside,8 I aim to demonstrate the sociological 
foundation of the Bolivarian state as a specific condensation of class forces, which 
significantly shape the ways in which it attempts to implement its policy goals. From 
this angle, I will show the relative compositions of the active labour force, which 
provides a contextual grounding for explaining the strategic selectivity of state 
policies, and the (sometimes) contradictory outcomes they produce. Thus, by drawing 
upon Poulantzas’ analysis of the capitalist state, as well as a host of more 
contemporary neo-Poulantzian innovations, I offer an analytical frame that is capable 
of explicating the nature and operation of the ALBA regional formation, the 
Venezuelan state, and the relations of power permeating these institutional complexes.  
In Chapter 3, I offer a historical reconstruction of Latin America’s long road 
to regionalism during the post-war period. By and large, Latin America’s early 
experimentation with regional organisation was entirely refracted through the US’s 
																																								 																				
8 There is, in fact, no direct way of measuring class composition in the countryside (short of physically 
studying specific production units, farms or social production companies [see, eg. Kappeler, 2013]). As 
Deere (2017) notes, when viewing land reform in Venezuela, only farm size is indicated (and the 
relative redistribution of holdings among the population), without revealing anything about the type of 
property rights prevailing within any given farm, nor the distribution of power and ownership among 
genders. Of course, the larger the landholding the more easily it can be surmised that wage-labour is 
used as the most necessary labour regime, yet this can only ever be assumed, and thus insufficient to 
draw any concrete conclusions viz. class composition.   
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hegemonic project aimed at stabilising the capitalist bloc of the world system, 
embodied primarily through regional communities. Each development drive, from 
modernization to neoliberalism, continually produced a series of social ruptures and 
cycles of struggle that laid the ground work for the emergence of Latin America’s new 
left at the cusp of the 21st century. Yet even this geopolitical re-alignment possessed 
its own internal divisions, from the relative divergence of development goals between 
MERCOSUR and ALBA, to the contradictions inside the ALBA bloc itself with 
respect to its material basis of resource extraction.  
Chapter 4 thus seeks to better understand these contradictions within ALBA, 
by presenting a comprehensive analysis of its articles of agreement with respect to the 
role of social movements throughout the regional institution, and to the specific 
political economy embedded within ALBA’s ‘Grandnational Concept’. As I show 
through a documentary and empirical reconstruction, the role of the sovereign state – 
in both its relationship to the ‘transnational organised society’, as well as its approach 
to political economic development – maintains an overarching presence, invested in 
both juridical and material terms. The underlying politics of food sovereignty in the 
ALBA space therefore appear in a radical discourse and philosophy converging 
around issues of the ‘social economy’, yet overdetermined by state power. 
Lest we fall into the trap of fetishising ‘statism’, it is important to reveal the 
concrete strategies, discourses and modes of knowledge among social forces from 
below. Chapter 5 builds upon this premise by analysing the emergence and dynamics 
of peasant movements in Venezuela, which struggle at both the national and regional 
(transnational) levels. Additionally, we will closely examine the work and praxis of 
the IALA School for Agroecology, which represents a key site of transnational 
organisation, counter-hegemonic knowledge production and the extension of popular 
pedagogical networks throughout the community. For both peasant movement actors 
and those in the IALA institution, the struggle for rights and territory is as much about 
radical education as it is about law and land; the struggle over the formation of a new 
‘common sense’ is also a material struggle.  
Chapter 6 seeks to situate the struggle for food sovereignty at the other end of the 
production chain, in the form of industrial processing. Through an analysis made up 
primarily of participant interview data, I show how the shadow of statism continues to 
dominate the production of food within the ALBA-Arroz rice-producing factories. The 
workforce exhibits both a strong level of intra-group solidarity, as well as a number of 
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divergences of outlook. For the former, the values of Bolivarianismo, deep 
commitments to the ‘social economy’, and a shared hostility to bureaucratic structures 
all shine through. For the latter, most low-level workers had little faith in the current 
government to extricate itself out of its current morose. The outcome of the workers’ 
struggle is also revealing with respect to the specific factory regime prevailing in 
ALBA-Arroz, as well as the concomitant politics of production that are shaped by it.  
The thesis then offers a conclusion for the above findings, incorporating 
theoretical insights and empirical data that offer new contributions to both the 
Poulantzian state theory approach as well as the politics of food sovereignty in the 
ALBA regional space.  
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2 Rights, Territory, and Sovereignty: 
Rethinking Peasant Politics Today 
This chapter will lay out the theoretical contours that will inform the remainder of the 
thesis. It specifically looks at the philosophy and practice of Food Sovereignty (FS), 
in order to understand the motivations, challenges and strategies of the main 
protagonists involved in this struggle. It will focus on three main coordinates – rights, 
territory and sovereignty – and attempt to reveal the ways in which FS protagonists 
understand and mobilise these categories in their strategies and discourse. The second 
section of the Chapter will then turn to the work of Nicos Poulantzas, particularly his 
analysis in State, Power, Socialism, as well as Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational approach’, 
as a means of refining the parameters at stake in thinking through socio-spatial 
transformation. The insights taken from this neo-Poulantzian approach will shed 
critical light upon the variegated sources of power against which FS actors struggle. 
 
2.1 Unravelling Food Sovereignty: A Critical Approach to ‘the Peasant Way’ 
So why rights, territory and sovereignty? After all, this is a somewhat arbitrary choice, 
as these elements by no means exhaust the various dimensions and topics relevant to 
food sovereignty struggles around the world. Yet precisely because of this reason, a 
choice must be made. As Henry Bernstein notes in his 34-page review of the FS 
literature:  
“Trying to assess the claims of FS, both analytical and evidential… 
presents certain difficulties. First is the sheer quantum of the literature 
generated by FS, magnified by the internet sites of the many 
organizations committed to it… Second, the FS literature encompasses 
versions of virtually all processes and patterns of agrarian change in the 
world today, sweeping up many diverse dynamics and struggles into its 
overarching framework of the vicious and the virtuous” (Bernstein, 
2014: 1032). 
In this face of these difficulties, I have chosen the above coordinates in order to bring 
out what I believe to be three of the most common and crucial parameters of the FS 
philosophy and activism. More importantly, perhaps, and as I hope to demonstrate 
throughout the entirety of this Chapter, we need to think about what rights, territory 
and sovereignty means, not simply in the minds of peasants (though these are also 
vitally important), but in terms of how certain practices and forms of power have given 
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these terms specific social content and, ultimately, discursive hegemony throughout 
history. This approach will then offer up some deeper lines of enquiry into how we 
can theoretically deconstruct the nature of capitalist power (and capitalist state power) 
in the contemporary world, and what this tells us about the unique nature of state 
power and the struggle for 21st century socialism today.  
 Before this exploration, it is important to specify precisely what is meant by 
the term ‘peasant’ or ‘peasantry’, a term that has taken on myriad interpretations over 
the years (Edelman, 2013). For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I define ‘peasants’ 
as all those who reproduce themselves through direct relations to land and soil as a 
key medium in their productive activities. As a corollary, those actors not directly 
involved in the metabolic process of agrarian production – be it supervisors, technical 
experts, industrial workers, or strictly owners of land/capital– do not come under the 
definition of ‘peasantry’, despite the agrarian roots of their specific work tasks or 
owned assets. Such a definition is necessarily broad, particularly given the blurred 
lines between peasant producers who are often (to varying degrees) wage-workers on 
others’ land. Reference to connections with the land and soil must also pertain to 
landless peasants as those who closely identify with rural life yet have been denied 
access to land, groups that are often at the forefront of food sovereignty struggles 
(Borras Jr., 2008: 275). This definition thus allows us to view a wide variety of actors, 
unit-sizes and production relations through a common, socio-ecological lens. In other 
words, whether producing for themselves or for others, peasants necessarily work the 
land and identify with it as the material basis of life.  
 
2.1.1 The Problem of Liberal Rights: Negotiating the Positive/Negative Conundrum 
In many ways, the contestation over the nature and content of rights has been the key 
to food sovereignty’s philosophy and practice (Patel et al., 2007; Wittman, 2011; 
Peschard, 2014; Claeys, 2015; Dunford, 2015). The types of rights discourses engaged 
with by La Vía Campesina (LVC) have steadily shifted throughout its lifetime. Part of 
this shift is due to the embattled legacy of human rights in the modern world, which 
can be divided between two conceptual poles: economic liberalism, and political 
(sovereign) power. For the former, negative mode of rights, the liberal doctrine of 
private property continuously moves through a series of enclosures, whether through 
monopolisation of private property in land, technological packages, seed varieties and 
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so on (Claeys, 2014: 33-4; cf. Borowiak, 2004; Kloppenburg, 2010). With the latter, 
positive mode of rights, the sovereign state represents the author and guarantor of 
particular rights for given groups. The much earlier call for ‘food security’ during the 
first food crisis of the 1970s (Mechlem, 2004) was a prime example of the state’s 
positive role in society. Nevertheless, the enjoyment of public goods through state 
provision does not necessarily enhance autonomy or empowerment – rather, it tends 
towards dependence on, and subsumption under, sovereign power (Claeys, 2015).  
These two dimensions of modern rights discourse (economic liberalism and 
state-sovereignty) represented a relative barrier to the first phase of LVC’s existence. 
During their initial engagement in negotiations through international forums – 
particularly the various food-related organs of the United Nations (UN) – LVC framed 
its rights discourse through the ‘right of nations’ to protect their food systems and to 
choose their ways of agricultural life in line with the concept of (sovereign) self-
determination (FAO, 1996). However, with little progress made on this front, LVC 
soon switched its rights frame during the mid-2000s towards a discourse emphasising 
the ‘rights of peoples’ to choose and manage their own agrarian practices as it suited 
their local and cultural specificities (Claeys, 2015: 459; LVC, 1996).  
Nevertheless, this move has seen only a partial rejection of the modern notion 
of rights; while the radical invocation of peasant rights summarily reject the capitalist 
‘food regime’ (based upon unequal terms of trade, intellectual property rights and 
ecologically destructive practices), it remains relatively focused on working with(in) 
(and sometimes against) the sovereign state in an effort to complement, strengthen and 
even protect new forms of agrarian organisation and self-determination. As Trauger 
(2014: 1139) argues, any appeal or engagement with the liberal state is inherently 
“paradoxical”, given that “capitalism and liberal states have been mutually constituted 
in the project of modernity”. However, this view tends to bracket the possibility that 
peasant struggles can be both in and against the state (cf. McMichael, 2008: 225; 
Akram-Lodhi, 2015: 573), and that such struggles are the direct reflection of the fact 
that state forms are socially and historically constructed. Just as the liberal, capitalist 
state was the product of class struggles and political projects of historically situated 
actors, so too will the struggle for food sovereignty entail the radical restructuring of 
the state and its legal, institutional and political relations.  
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Rights to What, and by Whom? 
Even with the LVC’s shift of discourse from the ‘rights of nations’ to the ‘rights of 
peoples’, the emphasis was always clearly within the positive rights domain, at least 
in terms of extending such rights beyond the narrow realm of the private market. And 
yet, it is only with the latter conceptualisation – ‘rights of peoples’ – that the positive 
rights domain begins to internalise a seemingly irrevocable split. On one hand, the 
core substance of LVC’s rights claims speaks to the inherently democratic nature of 
socio-economic production, which includes the decisions taken over the method and 
execution of specific productive practices, as well as the wider systems through which 
these practices link up into larger networks of intermediate production and distribution 
(see LVC, 2007). In essence, these strategic powers are invested in those who occupy 
the land, and are thus invested with geographically specific “bundles of powers” to 
dispose of the material conditions of social (re)production (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).  
At a certain level, therefore, the realisation of self-management on the land, 
and the networks and systems linking up agrarian spaces, must come from the self-
directed struggles among those embedded within such spaces. Social emancipation 
must, to a certain degree (perhaps a substantial degree), come in the form of self-
emancipation (cf. Claeys, 2012). On the other hand, the social substance of these rights 
does not necessarily dispose these agents with the requisite power to actually bring 
about their political realisation. This problem may present itself as a question between 
legal convention and facts on the ground – i.e., between de jure agency, and de facto 
agency.9 In other words, it sometimes appears as if de facto agency can only ever 
become substantial in the presence of its de jure recognition. For instance, Fox notes 
the analytically distinct yet related aspects of ‘rights’ and ‘empowerment’ (see Figure 
2). Their substantial relationship in terms of social change, according to Fox, is 
determined by the degree to which ‘empowerment’ (de facto agency) is concretised 
by ‘nominal rights’ (de jure agency). Thus, “empowerment can make nominal rights 
meaningful, and nominal rights can make empowerment possible” (Fox, 2007: 335). 
Yet there is an inherent ambiguity in this argument, one that is indeed 
recognised by Fox: “Formal institutions can help to establish rights that challenge 
																																								 																				
9 To clarify this distinction, I am speaking of certain forms of agency that are legitimately prescribed 
(de jure) – articulated within the normative frame of reference within society, which in the modern 
context emerges from the juridical state – in contrast to agency that is materially realised (de facto) – 
irrespective of whether this agency is recognised by traditional sources of social power or not.  
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Figure 2: The reciprocal interaction between rights and empowerment. 
Source: Fox, 2007: 336. 
 
 informal power relations, while those informal structures can also undermine formal 
institutions” (ibid). What are we to make of these ‘informal’ power relations? At one 
remove, it might seem as if these informal power relations sit somewhere outside the 
formal structure of the state and law; hence their capacity to undermine nominal rights, 
by virtue of escaping their reach. However, we must understand the relatively 
superficial image this reading gives us, for approaching the problem in this way is to 
assume that the state is nothing other than an aggregation of formal, abstract rules.10 
Power relations as such cannot be reduced to a division between formality and 
informality – for ‘informal’ powers may well be materially inscribed into the formal 
institutions that, in many cases, make these informal powers so effective. Thus, every 
transformative, even revolutionary, moment is structured by the prevailing division of 
powers between agents, powers that are not exhausted by the legal (and thus rights-
allocating) domain.  
All of this serves to illustrate the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ involved in transforming 
societies towards the principles of food sovereignty, as well as their complex inter-
relations. For if food sovereignty is “one of increasing social and environmental 
																																								 																				
10 An illusion to which much of contemporary liberal jurisprudence has become enamoured, amounting 
to a mere “accountancy of rules” (Douzinas, 2000: 374). 
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even revolutionary, moment is structured by the prevailing division of powers between agents, powers 
that are not exhausted by the legal (and thus rights-allocating) domain.  
All of this serves to illustrate the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ involved in transforming societies towards 
the principles of food sovereignty, as well as their complex inter-relations. For if food sovereignty is 
“one of increasing social and environmental benefits and a more equitable distribution of resources and 
political power in the food system” (Holt-Giménez and Shattuck, 2010: 87), then we are immediately 
moving beyond purely formal questions about rights, and instead towards a specific set of social 
relations. This consideration of ‘relations’ refers to more than simply the relationship between those 
imbued with the power to dispose of rights, and those who become th  bearers of such rights, which 
in the mode n form of law r fers to state-society relations (cf. Finer, 1997: 1298-9). Rather, the notion 
of ‘relations’, in relativ  distinc ion to ‘ ights’, fers to the social context in which a ents dispute and 
struggle over the distributional enjoyment of property, whereas a ‘right’ to this property denotes 
merely the formally validated relationship of the agent to the specific objec  i  question. This is not 
simply an abstract observation; it is in fact instructive to note that dir ctly aft r outlining the three 
objects of rights (land, systems, food), the Nyéléni Declaration states that a transformative realisation 
of these rights “implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality” (LVC, 2007). 
336 Unpacking Accountability Politics
Rights 
Empowerment
Formal institutions
Informal institutions
Figure 11.1. The reciprocal interaction between rights and empowerment
whose enforcement remains politically contingent rather than institu-
tionally guaranteed. While social mobilization may lead to negotiation
and sometimes extracts concessions from the state, rights—defined in
terms of enforceable claims—remain few and far between.
‘Low Accountability Traps’ Are Persistent and Reinforced
by Decentralization
One of the most powerful mechanisms for perpetuating political exclu-
sion after national regime transitions is the mutual reinforc m nt
between flawed elections and weak public oversight agencies, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. This interdependence between vertical and hor-
izontal accountabilities rose to the top of Mexico’s national political
agenda following the 2006 presidential elections, when the federal
election administration agency and electoral court exercised their legal
authority to determine which contested votes counted, and which
should be recounted. Yet these agencies were designed with a bounded
mand e, to address the c sting and counting f v te . T is me ns that
even if the electoral court had allowed a full recount, many of the most
important patterns of political exclusion would not have emerged. This
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benefits and a more equitable distribution of resources and political power in the food 
system” (Holt-Giménez and Shattuck, 2010: 87), then we are immediately moving 
beyond purely formal questions about rights, and instead towards a specific set of 
social relations. This consideration of ‘relations’ refers to more than simply the 
relationship between those imbued with the power to dispose of rights, and those who 
become the bearers of such rights, which in the modern form of law refers to state-
society relations (cf. Finer, 1997: 1298-9). Rather, the notion of ‘relations’, in relative 
distinction to ‘rights’, refers to the social context in which agents dispute and struggle 
over the distributional enjoyment of property, whereas a ‘right’ to this property 
denotes merely the formally validated relationship of the agent to the specific object 
in question. This is not simply an abstract observation; as LVC’s Nyéléni Declaration 
states, the transformative realisation of these rights “implies new social relations free 
of oppression and inequality” (LVC, 2007). 
 These considerations therefore require a more concerted emphasis on the 
material locus of rights, particularly with respect to the specific rights invoked by FS 
actors, and LVC in particular. For in relation to the contradiction noted immediately 
above:  
“Vía Campesina’s conception of a right… is one that is explicitly 
without content – the right is a right to self-determination, for 
communities to redefine for themselves the substance of the food 
relations appropriate to their geographies. This is a contradictory 
understanding of rights – where the state remains a guarantor of the 
rights, but where it plays no role in the authorship of these rights” (Patel 
and McMichael, 2004: 249, emphasis added). 
This contradiction goes to the heart of what Bentham described as a difference 
between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ rights, in which the latter refers merely to rights that 
are invoked without the requisite author and guarantor of such duties. Thus, LVC’s 
philosophy amounts to “a call for a right to a right” (Patel et al., 2007: 91), without 
specifying the ways in which the material foundations of everyday rights become 
instantiated (cf. Patel, 2009: 669). And yet, while the above considerations on the 
relative absence of the social content of rights discourses characteristic of FS struggles 
remains pertinent, it is not entirely accurate to say that the rights claims made by rural 
actors are entirely without material foundation. We will therefore explore one of the 
key socio-spatial categories that crucially inform a significant portion of FS discourse.  
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2.1.2 Value(s) of Territory: Contested Practices (and Perceptions) on the Land 
The preceding problematic opens up a series of related questions concerning the 
intersections between rights and territory. Such a problematic was noted early on by 
Raj Patel, who brought attention to some of the unspoken ambiguities in the FS 
literature/movement: 
“To demand a space of food sovereignty is to demand specific 
arrangements to govern territory and space. At the end of the day, the 
power of rights-talk is that rights imply a particular burden on a 
specified entity – the state. In blowing apart the notion that the state has 
a paramount authority, by pointing to the multivalent hierarchies of 
power and control that exist within the world food system, food 
sovereignty paradoxically displaces one sovereign, but remains silent 
about the others” (Patel, 2009: 668). 
Though this passage is almost universally quoted among FS scholars, particularly with 
respect to questions concerning ‘multiple sovereignties’ (which we will see below), 
Patel’s query also helps to underscore the fact that when discussing the nature of 
‘rights’ (as in the case of LVC rights framing), we are immediately conjuring up 
notions of territoriality and space. In other words, rights invoke not just subjects but 
places. Nevertheless, ambiguity remains in terms of how FS protagonists attempt to 
carve out (and how FS scholars attempt to understand) new rights discourses and their 
territorial manifestations in a world system overdetermined by the commodification 
of land and territory. 
As Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2015: 441) suggest, “democratic control over land 
and territory responds to capitalism’s regressive processes of ‘territorial 
restructuring’”, which “seeks control over the places and spaces where surplus is 
produced by shaping and controlling the institutions and social relations that govern 
production, extraction and accumulation”. Hence, capital’s tendency to produce a 
series of ‘metabolic rifts’ (Foster, 2000) – through the degradation of the soil, stark 
divisions between town and country, as well as the (often forceful) separation of 
peasants from their means of subsistence – becomes the central dynamic against which 
FS movements position themselves by reclaiming the elements of life that have been 
wrenched from local control by national/transnational capital (cf. Brent, 2015; 
Vergara-Camus, 2014). Araghi (1995) brings attention to the wider, global context of 
capital accumulation that ultimately affects many such instances of qualitatively 
different types of peasant units (differentiated by size, production methods, crops 
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grown, and levels of political integration with state institutions) that for the past 50 
years has resulted in “depeasantisation”. Thus, the marked draining of people from the 
land, resulting in the “global army of migratory labour” (Araghi 2003: 61) has severed 
the organic connection between people and their traditional modes of place-based 
empowerment, in exchange for precarious (or non-existent) work and minimal civic 
rights within sprawling urban centres. 
In addition to the ways in which territory becomes a physical asset over which 
capital and labour struggle for control, the notion of territory gains a wider significance 
for the FS movement. In 2006, during the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)-
sponsored ‘International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development’, a 
parallel paper was drawn up by the various civil society groups that had participated 
in the Conference. The document set out a clear indication of the new vision of 
territory as not simply a material object, but also a specific place in which life and 
communal identity gained its content (see LVC et al., 2006). The struggle, then, 
becomes one of resisting and even overturning the now predominant Anglo-Saxon 
worldview, which “treats land as the passive object of human activity and ignores all 
forms of value that are not easily priced on the market” (Kolers, 2009: 64). In this way, 
LVC conceives of territory as a particular matrix of being that goes beyond the idea 
of mere ‘land’ – as an object of land reform – but rather as a bundle of spatial signifiers 
that connote a sense not just of ownership (as the traditional metric for land reform) 
but also the framework through which the notion of peasant rights, and the 
constellation of territorially specific values that emerge from them, gain traction 
(Grajales, 2010). Thus, “[t]he growing concern for the Mother Earth inside LVC has 
in turn resonated with a questioning of why we want land and territory and how we 
use it; in other words, ‘Land for what?’, or ‘Territory for what?’” (Rosset, 2013: 727). 
 
Territory as Use-Value, Cultural-Value… or Political Technology? 
The above distinction – commonly found within FS literature – between perceptions 
(and indeed material practices) that treat the ecological substratum of agrarian life as 
either ‘land’ (productive asset) or ‘territory’ (cultural space) presents a relative 
challenge to any comprehensive policy of agrarian transformation. Contending 
perceptions and practices on the land can pose certain barriers to effective cross-class 
or cross-cultural organisation within a broad based social movement. Despite the 
ongoing sensitivities bound up with these differences, the LVC has taken concerted 
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steps to unify its discourse among its varied social base. Hence, whether from the 
perspective of peasant production, or indigenous territorial control, the idea of territory 
as more than simply a commodity but also the place of everyday life (and its 
reproduction) has become relatively hegemonic within the LVC.  
 And yet, as with our discussion of FS rights discourse, these struggles over the 
meaning and practice of territory emerge from within a markedly complex field of 
action, which has been laid down by the capitalist state and administered through a 
specific set of territorial practices. Thus, the issue of political technology becomes a 
decisive battleground among various actors who attempt to embed their agency into a 
transformative set of practices, i.e. as a means of affecting change at the societal level. 
I borrow this term from Stuart Elden, who conceives of ‘territory’ as a “political 
technology” that goes beyond the execution of technical calculations (science, 
technology, etc.) and towards “legal systems and arguments, political debates, 
theories, concepts, and practices” (Elden, 2013: 17). Thus, Elden distinguishes 
between “land” as “a relation of property” (containing a political-economic function) 
and “terrain” as “a site of work or battle” (containing a strategic function) (ibid: 9). In 
this way, territory as such is irreducible to either land or terrain but is instead 
constituent of them. In order to give land and terrain their historically specific form, 
these elements are put to work through a distinct set of discourses and material 
practices that congeal into a spatially and temporally particular bundle of political 
technologies. It is within the constitutional architecture – the formal body of laws and 
people-rights (corresponding to what Poulantzas calls the “People-Nation”) – and the 
de facto power of the state to interpret and “stretch” these constitutional articles that 
reveals the intimate relationship between sovereignty and territory that are both 
contained within contemporary political techniques (see Kröger and Lalander, 2016). 
Thus, like the issues concerning rights, the centre of gravity in today’s 
hegemonic pattern of political techniques is undoubtedly the sovereign state, and the 
wider (international) system of ‘like’ states among which it resides. Yet this 
observation is only at the most general level, for sovereignty (and its associated 
techniques) can be deployed through a number of different ways. Sovereign regimes 
can be established upon ‘corporatist’, ‘neoliberal’, or even ‘post-liberal’ lines, all of 
which emerge from the specific ensemble of social forces that give rise to a given 
institutional resolution to the underlying foundation of societal divisions. It is this  
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Figure 3: Post-Liberal Challenges to Liberal Democracy. 
Source: Wolff, 2013: 36. 
 
latter designation, which has come to occupy an increasingly prominent place among 
studies of Latin America’s ‘left turn’, that belies not so much a radical rupture with 
the status quo but rather new political projects that foster hybrid forms of social, 
political and economic practice (Arditi, 2008). For Yashar, the post-liberal turn 
represents “a different kind of political mapping – one that would secure individual 
rights but also accommodate more diverse identities, units of representation, and state 
structure” (Yashar, 1999: 88). This conceptualisation stands in contrast to the 
predominant form of ‘political mapping’ that is consonant with the era of liberal 
modernity, constituted by “economy, individual, instrumental rationality, private 
property, and so forth…” (Escobar, 2010: 12).  
Thus, in terms of conceptualising the set of political technologies bound up 
with the post-liberal turn, we can, following Wolff (2013), conceive of this matrix 
through five inter-related forms: electoral regime, civil rights, political rights, division 
of power/horizontal accountability, effective power to govern (see Figure 3). Taken 
together, these axes of governance also speak to a specific political technology in its 
post-liberal form. ‘Territorially’ speaking (which, as I contend, is the proper register 
for enunciating the language of political technique), we can understand the spatial 
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we have seen, should not be seen in ter s f autonomy qua isolati n, for to do so would to render 
oblique the underlying challenges f cing he project for fo d sovereignty. In this way, “peasants also 
fetishize land, but not necessarily as a source of value. Some peasants understand land rather as a 
source of life itself” (Vergara-Camus, 2014: 171). Thus, as Vergara-Camus alludes, while peasants may 
not view the land as a mere commodity, there is also the potential to perceive agrarian space as a kind 
of pristine ‘place’ in which personal identity, relations to nature and, indeed, production carries on 
within an ambiguous ‘local’ setting that is potentially divorced from the wider sets of social relations in 
which it is embedded (Harvey, 2009: 183; cf. Mohan and Stokke, 2000). 
 What the preceding discussion on the notion of territory seeks to clarify is the way in which 
term signifies something beyond the related notion of ‘land’ and ‘cultural space’, and towards 
pinpointing the fluid relations between place and power (Elden, 2013). More precisely, territorial 
transformations entail significant challeng s towards previously held practices embodied within 
dominant political techniques, and the repositories of (ins itutionalised) social power in which they 
become congealed. Such techniques principally ref r t  the ways in which material objects (be they 
tools, terrains or human bodies) become legible, and thus to the very production of knowledge through 
which legibility becomes inscribed. In the modern, liberal era, these repositories of knowledge/power 
are most visible within image of the sovereign state (see Scott, 1998). And yet, “explicit discussion of 
the politics of making and using knowledge is frequently absent from [FS] movements and academic 
work” (Iles and Montenegro, 2014: 10). Unpacking the ways in which ‘territory’ becomes a bundle of 
political technologies is therefore central not only to the analysis of sovereign state power but also to 
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organiza ions, and rota ion of assignments’ may exempt crucial – especially
local – policy domains from the electoral regime.
(B) Political rights of participation: These, again, are crucial as preconditions
for competitive electio s, but a so c nstr in d. They consist in the right to vote
(in representative elections; see above) as well as in the range of freedoms (of
association, assembly, speech, opinion) that enable the collective formulation
of opinions and demands. At the same time, ‘non-electoral politics’, such as
non-institutional political participation through social movements, do not have
a systematic place in this liberal democratic conception, nor have ‘non-liberal
channels of participation’, such as participatory budgeting, ‘that seek a voice in
the allocation pub c resources rather han in the designation of public
authorities’. Liberal critics have argued against both non-institutional and
Figure . The Analytical Framework: Post-Liberal Challenges to Liberal
Democracy
Source: author’s elaboration, drawing on Wolfgang Merkel, ‘Embedded and Defective
Democracies’, Democratization, :  (), p. , Fig. .
 Escobar, ‘Latin America’, p. . See also Santos, ‘Enriquecer la democracia’, p. .
 Arditi, ‘Arguments about the Left Turns’, p. .
 Ibid., p. . See also Santos, ‘Enriquecer la democracia’, p. .
 Jonas Wolff
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construct of post-liberalism as the enhancement and consolidation of “vertical 
territoriality” (Delaney, 2005: 32-3), which refers to the multiplicity of territorial 
spaces constitutive of a ‘national’ territory, most commonly seen within federal 
regimes. However, in contrast to federal systems, in which the constituent federal 
territories are substantially overdetermined by the effective hegemony of the 
central/national state, the idea behind the political techniques associated with post-
liberalism point towards the real and material decentralisation of powers traditionally 
confined to society’s power centres. This of course speaks directly, and in a ‘territorial’ 
register, to the notion of ‘peasant rights’ in the discourse of food sovereignty, and thus 
the territorial autonomy embedded with such rights-discourses.  
The preceding discussion on the notion of territory seeks to clarify the way in 
which territory signifies something beyond the related notion of ‘land’ and ‘cultural 
space’, and towards the fluid relations between place and power (Elden, 2013). 
Political technologies principally refer to the ways in which material objects (be they 
tools, terrains or human bodies) become legible, and thus to the very production of 
knowledge through which legibility becomes inscribed. In the modern, liberal era, 
these repositories of knowledge/power are most visible within image of the sovereign 
state (see Scott, 1998). And yet, “explicit discussion of the politics of making and 
using knowledge is frequently absent from [FS] movements and academic work” (Iles 
and Montenegro, 2014: 10). Unpacking the ways in which ‘territory’ becomes a 
bundle of political technologies is therefore central not only to the analysis of 
sovereign state power but also to the possible pathways towards the material 
transformation of this power. Thus, in taking inspiration from Gramsci’s formula, in 
which “State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by 
the armour of coercion” (Gramsci, 1971: 263), we may understand an historically 
specific form of rights and territory as equating to sovereignty: a representational form 
in which the rights of the People-Nation are protected by modern techniques of power. 
 
2.1.3 From Westphalian Sovereignty to Multiple Sovereignties 
As Roman-Alcalá recently noted, the question of, “‘Who is the sovereign within FS?’ 
has emerged as one of the most crucial of the unanswered questions” in both the FS 
literature and the movement itself (Roman-Alcalá, 2016: 1, emphasis in original). 
Despite the complexities of identifying the location of ‘sovereignty’ within the food 
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sovereignty discourse, a deeper understanding of LVC’s approach to agriculture and 
social life helps to reveal the stakes involved in the question over sovereignty as such. 
As argued by one of the leading thinkers on FS, Philip McMichael, “In the discourse 
of capitalist modernity, food is conceived essentially as a commodity – an input to 
enhance accumulation and urban provisioning. Peasant mobilization today conceives 
of food as comprising social, ecological, cultural, and political relationships” 
(McMichael, 2002: 33). The corollary to this broader and deeper understanding of 
agriculture is that political power reverts to those social agents that reside within a 
given location in which agrarian production is ultimately embedded. Through this type 
of political vision, which McMichael dubs the “second modernity” (in contrast to the 
“first modernity” based around the exclusive right of the Westphalian state to both 
dispose of subject-rights and lay claim to national territory), contemporary peasant 
movements are “asserting the right to alternative forms of democratic organization and 
the securing of material well-being through multiple sovereignties based in cultural, 
environmental, and economic sustainability” (ibid: 39). Other authors have alluded to 
this spatial organisation of power in various ways, as either “agrarian citizenship”, or 
“sites of sovereignty” (Wittman, 2011: 92; Roman-Alcalá, 2016: 3). Yet regardless of 
how this political geography is termed, all such definitions revolve around the 
common understanding that the right to occupy space and to administer a given (local) 
territory is given by those who inhabit each individual space, such that the politics of 
space itself transforms into a praxis of direct social participation and power that is 
capable of cascading upwards, throughout “communities, peoples, states and 
international bodies” (LVC, 2007). 
 This form of praxis seen within the LVC has a sharp resonance with Kees van 
der Pijl’s own concept of ‘multiple sovereignties’. As he describes it: 
“Democracy and self-rule must begin locally, in the spheres of 
production and daily life. However, the parliamentary form of debate 
by political representatives of collective interests, accompanied by the 
transparency created by old and new media, would be revitalised if this 
[UN] level of global governance were included” (van der Pijl, 2007: 
201). 
In this way, the ‘scaling up’ of direct democracy (or vertical territoriality) towards the 
highest (UN) level, is given within the concept of multiple sovereignties at the global 
level – i.e., not simply multiple in a horizontal fashion traversing space, but in a 
vertical fashion in which the barrier of space itself (the energy and resources required 
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to traverse long distances) is partially overcome through the formation of group 
representatives that can carry local demands up through the spatial hierarchy of global 
governance. As such, this political form has become increasingly noticeable within 
the international praxis of the LVC.  
 As the 1990s witnessed an ever greater push towards trade liberalisation, 
primarily expressed through international forums such as the World Trade 
Organization (Hoogvelt, 2001), LVC had framed the problem of agriculture in nation-
state terms and, in doing so, had begun to engage with international forums. Since that 
time, LVC has participated in a number of FAO sponsored summits, affected a 
noticeable shift in the language and norms deployed in forums like the FAO and other 
UN human rights bodies, and created ever larger institutional spaces in which peasant 
movement representatives participate (Edelman and James, 2011: 95-6). Despite the 
scaled-up approach to civil society politics seen within LVC strategies, there are major 
limits to what this institutional participation has (or even can) achieve at the UN level. 
As one of the central LVC figures recounted: “UN recognition of Food Sovereignty 
could constitute an umbrella for all these mobilizations… But the way UN [sic] works 
means that representatives have to be present continuously, it is a permanent effort 
and heavy task” (Paul Nicholson; cited in Claeys, 2015: 459). Thus far no such 
presence has yet been decided within the movement or within international bodies, 
and it is unlikely that one may emerge in the near future, given the significant 
resources that are required to establish an effectively permanent social movement 
presence within these global institutions. 
Even with the notable shift in language that characterises international law on 
the rights to food found within the UN/FAO commissions and summits, there remain 
deafening silences on such issues as “rights to conserve and exchange or sell 
traditional seed varieties, to intervene in markets and set prices, to participate in 
economic decision-making at the international and national levels” and so on 
(Edelman and James, 2011: 96-7; see also Brem-Wilson, 2015). At the level of 
hegemonic discourse, such silences thus amount to what Hopewell (2016) dubs a type 
of “invisible barricade” to the fuller participation of, and transformation by, civil 
society actors. A corollary to this problem is the structural inclusion of international 
capital as another ‘non-state actor’ with the same rights of inclusion as other (social 
movement) actors. The presence of capitalist firms became particularly prominent 
during the mid 1990s; with the publication of the UN’s Report on Global Governance 
	 	 43	
(1995), the increasing presence of NGOs, citizens’ movements, MNCs and global 
capital markets signalled the need for states to “adjust to the appearances of all these 
forces and take advantage of their capabilities.” These adjustments have culminated 
in an explosion of Public-Private Partnerships brokered through UN agencies (Utting 
and Zammit, 2009). And while this closer partnership between international capital 
and global forums might suggest an all-powerful global reach of private firms, this 
power ultimately stems from the consistent lobbying by national states for the 
continued inclusion of (and often lax vetting processes over) these firms (McKeon, 
2009: 171-2).   
 What this review of LVC’s participation in UN bodies suggests is that while 
such participation offers an immanent process of building a truly global structure of 
multiple sovereignties, the very institutional infirmity exhibited by peasant 
movements indicates the fact that the power of sovereignty resides elsewhere, beyond 
the meeting rooms that host multi-stakeholder negotiations. Rather, and despite the 
proliferation of global institutions, national sovereignty remains the fundamental 
referent in terms of socio-political power, which is spatially expressed through an 
already ‘multiple’ sovereign realm composed of many states within an international 
system (Kazancigil, 2007). This then puts the impetus for food sovereignty back onto 
the material plain of struggle – namely, the sovereign nation-state – in order to build 
up the requisite power to withstand (rather than directly compete with) the geopolitical 
power of capital. Yet to do so would indeed require the formation of multiple 
sovereignties that significantly penetrate the traditional spaces of political power 
(sovereign states), as well as higher-level spaces (regional institutions), and potentially 
beyond. In this way, some suggest that instead of aiming directly at the height of the 
global institutional architecture (i.e., the UN), peasant movements could alternatively 
focus on “regional groupings or ideological blocs, such as the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) or the Venezuelan-led Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas (ALBA)” (Edelman and James, 2011: 99). Yet we might ask why UNASUR 
has not adopted the principles of food sovereignty, while the ALBA has. The answer 
again stems from the basic (sovereign) constitutive units of global or regional 
organisations, and the differential nature of their own social and discursive projects, 
which in turn reflect the ensemble of social forces that animate them (Pritchard et al., 
2016). Thus, while the struggle for multiple sovereignties is a key aspect to the 
political geography of food sovereignty, this struggle must ultimately begin at the 
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confrontation with the sovereign state, even if the ultimate goal is to break down the 
centralisation of sovereign power.  
 
Where (and What) is the Common Ground Between Multiple Sovereignties? 
If we recall the above formula for understanding sovereignty as the aggregation of an 
historically specific form of rights and territory, then it becomes clear that in 
answering the question as to how multiple sovereignties can cohere depends 
fundamentally upon the degree to which both the power of FS rights discourse and the 
political technologies necessary for their instantiation become generalised. We can 
better understand this necessary relation by noting the ways in which specific forms 
of rights and territory became coterminous (and indeed productive of) capitalist 
sociality. In this sense, the question of where and what is the common ground between 
multiple sovereignties can only be approached through a more concerted focus on 
precisely the structure that has cropped up again and again in the course of the above 
discussion: the sovereign nation-state. In essence, the FS literature and movement does 
not truly possess a ‘theory’ of the capitalist state. Yet I argue that a more robust 
analysis of the rights and territoriality constitutive of the sovereign nation-state can be 
aided through a close reading of Nicos Poulantzas, particularly with respect to his final 
(and in many ways unfinished) volume, State, Power, Socialism, which fundamentally 
seeks to ground the workings of state and society through the common lens of social 
relations of production and the concomitant strategies and struggles that go into their 
reproduction (and possible transformation).  
 
2.2 Food Sovereignty as Class Struggle: A Poulantzian Approach  
Taking the conceptual coordinates of rights, territory and sovereignty as the basic 
problematic undergirding the transition to food sovereignty, this section will draw 
upon those aspects of Nicos Poulantzas’ work that heavily touch upon law, technique 
and democratic socialism. Suturing all of these considerations together will be the 
basic underlying theme of Poulantzas last work, State, Power, Socialism, which sought 
to bring out these coordinates by critically deconstructing the nature and composition 
of the capitalist state. Thus, the following sub-sections explicate these lineaments of 
the capitalist state, which, as I argue, is entirely necessary for revealing the concrete 
challenges that face social actors seeking transformative revolutionary change. The 
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remainder of this chapter will therefore seek out the obscure yet terrifyingly real 
effects of state power, which will offer a more grounded field of analysis through 
which we might be able to better understand the full import and implications of socio-
political agency embedded within the transformative project of food sovereignty in 
ALBA.  
 
2.2.1 Hegemony, Class Struggle and the Strategic Field of the State 
Broadly speaking, the great majority of Poulantzas’ theoretical enterprises bore the 
imprint of Althussarian structuralism. Particularly in Political Power and Social 
Classes (1973), as well as Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (1975), we find the 
various components of capitalist society subdivided into neat, if not complexly related, 
‘regions’ or ‘instances’ of activity (e.g., politics, economics, ideology). Within this 
dominant oeuvre, as Stuart Hall notes, “there is a double framework to every question 
– each element appearing twice, once as the ‘effect of structure’, once as the ‘effect of 
a practice’” (Hall, 2014: ix). As such, this double-layering of each problematic speaks 
to the overtly formalist approach found in Poulantzas’ comprehensive yet somewhat 
skeletal taxonomy of capitalist sociality. As Poulantzas later noted in a type of auto-
critique, his earlier work “did not succeed in exactly situating the specificity of the 
state, … [nor] in grasping the relations between state, society, economy, in a 
sufficiently precise fashion” (Poulantzas; cited in Jessop, 1985: 144). In contrast, 
State, Power, Socialism, (SPS) goes beyond the formalist fold by re-inscribing the 
complex, micro-foundational elements of social struggle into a broader understanding 
of ‘the state’ that extends into the very bowels of society itself. Underlying this 
relational (rather than structural) approach to the state is his ontological view of class 
as that of process, rather than abstract category, subjective disposition, or structural 
effect – an approach that was already present in Classes and Contemporary 
Capitalism, but only fully elaborated in SPS. Rather, it is the effect of socially and 
historically specific class struggles that congeal into the institutional materiality of 
the state. Hence, reading the key parameters of the modern state – juridical rights, 
territorial practices, and sovereign power – through the lens of State, Power, Socialism 
reveals the social content of complex political projects and discursive imaginaries.  
It is first of all necessary to unpack Poulantzas’ basic operative components: 
the relations of production and the social division of labour. The basic relations of 
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production under capitalism renders the direct producer (worker) with no other 
possession other than her body, which she must sell to capital for a wage. These 
relations thus lead to a situation in which a general separation between manual and 
intellectual labour takes place, whereby all organizational capacities are accrued to 
capital, leaving the worker as a mere (manual) appendage of the productive forces 
(whether in the form of machines or land), and leading to a situation Marx referred to 
as the “despotism” of capital (Marx, 1981: 477). The social division of labour therefore 
marks the division between labour and capital in general (as well as intermediate 
strata). This serves to presage Poulantzas’ reading of the capitalist state as inscribed 
by the social relations of production under capitalism, and the general division 
between manual and intellectual labour as such.11 Thus, “In all its apparatuses (that is, 
not only in its ideological apparatuses but also in the repressive and economic ones) 
the State incarnates intellectual labour as separated from manual labour” (Poulantzas, 
2014: 55-6, emphasis in original). While capitalist power inside the factory amounts 
to a type of despotism (drawn from the monopolisation of the means of 
production/intellectual labour) without recourse to direct political domination, “it is 
within the capitalist State that the organic relationship between intellectual labour and 
political domination, knowledge and power, is realized in the most consummate 
manner” (ibid: 56). Yet the power of capital and the power of the state are not 
externally related, but organically cohere through specific relations of hegemonic 
force. Thus, “like ‘capital’, [the state] is rather a relationship of forces, or more 
precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class 
fractions, such as expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form” (ibid: 128-
9).  
In this way, the complexity of the state’s institutionality emerges from a given 
relationship it maintains to specific social classes. State action cannot be reduced to 
‘class’ per se (and thus to the ‘dominant’ class), but rather congeals around the various 
struggles between classes that at any given historical moment form together into a 
specific hegemonic power bloc (ibid: 129). Yet the varying composition of the power 
bloc speaks to the variegated rhythms and changing (im)balances that take place 
throughout the course of capital accumulation at the global scale, processes which are 
																																								 																				
11 While Marx typically refers to this division as that between ‘mental’ and manual labour, Poulantzas 
employs the term ‘intellectual’ labour. I will therefore confine myself to using Poulantzas’ term from 
here on.  
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also bound up with the constant struggle within and between social classes (ibid: 158; 
cf. Poulantzas, 1975). Poulantzas’ approach to understanding the particular actions of 
the state ultimately revolve around the selectivity of particular policies that articulate 
a given organic relationship with a specific class fraction and a particular branch of 
the state apparatus.12 Hence, like capital in general, composed of relatively 
autonomous fractions, such as productive, commercial or financial capital which have 
their own particular perceptions and world-views (cf. van der Pijl, 1998), the state 
apparatus is itself composed of a number of “relatively autonomous bureaucracies, 
each of which has its specific field of competence, its own clientele and perceptions 
of problems” (Poulantzas, 2014: 194). The above components thus specify the 
institutional materiality of the state. 
 Both state structure and state strategy takes place within and across the specific 
strategic terrain of action and struggle. Such a terrain thus speaks to far more than the 
mere physical embodiment of state institutions (government buildings, bureaucratic 
departments, parliament, etc.) but rather to the extended space in which state power 
gains its traction. Although the dominated classes do not cohere within state 
apparatuses in the same way as the politically dominant classes (capital, petty-
bourgeoisie, etc.) they nevertheless populate the extended (strategic) field of the state, 
through their presence in the school system, prisons, political parties and, importantly, 
various spaces of production (what is usually incorrectly conceived of as a separate 
and hermetically sealed-off realm of the ‘economy’). This fact thus opens up the 
possibility for subaltern struggles to directly impact upon the operation and evolution 
of the state and its attendant strategies and political technologies. As popular classes 
are immediately written out of the domain of intellectual labour (as both workers and 
relatively disempowered citizens), they must struggle at a certain ‘distance’ from the 
state, even while struggling within the fringes of its embodiment (ibid: 152). The 
institutional materiality of the state therefore provides it with specific powers and 
capacities, which as Jessop (1985: 119) summarises, consist of: “the individualization 
of the body-politic, the role of law as the mode of organized violence, and the 
																																								 																				
12 The notion of the ‘selectivity’ of action was not well brought out in Poulantzas’ work, maintaining at 
best an implicit acknowledgement. One of the few references to it makes note of the “non-decision 
making” of dominant actors, which “applies not only to the hard core of the relations of production, but 
also to spheres that go far beyond it” (Poulantzas, 2014: 194). In essence, Poulantzas is referring to the 
bounded rationality of agents, of the universal gap between agent knowledge and objective conditions. 
Nevertheless, the notion of selectivity qua agential property was never fully worked out, and will thus 
be further explored below.  
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bourgeois forms of nationhood and the nation-state.” Thus, as Jessop suggests, 
Poulantzas’ framework remains highly relevant to considerations of law and rights, 
the atomisation of the body-politic as an inherently territorial practice, and the 
formation of state- and –nationhood as the condensation of modern sovereignty.  
 
Political Struggles Over the Social Content of Rights 
Our discussion of rights in §2.1.1 centred on the question of the relationship between 
formal rights and the (often informal) social relations of power, a question that must 
be further addressed in order to unpack the ways in which FS protagonists might be 
able to use rights discourse beyond the narrow confines of liberalism (or even post-
liberalism), and in doing so impute a substantial social content into their rights-claims 
and discourses. To approach this question, it is first necessary to reveal how rights are 
constituted by a related social content.  
 As Poulantzas argued: “The concrete content of rights and duties precisely 
depends upon the materialization of needs and labour in… [specific] historical 
material circumstances” (Poulantzas, [1965] 2008: 65, emphasis in original). Here, 
“needs and labour” roughly correspond to the forces and relations of production (ibid: 
59), yet between the two, “labour” forms the crucial part, for it is the ways in which 
(and among whom) the productive forces are owned, possessed and organized that 
certain bundles of social power begin to emerge (relations of production). To forge 
unity in the differentiated landscape of class-divided society, the establishment of a 
particular juridical form corresponding to social content (relations of production and 
social division of labour) is required. The real efficacy of the juridical form lies in “a 
relationship of force invested in a relationship of freedom” (ibid: 66). As an 
embodiment of this contradictory relation between freedom and force (or, “Fraternity-
Terror”), a certain third force, a relatively segmented fragment of the larger social 
whole, comes forth to ensure that relations of exploitation assume the form of 
reciprocity; i.e., that the act of appropriation is accompanied by the return of a duty. 
Poulantzas thus noted the historically universal presence of this Fraternity-Terror 
binary across class societies; yet under capitalism “law first appeared as a limitation 
upon state arbitrariness, and as a barrier to a certain form of violence. This ‘State based 
on law’, conceived as the contrary of unlimited power, gave birth to the illusory 
opposition Law/Terror” (Poulantzas, 2014: 76). This illusory opposition maintains a 
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homologous relation to the equally illusory opposition between the public/private in 
capitalism, or between the state and civil society.  
It is through the state-produced “isolation effect”, interpellating individuals 
into isolated monads (citizens, rather than classes) that relate to each other through the 
mechanisms of market competition, that makes individuation “terrifyingly real” 
(Poulantzas, 1973: 130-1). Poulantzas’ use of the term “terrifyingly” was no accident, 
tracing a common etymological root with terror and territory (Neocleous, 2003: 102). 
In this sense, private property is itself terrifyingly real, with each factory or farm 
representing its own quasi-sovereign power, in which the despotism of capital reigns, 
even while the general despotism (the real sovereign power) of the Leviathan weaves 
itself through them all. It is not for nothing that Ellen Wood once observed that through 
such relations of production, we find that “the integration of production and 
appropriation represents the ultimate ‘privitisation’ of politics” (Wood, 1981: 92; cf. 
Poulantzas, 2014: 18-9). Hence, by locating the common root of class power in the 
division of manual and intellectual labour, as reproduced both in the quasi-sovereign 
factory and the fully-sovereign state, it immediately becomes clear how the materiality 
of class power bursts the abstract boundaries of formal law. For as Christopher Arthur 
points out, “The monopolisation of the means of production by the capitalist class is 
an extra-legal fact” (cited in Miéville, 2006: 92). From this rather startling observation, 
an entire series of social facts cascade out of the boundaries of formal rules; this is 
particularly so with respect to the numerous instances of ‘para-state terror’ throughout 
the Latin American countryside (Mazzei, 2009; Hristov, 2014). Sovereign techniques 
of power thus continuously exhibit a certain surplus of action beyond the juridical 
form. Whether legally legible or not, each is fundamentally constituted by Terror, even 
if it is the abstract juridical form that is most adequate to the construction of Fraternity 
as a legitimating function. 
 By tracing the social content of liberal rights to the dominant relations of 
production and social division of labour, it becomes possible to see rightful action as 
both legibly inscribed into the juridical framework of recognised rules as well as a 
whole bundle of powers that seemingly contravene the ‘letter’ of the law, yet share a 
common foundation with the legal sphere itself. In other words, it is class violence – 
conceived both as legally prescribed private property rights and extra-legal acts 
reproducing class domination – that constitutes the common foundation between legal 
and extra-legal power(s), as the primary means (historically and socially speaking) 
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through which the ‘reality’ of jurisprudence and power (Law/Terror) become 
actualised, and by which such realities are transformed into new ones. And yet, 
because the primary determination here is that of ‘class’ as such, the entire distinction 
between formal/informal powers cannot be confined to merely those powers invested 
within the dominant classes. Rather, the formal/informal divide similarly transects the 
field of dominated classes and, we may surmise, it is far more likely that their agency 
will tend towards the domain of informal powers, precisely because (given their class 
position) the formal, juridical body of law does not by its own class content represent 
them (Wood, 2012: 315-6).  
But it is one thing to say that class violence qua struggle changes the politico-
legal landscape; it is quite another to delineate how and on what basis this might come 
about. Indeed, as Sassen contends (2006: 416), the key “parameter for authority and 
rights” is territory. After all, the key parameter for the transformation of the feudal 
mode of production into the capitalist one was undoubtedly territorial, in which the 
process of primitive accumulation saw an entire class of peasant producers “cut off 
from the network of personal, statutory and territorial bonds” (Poulantzas, 2014: 64). 
Henceforth, the idea and practice of territory takes on a decisively distinct meaning, 
one that is simultaneously underwritten by the juridical legibility of law and the terror 
of sovereign power. 
 
Mapping the Nation: Political Technologies of the Capitalist State 
The utilization of terror – as perhaps the key territorial practice – does not stop at the 
limit of overt, coercive force. The very act of claiming exclusive rights to administer 
society is itself an assertion of coercive power over the very bodies of subjects, though 
exacted in subtler forms of discipline, forms that are consonant with the specific 
spatialities implied within a given set of social relations. As Henri Lefebvre has amply 
demonstrated, each mode of production carries with it, and is made possible by, its 
own particular social space (Lefebvre, 1991). Starting from this premise, Poulantzas 
argues that it is the sudden elevation of national territory as a master-organizing 
concept that signals the arrival of the modern ‘nation’ (cf. Elden, 2013: 323ff). Yet the 
significance of territory (in the modern sense) does not in turn derive from the ‘fact’ 
of national territory, i.e. that this significance is found on the outer limits of the nation 
(its national border). Rather, the significance of modern territory is borne out by the 
very material framework of the capitalist social division of labour, which induces a 
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“serial, fractured, parcelled, cellular and irreversible space” (Poulantzas, 2014: 103, 
emphasis in original). Every farm, factory, warehouse, retailer, and even residential 
block – each constituting a separate node within the overall circulation of capital, from 
production to consumption – fragments the social landscape, as so many quasi- 
(proprietary) de facto sovereignties, while contradictorily united through the 
‘universal commodity’ (money) and the law of value (cf. Lefebvre, 1991: 355; 
Poulantzas, 2014: 104). The exclusivist character of private property, as is 
characteristic of Anglo-American common law, essentially elevates the exclusion 
principal to a form of political power; as one legal scholar puts it, “Property is 
sovereignty, or rather, thousands of little sovereignties parceled out among the 
members of society” (Merrill, 2000: 972). Thus, the direct producers previously in 
possession of common property became separated from their means of production 
(primarily the land), and ‘liberated’ from their territorial fixtures, “only to become 
trapped in a grid – one that includes not only the factory but also the modern family, 
the school, the army, the prison system, the city and the national territory” (Poulantzas, 
2014: 105; see also Scott, 1998: 32). 
 Corresponding to this rights regime and territorial landscape is a specific 
political technology based on the abstraction of social space, the accumulation of 
knowledge over the national realm, and hence a form of “pastoral power” – guiding 
and ‘protecting’ individuals through mapping and integrating ‘citizens’ into the 
pastoral state (cf. Foucault, 1982). As a corollary, this new material foundation of state 
power (knowledge) and its accumulation was as crucial to the modern state as was the 
monopoly of legitimate violence (Foucault, 1988: 151). From the cataloguing of the 
enclosure movement to the policing of food riots, the early agrarian transitions to 
capitalism summoned their own forms of both abstract and physical violence (Graham, 
2011; Bohstedt, 2010). 
Thus, enclosures, contract enforcement, education (both civil and military), 
policing and prisons all rose together, woven into the fabric of state violence, a type 
of permanent (if not muted) internal war (cf. Foucault, 2003: 50; Poulantzas, 2014: 
105), and yet constantly legitimised by the overarching juridical framework through 
which these fields of force were enacted. Yet such techniques, and their territorial 
articulations, could not be legitimated indefinitely; they were, after all, as with the new 
matrix of abstract, juridically constituted rights, imbued with a distinctive class 
content, and thereby inviting their own challenge from those classes to which they did 
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not primarily serve. Thus, the arch of popular struggles across the modern world 
engendered a long and winding road towards a specifically sovereign regime. As 
Poulantzas notes, the primordial form of sovereignty, in the guise of Absolutism, 
represented a type of capitalist juridical-institutional ensemble in utero, by 
extinguishing “extra-political” sources of law (religion, etc.), establishing the first 
workings of a bureaucracy, and the centralisation of the means of coercion 
(Poulantzas, 1973). Yet such regimes were still premised upon a directly political 
constitution of proprietary rights, via the selling of state functions to private 
individuals (e.g., tax farming) (Teschke, 2003: 171-2). Only after the absolute 
separation of peasant producers from their lands and means of production – i.e., the 
absolute ‘freedom’ of the worker – could the formal separation between the economic 
and the political take place, and in which proprietary rights became only indirectly 
politically constituted via the terrifyingly real effect of abstract bourgeois property 
law. Hence, the multitude of class struggles constituting the European wave of 
primitive accumulation gave birth to an uneven temporal sequence of transitions from 
Absolutist to ‘modern’ sovereignty, and their counterparts of ‘popular sovereignty’ 
and ‘nationalism’ (Yack, 2001).  
The rise and consolidation of parliamentary sovereignty, later referred to as 
‘representative democracy’, further deepened from the same sequence of class 
conflict, primarily led by worker struggles, but also significantly by the early women’s 
movement (see Przeworski, 1985; Eley, 2002). Yet it is the very nature of this 
institutional parliamentary form – as one of the primary sites in which subaltern 
struggles become articulated and (temporarily) resolved – that materializes the 
underlying presence of political conflict constitutive of class society. It is from this 
angle that we can begin to see the ways in which the very regime of sovereignty (as 
the rights-bearing state laying juridical and territorial claim over its subjects) is one 
that constantly undergoes revision, subject to the changing balance of class forces. 
Indeed, every such struggle grounds itself in a discourse that seeks to fundamentally 
challenge some particular corner of the overall rights/territory regime, and thus of the 
meaning of sovereignty itself.  
 
Multiple Sovereignties and the Problem of Dual Power 
Having traced the preceding argument through the conceptual vectors of rights and 
territory, we are now in a position to better approach the question implied by §§2.1.1-
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3: namely, what does it mean to use the sovereign nation-state as a means by which to 
construct a set of social practices that effectively negates its entire raison d'être, 
otherwise known as raison d'État? The revolutionary conjuncture in Russia took this 
question towards both a theoretical and immediately political significance. V. I. 
Lenin’s writings on the topic sought to grapple with the very nature of the state, and 
how it impacted upon revolutionary tactics. From these considerations emerged the 
concept of “dual power”, first put forward by Lenin as a means of explaining the 
contradictory situation of the revolutionary epoch in Russia during 1917. This concept 
referred to the presence of two mutually antagonistic forms of socio-political power 
during the immediate aftermath of the February revolution. Thus:  
“Alongside the Provisional Government… another government has 
arisen, so far weak and incipient, but undoubtedly a government that 
actually exists and is growing – the Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ 
Deputies… a power directly based on revolutionary seizure, on the 
direct initiative of the people from below, and not on a law enacted by 
a centralized state power” (Lenin, 1964: 38, emphasis in original). 
This historical watermark gave dramatic expression to the ways in which informal 
power, invested in workers and their spaces of production, bursts onto the scene in 
direct conflict with formal power, invested in parliamentary procedure and juridical 
rule. Yet the opposing class content of each side led to an irrevocable rift in the 
sovereign ‘lawscape’ (Graham, 2011). As a corollary to this revolutionary situation, 
the logic of dual power predisposes itself to an inherently unstable situation, given that 
the very nature of sovereignty (at least in the modern sense of the term) cannot exist 
in two places at once, with each claimed by antagonistic classes.  
This concept has recently made significant inroads into the literature on 
contemporary Venezuela. Helen Yaffe, for instance, sees dual power in Venezuela as 
characterized merely by a division between state-owned property (oil company) and 
the rest of the private capitalist economy (Yaffe, 2015: 29). Enríquez (2013) speaks of 
dual power as the mere fracturing of the state, in which the apparatus contains both 
old and new classes. More substantially, George Ciccariello-Maher attempts to fully 
integrate Lenin’s conception with the advent of Bolivarianismo. Thus, he sees the 
Bolivarian state as encapsulating Lenin’s model, in which the state is “still an 
instrument of class power (a state), but one oriented towards its own abolition” 
(Ciccariello-Maher, 2013: 243). In this way, he sees the scenario of dual power in 
Venezuela as a “fulcrum to force… radicalization from below” (ibid, emphasis in 
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original). Ciccariello-Maher views this process as constituted through the flowering 
of ‘communal councils’ (spaces of direct participatory power for local communities) 
as well as the formation of ‘citizen militias’ giving shape to a type of power 
reminiscent of the Paris Commune, and thus of dual power in the Leninist guise (ibid: 
243-50). Yet his ambiguous restatement of the simple ‘withering away’ of the state 
assumes a somewhat fluid and processual form, in which he frames the problem of 
dual power as an ambiguous ‘revolutionary’ process (ibid: 251). And yet, it is precisely 
because he moves from a perspective of a moment of rupture to one of continuous 
process that the very problem of dual power magically turns into a non-problem of 
permanent struggle ‘from below’ (cf. Webber, 2015).  
Dario Azzellini’s account, on the other hand, is on somewhat firmer ground. 
For although Azzellini sees the Bolivarian process as entailing the active participation, 
rather than the necessary destruction, of the state in the formation of popular power, 
this contains a structural antinomy that cannot be avoided in theory, let alone in 
(revolutionary) practice. Thus, he notes the concrete asymmetry of power between 
state structures and spaces of popular power, which can lead to a situation whereby 
the latter is merely absorbed into the former, with all of the potential dangers this 
entails: from the re-emergence of hierarchal structures, division of leaders and led, and 
bureaucratisation – all occurring within participatory spaces (Azzellini, 2016: 276). 
This danger therefore represents the logical “culmination of dual power” (ibid), in 
which the very act of absorbing one side into the other reveals the inherently 
contradictory nature of their mutual articulation – a political situation that cannot 
endure, but must be resolved one way or another. Indeed, he surmises that the only 
way in which the Bolivarian revolution could actually continue its forward movement 
would be for the “constituent power” (from below) to triumph over the “constituted 
power” (from above) (ibid: 277).  
 It was precisely this problem that Poulantzas sought to understand in State, 
Power, Socialism, with respect to the process of socialist transition under the 
conditions of the modern (late 20th century) capitalist state. For Poulantzas “the 
traditional social-democratic experience” in the West, and the onset of so-called “real 
socialism” in the East, continually reproduced the problem of statism and the 
suffocation of genuine self-directed political agency from below (Poulantzas, 2014: 
251). Thus, in both Western and Eastern variants we find diametrically opposed views 
of parliamentary democracy (one fetishizes its democratic utility, while the other 
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condemns it as the antithesis of genuine democracy) ending up in the same structural 
straightjacket: “Stalinist state-worship, [and] social-democratic state-worship” (ibid: 
255). The basic sociological insight to this double bind is the fact that in both instances 
the fundamental antagonism of the capitalist mode of production – the division 
between manual and intellectual labour as one of the primary expressions of economic 
exploitation – remains intact, and thus modern state power as such (cf. Sandbrook, 
2011). Poulantzas knew perfectly well that there was “no easy recipe for a solution” 
(Poulantzas, 2014: 265), precisely because of this immanent moment of dual power 
inscribed within the balance between representative and direct democracy. But there 
were various markers situating the evolution of his thought on this problem. 
As Jessop (1985: 300) underscores, Poulantzas’ thinking on this issue went 
through a series of changes, beginning with a more pronounced favouritism for the 
dominance of popular power. He then changes his mind, conceding that, should the 
moment of dual power arise, parliamentary sovereignty should take precedence in 
order to preserve political liberties broadly speaking, even though such electoral 
institutions should undergo deepening democratization. Popular struggles should 
therefore make an impact on the representative institutions within the state, but without 
undermining these institutions’ role in elaborating national-popular hegemony within 
the social formation itself, which is also crucial for state support of local initiatives. 
On this latter point, writes Jessop, “given the difficulties of coordinating dispersed and 
fragmented democratic organs at the base without relating them organically to 
representative democracy, they may become strong enough to short-circuit the 
initiatives of a left government without ever acquiring the strength and cohesion to 
rule alone” (ibid). An alternative arrangement might then emerge in which popular 
spaces remain open enough to integrate other political currents (rather than a singular 
one, prone to subsumption under the ‘single-party’), while nevertheless firmly 
grounded within local participation and control (Jessop, 1985: 301).  
This basic outline of what could be considered a type of functional space of 
multiple sovereignties can therefore be understood as conforming to a given 
configuration of issues, their spatial extent of impact, and the competence of 
management among situated actors. Indeed, the connection between specific scales 
and the material/subjective nature of human existence is a vitally important one, lest 
we slip into a completely arbitrary promotion of local participation and popular power. 
Rather, the very nature of social existence – in both its cognitive and material 
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dimensions – predisposes the idea of multiple sovereignties, or “nested hierarchal 
arrangements” as Harvey (2012: 69) puts it, as an inherently pragmatic one in terms 
of a post-capitalist alternative. Such nested arrangements may well organise 
themselves according to the specific material and organisational qualities given to a 
particular space, and the level of experience/competency congealing within such 
domains (see Duncan, 1996: 41-2). In other words, “[w]hat looks like a good way to 
resolve problems at one scale does not hold at another scale” (Harvey, 2012: 69). We 
must therefore move up and down the scalar chain depending on the issue area and the 
degree to which it is amenable to participatory democracy structures at the local end 
of the chain. In the context of Food Sovereignty, the vitality of community decision 
making is directly linked to the centrality of agriculture, in that agro-ecological 
production cannot take place solely at a high level of abstract problem-solving (unlike, 
say, macro-level fiscal organisation), given that people must be present on the land (or 
factory) itself, in the process of “being there alive” (Marx). And in this way, the 
immediacy of problems to be solved, and activities to be carried out, may be less prone 
to the usurpation of specialised, abstract knowledge typically concentrated within the 
sovereign state. Rather, the proliferation of “specialized assemblages”, understood as 
“the multiplication of partial systems, each with a small set of sharply distinctive 
constitutive rules” (Sassen, 2006: 422), would help to both balance against, and 
socially consolidate, higher-order functions or powers that contain their own 
constitutive rules or competencies, approximating a “vertically integrated policy 
monitoring” form of multi-spatial governance (Fox, 2001). Thus, the flowering of 
multiple sovereignties will itself pivot upon both the democratisation of knowledge 
itself and a radical transformation in the class content of that knowledge.  
All the same, the realisation of Food Sovereignty – in essence a political 
program that encompasses more than mere agriculture, but the social relations of 
power that undergird its organisation – necessarily calls into action the relational 
structure of different scales beyond the local, in which specific decision making 
powers adhere to certain problems or technical requirements that (at least in the short-
term) may not be suitable to purely local capacities. At a minimum, this 
conceptualisation offers a window into the ways in which the promotion and 
consolidation of popular power can not only co-exist with but also actively support 
(and be supported by) higher parliamentary/technical organisational institutions.  
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From these three coordinates, I argue that sovereignty is nothing other than the 
historically specific and politically contested combination of rights + territory; hence, 
the specific qualities of the latter make up the particularities of the former. The 
inherent fragility of this terrain of struggle was prefaced above through Poulantzas’ 
broader conceptual pallet, in which the state takes on a relational character between 
classes, constitutes a strategic terrain of struggle, and in doing so periodically 
crystallises into a particular hegemonic bloc capable of organising economic 
production and political normalisation. However, introducing further theoretical 
extensions to Poulantzas’ core concepts opens up both the specific strategic pathways 
pursued by agents, as well as the socio-spatial coordinates that drive, and is informed 
by, such strategies. 
 
2.2.2 Spatialising Poulantzas: Strategic Selectivity, the Geograph(ies) of Capital 
and Counter-Space 
Given the unfinished status of Poulantzas last book, and in light of its tantalizing 
insights into the micro-foundations of power and agency, Jessop put forward the 
“notion of strategy” as a specific methodological extension of the relational theory of 
the state (Jessop, 1985: 341). Jessop’s “strategic-relational” approach thus forms a 
conceptual bridge between the iron law of capital accumulation on the one hand, and 
a purely empiricist examination of class struggles on the other (Jessop, 1985: 343-4). 
This view differentiates between accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects 
(ibid: 344); the former referring to specific growth strategies under the hegemony of 
a particular fraction of capital (productive, commercial, financial), while the latter 
denotes a complex articulation of discourses and practices that unite various classes – 
both dominant and dominated – and which seeks to reproduce the basic foundation of 
capitalist class rule and thus the relations of production as a whole (Jessop, 1991; 
Jessop, 2002). As a result of this chaotic social process, state institutions do not simply 
produce a ‘globally’ coherent line of policy, but a contested and micro-foundational 
iteration of “strategic selectivity” in policy making, which ultimately “involves 
examining how a given structure may privilege some actors, some identities, some 
strategies, some spatial and temporal horizons, [and] some actions over others” 
(Jessop, 1999: 51). In this way, the internally related vectors of accumulation crises 
and class struggles involve not merely “social fixes” but also spatio-temporal fixes 
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that establish “spatial and temporal boundaries” that become adequate to a given 
conjuncture (Ngai-Ling and Jessop, 2006: 317). Institutions therefore exhibit spatial 
selectivity in conjunction with the prevailing geography of accumulation embedded 
within a specific accumulation regime (Jones, 1997). Certain sub-national regions, 
urban centres, or even higher scalar levels of governance will therefore assume greater 
centrality to a given pattern of accumulation and its corresponding bloc of 
hierarchically organised capitalist fractions. Selectivity of action is therefore strategic 
and spatial in equal measure.  
Spatial fixes are primarily expressive of “a potential contradiction between the 
formal market economy considered as a pure space of flows and the substantively 
instituted economy considered as a territorially and/or socially embedded system” 
(Jessop, 2002: 110). With the constant revolutionizing of the productive forces 
(brought about through both class struggles with labour and other capitals), and in 
combination with the continually expanded scale of production, we find enormous 
concentrations of physical infrastructure, in the shape of both large-scale factories and 
the various social spaces agglomerated around them in the shape of “company towns”. 
Yet as the force of capitalist competition moves throughout this new terrain 
production, the manifestation of crisis in one location prompts the geographical re-
organisation of capital into new ones, forming a seemingly endless chain of ‘spatial 
fixes’ that seeks to combat the devaluation of existing capital by establishing new 
bases of accumulation elsewhere (Harvey 2006: 246). As Arrighi (2006) has shown, 
each major crisis afflicting the capitalist world economy tends towards not merely the 
geographical shift in the organisation of production but also towards a cumulatively 
larger hegemonic political space in which new rounds of accumulation take place: 
from the Italian city states, to the “quasi nation-state” of the Dutch Republic, to the 
island nation-state of Great Britain and to the “continent-sized island” of the US. The 
rise of the continent-sized US regime at the turn of the century added an extra degree 
of pressure on other parts of the world to adapt to new regional-scales of accumulation 
(cf. Harvey, 2006: 444). As various authors make clear (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995; 
Pelagidis and Papasotiriou, 2002; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004), ‘global’ economic 
activities carried out by transnational firms tend to cluster around their home regions. 
We therefore find that “intra-regional expansion offers firm-specific advantages of 
lower costs and more tractable managerial networks” (Carroll, 2010: 229). And while 
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we may find variations in how certain firm-specific advantages unfold spatially,13 the 
capitalist world economy on average clusters around the major geographical regions 
of the world, thus leading towards “selectively transnational” spaces of production 
(Hay, 2000: 523). From this framework of strategic and spatial selectivity, we can 
begin to better understand regional formations as new layers constituting the “arts of 
international government” (Larner and Walters, 2002: 392). This layer, as Niemann 
(2000: 90) notes, “does not have the kinds of ambiguous continuities of the state 
layer”, but rather “reflects the constitutive desires and needs of those social forces 
which can no longer operate properly in the contexts of existing layers.” Each regional 
formation will exhibit its own mix of strategic and spatial selectivity – the EU as a 
multi-level region, NAFTA and Japan’s “flying geese” as a hub and spoke model, and 
today’s Asia-Pacific as a market led system of regional cooperation (Larner and 
Walters, 2002: 393). As such, regional formations are understood here as second-order 
condensations of social relations of power (Brand et al., 2011), representing both a de-
nationalisation of state power (Jessop, 2002), yet understood as the reproduction (not 
‘dilution’) of state power via differentially constituted scales, spaces and classes 
(Demirović, 2011).  
Bringing this framework to the central case of the ALBA, the strategic and 
spatial selectivity of this regional institution primarily emerges from the legacy of past 
social and geopolitical struggles characterising Latin America’s resistance to the 
discipline of neoliberalism. As a consequence, the counter-hegemonic project pursued 
by ALBA emphasises discursive and material practices that are adequate to resisting 
such discipline, particularly with regard to strengthening the sovereignty of member 
states in conjunction with the process of endogenous development (Chapter 4). Such 
a project thus becomes overdetermined by the return to statism as the foundation to 
regional development, yet one that is qualified by a ‘re-embedding’ of the economy 
into a deeper politicisation in conjunction with a re-invigorated connection with the 
																																								 																				
13 For instance, it is much more likely for globally positioned firms to concentrate their downstream 
activities (sales and marketing) within the regional space, whereas for upstream processes (production 
and sourcing of component parts) the spatial distribution is more varied. On this latter aspect, large 
commercial retailers (Nike, Walmart) overwhelmingly tend towards low-wage areas in which large 
pools of low-skilled labour can be readily accessed. However, in other, more high-skilled and capital-
intensive industries, such as the automobile sector, the geography of both production and sales become 
much more tightly integrated within the same (home) region (Rugman, 2004; Amighini and Gorgoni, 
2014). This simply shows that spatialisation strategies for capitalist firms will depend on a number of 
factors, including the very material basis of the activity involved (i.e., clustering of high-skills, technical 
expertise, production techniques).  
	 	 60	
popular classes. There is, of course, an inherent tension between a genuine 
socialisation of politico-economic management and a crude statism. As Sandbrook 
notes, socialist systems may also ‘disembedd’ economies by affecting redistributive 
policies through the reproduction of commodity relations in land or labour (2011: 
417). And yet, the issue here is not really one of embedding or disembedding economic 
relations, for even free-market practices are always subsumed within a definite field 
of social relations, marked by their corresponding social-property forms. The real crux 
of the issue comes down to dissolving the division between manual and intellectual 
labour, primarily in the work place through ‘labour centred development’ practices 
(worker management) in both the field and factory. Encapsulating this shift is the 
steady dissolution of the manual/intellectual labour divide, that does not in itself 
dissolve commodity relations all at once, but provides important aspects of self-
conscious understanding, strategic thinking, and collective empowerment in both 
spaces of production and reproduction, all of which pre-supposes the final 
transformation away from commodification. 
 Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, we must enquire into the specific 
material basis, qua accumulation strategy, through which ALBA is able to affect its 
policy of food sovereignty. From its inception, the mobilisation of Venezuela’s oil 
wealth became the decisive driver in the first two ALBA initiatives (created even 
before ALBA’s inauguration but forged in its spirit of intent) as the Caribbean Energy 
Cooperation Agreement providing low cost, low interest oil to Caribbean states, and 
latterly the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement between Venezuela and Cuba. As 
such, the socio-ecological foundation of food sovereignty in ALBA comes not 
primarily from the soil, but what lies beneath. This explains why the actual 
materialisation of ALBA’s food sovereignty initiatives are contained within the 
Venezuelan territory, particularly in the form of the Mixed Socialist Enterprises of 
ALBA (Empresas Mixtas Socialistas del ALBA). As we will see in Chapter 6, the 
social and institutional nature of these production units put into question the deeper 
commitments towards popular participation in socio-economic life under the ALBA 
banner. More significantly still, the contradiction of building this productive 
foundation from the basis of oil rentierism shapes a specific institutional materiality 
of the Venezuelan state, as well as creating huge fissures within the overall 
accumulation strategy of the ALBA region as a whole. Such features therefore help to 
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explain the specific strategic and spatial selectivity of ALBA’s food policies, which 
we will successively unpack throughout the remainder of the thesis.  
 
 
2.2.3 How Bourgeois is Poulantzian Sociology? A Note on Resource Rents and 
State Forms in 21st Century Latin America 
The above indicated importance of resource rents in analysing the political economy 
of ALBA necessitates a brief engagement with a new yet quite prolific wing of 
Marxian scholarship concerned with explaining the development of Latin American 
left wing states (e.g. Grinberg and Starosta, 2009; Grinberg, 2013; Purcell, 2013; 
Kornblihtt, 2015). This engagement would not be so necessary, however, were it not 
for the fact that this branch of Marxism specifically takes aim at Poulantizan-like 
approaches, which (they argue) amounts to a bourgeois sociology in the form of 
‘structural-functionalism’ (cf. Clark, 1977; Purcell, 2017; Grinberg, 2016). These 
scholars follow the Marxian approach pioneered by independent Argentinean scholar 
Juan Iñigo Carrera (2007) at the Centro para la Investigación como Crítica Práctica 
(CICP). Given that I find much value in what I will call the CICP school, it is necessary 
to delineate precisely how a Poulantzian framework can incorporate a Marxian 
understanding of ‘ground rent’ and ‘landlord state forms’ – two categories that are 
central in the CICP. 
 In focusing much of their attention on the contemporary development of Latin 
America, CICP scholars point towards the central role of “ground rent” in the region’s 
accumulation process. The basic premise is that landlords, who by virtue of their 
private ownership over a portion of the earth and its natural wealth, may command a 
price (albeit negotiated with productive capital) for their territory in the form of a 
portion (or all) of the surplus profit capitalized as differential rent in the form of a 
royalty charged to them (Purcell, 2013: 150-1). As a means of overcoming seemingly 
simplistic accounts that posit state/landlord agency as “autonomous” determinants 
(e.g. Grinberg and Starosta, 2009), CICP approaches note that the fortunes of landlords 
are conditioned by the overall production of surplus value at the world scale – i.e., the 
amount of purchasing power available to oil-importing countries. Hence, “national 
specificities” in developmental patterns are “the immanent result of the global 
unfolding of the ‘law of value’” (Fitzsimmons and Starosta, 2017: 3).  
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The virtue of this approach is its critique of more romanticist readings that treat 
state policies as entirely autonomous from the global forces of capital accumulation. 
Yet the organising discourse within this approach also presents certain challenges with 
respect to exactly how we are supposed to view social agency in a given context, and 
why certain states assume the forms they do. In terms of the former, CICP generally 
admits no determinate force to agency or class struggle in the transformation(s) of 
capitalism, but only the “autonomised movement of self-valorising value” (Kicillof 
and Starosta, 2007: 28). Yet such a restricted reading runs into certain problems when 
confronted with empirical examples. For instance, in terms of Kornblihtt’s study of oil 
rent appropriation in Venezuela and its connection to macro-economic variables, he 
notes that “[f]urther research is required to correctly determine the reason for which 
oil rent is currently not invested… [at the rate] it was in the 1970s” (2015: 67). His 
provisional hypothesis is that the new international division of labour favours those 
states that contain a cheap labour force (such as East Asia), and that in light of these 
competing export power-houses, the Venezuelan state and bourgeoisie cannot (or will 
not?) invest adequate amounts of capital in order to match this competition (ibid: 68). 
Yet this begs two questions: why could the Venezuelan state and bourgeoisie not 
implement a new labour regime based on the cutting of workers’ wages? And why 
must we assume that the logic of Bolivarianismo would even attempt to compete with 
traditional capitalist economies in terms of export market capture?  
The most basic answer to these questions revolves around the concept of 
mediation, in which state policies and other agential dynamics are understood. For 
instance, labour regimes in East Asia and Latin America become articulated through 
an Export-oriented developmental state form, and a landlord state form, respectively 
(Grinberg and Starosta, 2009). While these differing forms are partly determined by 
the material foundation of a given national territory (e.g., highly disciplined workforce 
in one and extraordinarily resource rich deposits in the other), the specific policies 
exacted by a given state amount to a mediation of the global movement of total social 
capital. Nevertheless, important differences remain between particular landlord states, 
such as Venezuela and Ecuador. As Purcell argues, the key mechanism of ground rent 
transfer in Venezuela is the “deliberate state policy” of currency over-valuation 
(Purcell, 2016: 113), while Ecuador has chosen to remain locked into a dollarization 
regime. Thus, if a specific “economic content” is realised within a given state form, 
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we still require a more nuanced analysis of how and why such an economic content 
comes about in the first place.  
Can this approach to Marxian political economy be in any way reconciled with 
the above Poulantzian approach? While CICP scholars would surely deny such a 
possibility, I argue that such a reconciliation is entirely possible so long as one does 
not over-simplify the type of theory offered by Poulantzas and Jessop. For the real 
sticking point comes down to characterising ‘bourgeois’ Marxism as positing national 
policies and class struggles as autonomous determinants in the evolution of capitalism. 
Yet nowhere in Poulantzas or Jessop’s account do these dimensions assume a fully 
autonomous force. At various stages of SPS, Poulantzas’ discussion of changing 
European state policies and forms during the 1970s are clearly related with the 
increasing “internationalization of capital”. And as with Jessop’s approach to strategic 
and spatial selectivity, the ways in which such selectivities of state action emerge 
cannot be adequately captured through either a fully autonomous force of state 
hegemony, nor through the seemingly autonomous force of accumulation. Rather, they 
are mediated through the complex combination of an accumulation regime (based on 
material conditions of production nationally and globally) and hegemonic project 
(constructed in order to temporarily normalise the inherent class antagonisms and 
contradictions of accumulation) – a view that comes remarkably close to the CICP’s 
conceptualisation of the state as the most adequate form for “regulation of… 
antagonistic social relations” (Fitzsimons and Starosta, 2017: 12; cf. Grinberg, 2016: 
253) 
 To my mind, the real difference between a Poulantzian and CICP approach is 
largely semantic, despite the distinctive philosophy underlying the latter. However, a 
Poulantzian reading of the capitalist state, as an open field of class struggle that 
constantly makes and remakes the nature of the state apparatus, allows for a more 
nuanced approach to social agency, which simultaneously takes seriously the 
discourse and ideologies that co-constitute the material realities of social change. For 
all these reasons, a critical Poulantzian analysis of ALBA also sharply converges with 
the conclusions offered by Purcell (2016) as to the inherent contradictions of ALBA’s 
agrarian development policies (as we shall see in §6.8).  
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2.2.4 The Production of Counter-Space(s): Technology and Knowledge as Social 
Commons 
Despite the differences between the CICIP school and Jessop’s strategic-relational 
approach, neither approach offers any substantial insight into how and on what basis 
subaltern classes seek to forge their own strategies, counter-spaces and institutional 
alternatives. Rather, for Jessop strategy is always concerned with elite strategy, while 
for CICIP the only actor is the “working class” as an undifferentiated mass. However, 
the diverse geographies of capital and counter-hegemonic space represent two central 
vectors that enrich the above Poulantzian approach to rights, territory and sovereignty, 
as well as speaking directly to the conceptual levels intrinsic to the making of a 
counter-hegemonic region.  
In the above discussion of the production of space, it was noted how the 
geographies of capital are primarily governed through the (crisis-ridden) development 
of the productive forces, giving rise to specific means of production and infrastructures 
in the built environment. Seizing control not only of the existing array of productive 
forces, but in further developing them in accordance with a specific class project is 
therefore just as important for subaltern struggles as they are for strategies of class 
domination. Technologies and technical artefacts thus possess a relative ambiguity in 
terms of their directional use: a family-sized car may strictly shape the manner of its 
use, but the components of cars (the wheels, metal, engine, seats, etc.) are less 
constricted in their variable use (McCarthy, 2015: 54).14 In this way, “knowledge [as 
well as technology] has a social content, a class-content… including the natural 
sciences and techniques” (Carchedi, 2011: 38). Despite the differentiated class content 
of specific technologies, at a more general level, technological frontiers are in fact the 
material embodiment of what Marx (1993) called the “general intellect” of society, 
expressed not simply synchronically (as the aggregation of all individual labours that 
create the conditions of possibility for a given technological ‘moment’) but also the 
diachronic accumulation of past innovations and insights that fundamentally inform 
any given technological advancement. This state of affairs therefore makes technology 
a form of social commons, though contradictorily privatised by capital (Dugger, 2016).  
																																								 																				
14 It is notable that a commonly held practice in agroecology is the use of old car tyres for the making 
of soil-beds, an example I saw constantly across Venezuela, and used widely throughout the world.  
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Speaking of the Paris Commune, Marx noted how “not only was education made 
accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class prejudice and 
governmental force had imposed on it” (cited in Bossa, 2015: 180). For Lefebvre, this 
amounts to a “revolt of the ‘lived’ against abstractions, of the everyday against 
economism, of the social and civil society against the ‘high rate of growth,’ whose 
demands are upheld by the state” (Lefebvre, 2009 [1975]: 114). Forms of working 
class education were thus central even in Marx’s economic writings. In commenting 
on the necessity to transform the capitalist division of labour in the factory from one 
of monotonous, atomised work, to one in which workers become consistently more 
aware and educated of all tasks involved in complex production processes, he refers 
to the contradictory manner in which the needs of large scale industry have already 
forged the seeds of popular educational institutions. “One aspect of this process”, he 
observes, “is the establishment of technical and agricultural schools… in which the 
children of the workers receive a certain amount of instruction in technology and in 
the practical handling of the various implements of labour.” Going further, “There can 
be no doubt that, with the inevitable conquest of political power by the working class, 
technological education, both theoretical and practical, will take its proper place in the 
schools of the workers” (Marx, 1981: 618-9). At the same time, however, it is equally 
clear that the conquest of political power by the working classes will be significantly 
shaped by the degree to which alternative forms of knowledge and technical control 
may take sufficiently deep root in society more broadly. 
From a food sovereignty perspective, then, the role of radical pedagogy 
remains a crucial arrow in the quiver of agrarian transformation (Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, as with all hegemonic projects (whether they are counter-hegemonic or 
not), their discursive coordinates must find themselves grounded in a material basis 
(an accumulation strategy) that is adequate to their class content (Jessop, 1991: 155). 
In the spatio-territorial context of the nation-state (and laterally, the regional 
formation), conquering this terrain is obviously linked to wider networks of productive 
cooperation beyond the small farm. Though not often acknowledged in the food 
sovereignty literature, there is “the need to increase rural incomes through 
interventions… such as complementary marketing and processing activities” (Altieri 
and Nicholls, 2008: 478). Though LVC mentions the necessity for “local markets and 
local processing” (LVC, 2012), it is not always clear whether this refers to on-farm or 
off- (and near-) farm processing centres. This choice will be conditioned by the 
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availability of on-farm processing technologies, or pre-existing processing centres 
representing past patterns of capital accumulation. More emphatically, Edelman et al. 
(2015: 925), note that any substantial socio-spatial transformation of the food 
sovereignty landscape is necessarily embedded within “the struggle to increase value 
and distribute according to need, which is embodied in the vision of food sovereignty 
to build agroindustry in rural communities, to increase economies of scale, create 
forward and backward linkages and generate added value, all under the control of 
those who labour.” The case of the ALBA rice producing factories (Chapter 6) forms 
a clear example of the above vision, in the context of ‘endogenous development’, with 
the inter-linking of direct producers into wider publically owned infrastructures of 
value-added industrial processing that might benefit from economies of scale. As such, 
balancing between adequate farm-gate prices and proper technical and organisational 
considerations in the factory itself constitute important strategic considerations in the 
construction of a supra-local space of production/distribution that, in the end, hopes to 
maximise social consumption and popular power. Broadening food sovereignty 
beyond the peasantry towards other classes of workers similarly introduces 
considerations on the ownership/control of the productive forces, including the 
organisation of work itself. At the very least, such socio-productive networks bring 
both peasants and workers into a common struggle in the push for food sovereignty.  
As a final consideration, theorising the production of counter-spaces as integral 
socialist counter-hegemony cannot be isolated from the broader social context of 
which they are a part. After all, social space “exist[s] as so many variants in the 
differential class practices”, with both dominant and dominated class practices as 
“variants of a single matrix” (Poulantzas, 2014: 116). Given the manner in which 
capitalist power becomes constituted by, and flows through, state power, the notion of 
counter-spaces, which Lefebvre conceived as modalities of autogestion (self-
management), “may be proposed and imposed at all levels of social practice, including 
the agencies of coordination” (Lefebvre, [1966] 2009: 148). If the “revolt of the lived” 
essentially targets (by its very nature) the knowledge and ideology of the capitalist 
state (“economism”), then by virtue of broader patterns of direct control/management 
of productive forces and spaces (and hence dissolving the manual/intellectual labour 
divide), “The State of autogestion, which is to say the State at whose core autogestion 
is raised to power, can only be a State that is withering away (ibid: 150). 
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2.3 Conclusion  
This Chapter has sought to delineate, map out, and interrogate the basic theoretical 
coordinates that will inform the rest of this thesis. Each section thus contains the same 
overall rationale: to critically analyse the social, political and territorial implications 
of Food Sovereignty (FS). Thus, the aim here has been to identify three key markers 
that continually emerge in both FS scholarship and activist discourse: rights, territory, 
and sovereignty.  
 §2.1.1 addresses the challenging relationship between La Vía Campesina 
(LVC) and the hegemonic rights discourse of the liberal socio-economic order. This 
then introduces the first question, as to the ‘what’ and ‘whom’ of rights formation. For 
the complexity of FS rights discourse is not that they demand positive rights, but that 
(in many instances, and as a consequence of politically autonomous rural spaces) these 
actors often blur the line between presenting themselves as both the subject and author 
of rights. On one hand, if the traditional author of political rights, the sovereign state, 
indeed follows through on such a radical course of socio-political change, the very 
extent of this transformation almost certainly implies a correspondingly large 
expansion of state power. On the other hand, a genuinely autonomous form of rights 
authorship could emerge from practices and competencies embedded within specific 
local or community settings. What, then, is the constitutive basis for the relations 
between state and social forces, and between the formality of rights and the 
materialization of social power? It is not that these two binary poles have no 
relationship to each other, but the relationship is a decidedly complex one, precisely 
because they appear as relatively separated. To discern this relationship requires 
excavating a wider set of parameters that speak to the very techniques of exercising 
complex forms of power.  
This then opens up the second parameter of FS discourse, that of territory, and 
the contrasted meanings various actors assign to this notion. While peasant struggles 
for land and territory are often waged against the immediate threat from agro-industrial 
capital, it is also clear that the meaning of territory varies considerably between strands 
of the LVC movement, e.g., between ‘land’ or ‘cultural territory’. However, there is a 
different way of approaching this problem, by treating ‘territory’ as neither simply 
‘land’ or even ‘terrain’, but as political technology, and thus a medium of socio-
political power. The very act of naming and measuring not just land, but populations 
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and resources, has traditionally been the privilege of state practice. And the variable 
coordinates that colour specific territorial practices typically spell out the type of 
political, sovereign regime under question. Latin America’s left turn, and the discourse 
of ALBA in particular, opens up new spaces of recognition and political participation 
for traditionally marginalized groups. Thus, to speak of a new kind of ‘vertical 
territoriality’, in which participatory practice may slowly come into being, already 
amounts to a new type of political technology. From this vantage point, we can begin 
to substantiate the earlier claim that food sovereignty is more than simply agricultural 
practice, but a definite set of techniques that help to galvanise the socio-political 
dimensions of agro-ecological trusteeship.  
Finally, I suggested a simple starting point from which we might be able to 
disentangle the substance of sovereignty, through looking at the ways in which rights 
and territorial practices become entrenched. As a suggestive metaphor, I adapt 
Gramsci’s formula for classifying the modern capitalist state – the “integral state”, or 
“state = political society + civil society” – into a complementary formula of 
“sovereignty = rights + territory”. Clearly, the marked presence of decentralised 
powers and agencies on the land (positive rights + autonomous/cooperative territorial 
practices) engender the formal concept of multiple sovereignties, understood by FS 
protagonists as a set of nested spaces moving from the local all the way up to the 
international (forum) level.  
 In order to bring substance to these considerations, I first turn to the work of 
Nicos Poulantzas, to help flesh out some of the implications of rights and territory 
under modern conditions, which are precisely those that FS actors are struggle under 
(and against). I therefore sought to elucidate Poulantzas’ work as it pertains to rights 
(Law) and territory (political technique). Beginning from the same methodological 
premises of historical materialism’s ‘hard core’ (the forces and relations of 
production), Poulantzas’ early work on law sought to show how every ‘state’ (so 
conceived) carries within it the Fraternity-Terror binary – the generalized will for 
collective freedom ensured through the presence of force, and made necessary by the 
relations of exploitation. While the capitalist state is unique in its stark separation 
between the two binary poles, as if the relative ‘legality’ of the state is somehow 
attended by the relative absence of coercion, violence is in fact central to this form of 
state-hood.  
	 	 69	
Sinews of violence and state power thus emerge through variegated political 
technologies, abstraction and legalism, upholding private property rights and hence 
primitive accumulation and factory despotism, and the policing of national territory in 
the face of food riots or surplus populations. Rather than passive recipients of elite 
commands, subaltern struggles constantly fissure the coherence of hegemonic blocs, 
creating ever novel forms of state and institutionality, as well as legal and social 
norms. As we saw further, once the intensity of class struggle reaches a certain limit 
point, the presence of an irreconcilable ‘dual power’ fracturing the sovereign regime 
becomes ever likelier. Paradoxically, Poulantzas’ justified critique of state-worship in 
both the communist and social democratic variants leads to the seemingly impossible 
regime of ‘multiple sovereignties’. Yet through the general democratisation of 
property rights, popular control and management of productive (and political) 
activities, as well as the territorial practices that become adequate to it, the formation 
of multiple sovereignties appears more as the relative decentralisation of competencies 
and operations consonant with a given social scale. Thus, rather than splitting the 
social formation in two, multiple sovereignties holds out the possibility of differential 
territories linked together through a number of popular initiatives and collectivities 
form below acting in conjunction and cooperation with higher level administration 
from above.  
All of these coordinates are thus articulated by Poulantzas’ broader theoretical 
framework, as a relational theory of the state, in which its institutional materiality is 
conditioned by the balance of class forces and the resultant condensation of this 
balance within its overall form. As a strategic terrain of struggle that permeates every 
corner of society, the state is thus an open plain of conflict, though differentially open 
to particular social forces and strategies at different moments.  
 In order to open up these lines of thought, the chapter turned to latter neo-
Poulantzian conceptualisations of agency and strategy. Jessop’s strategic-relational 
approach thus makes more explicit what is only implicit in Poulantzas’ formulations. 
The concept of strategic selectivity thus connects the materially grounded 
accumulation strategies of dominant classes with the general production of consent 
and compromise forged through hegemonic projects. A given set of parameters for 
accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects thus shapes the selectivities of policy 
making, which is itself subject to micro-foundational contradictions and incoherences, 
themselves reflective of the contradictions inherent within accumulation and political 
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domination. Unpacking the dynamism of these strategically selective practices 
simultaneously calls for a more concerted focus on the nature of social space itself. 
Following Lefebvre (1991: 349), the nature of space, as outlined above, moves through 
several steps: as an array of productive forces, “a role originally played by nature, 
which it has displaced and supplanted”, and hence constituting a set of means of 
production (as well as being “politically instrumental”); underpinning the 
reproduction of property relations and their spatial implications (ownership of land, of 
space; hierarchal ordering of locations; organising of networks as a function of 
capitalism, etc.); comprising a set of institutional and ideological effects, complete 
with symbolisms and systems of meaning; finally containing potentialities, 
inaugurating the project of a different space. Through this multi-layered operation of 
social space, practices of power are as much spatially-selective as they are 
strategically-selective. Understanding the process of regionalisation is therefore 
tantamount to unpacking its underlying socio-spatial processes of becoming, primarily 
from the expanded scale and scope of accumulation, yet refracted through differential 
strategic and spatial selectivities marking the distinctiveness of regional regimes 
throughout the world.  
 The ALBA regional space is thus similarly marked by such selectivities that 
speak to the balance of class forces and congealed class projects constitutive of it. 
Premised upon a counter-hegemonic project against the discipline of Western-led 
globalism, the strategic and spatial selectivities of the ALBA combines the presence 
of the strong state with the proliferation of decentered powers. Such a reaction assumes 
a return to sovereignty, through international solidarities marked by regional articles 
of agreement yet enacted through ad-hoc negotiations. Though such agreements make 
note of both food sovereignty and the expansion of popular power, it is necessary to 
more closely examine the manner in which such policies are put into action, and the 
practices and strategies of various political actors that form a complex picture of socio-
spatial power. 
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3 Latin America’s Long Road to Regionalism: 
Capitalism, Ecology and Geopolitics 
 
The chapter will chart the emergence of Latin American regionalism through the rise 
and fall of US hegemony. Though initially ensnared by the dictates of Cold War 
geopolitics, Latin American leaders had always sought to carve out a new, modern 
version of Simón Bolívar’s 19th century dream of uniting the Latin continent. The 
uneven development found across the region, as well as the over-riding dominance of 
US power, continually thwarted the many attempts at a comprehensive region-wide 
arrangement, resulting instead in a proliferation of regionalisation schemes. The 
relative transformations in the international division of labour across the world system, 
in conjunction with the Cold War politics of imperialism, significantly affected the 
transformation in state forms and sovereign regimes – from post-war 
developmentalism to neoliberalism, engendering unique sets of rights, territorial 
politics and sovereign power. Yet the neoliberal onslaught would foster a new sense 
of rebellion through the Southern Cone, which in turn would lay the groundwork for 
‘Our America’ (Nuestra América). The new Latin American left therefore marks the 
newest phase of region building in the 21st century. However, this new push for a post-
hegemonic regionalism is not without its own tensions and contradictions.  
 
3.1 Geopolitics of Capitalist Agriculture: US Hegemony and the Problem of 
Regional Order 
The global power shift from British to US hegemony was, as with all such historical 
transitions, the manifestation of deeper underlying socio-ecological contradictions of 
the capitalist state-system. Britain’s ‘extensive’ regime of accumulation engendered a 
huge expansion in the productive forces across the globe, primarily in the form of 
transport infrastructures, as a response to the imperial centre’s voracious appetite for 
food and raw materials, which dramatically shrank the time-space configuration of the 
world economy (Moore, 2010a: 394). As a consequence, Britain’s spatial integration 
of peripheral spaces inadvertently elevated these new areas of production within the 
overall hierarchy of production and supply of grain at the world level. With the 
consolidation of settler colonial state-spaces, European agriculture was soon displaced 
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by a six-fold increase in imports from these areas (Friedmann, 1990: 14; Mazoyer and 
Roudart, 2006: 368-9). The ever more ‘energetic’ exploitation of the ecological base 
by these emergent centres of world agriculture – seen throughout the great plains of 
the United States, Canada and Argentina (to name but a few) – contributed not only to 
the systemic crisis of the capitalist world economy (the ‘Great Depression’ of the 
1870s and its system-wide depression of prices), but various ecological crises, the 
largest culminating in the great dustbowl throughout the American plains (S. Phillips, 
1999).  
 With the emergence of the US hegemonic regime, there was an inherent 
contradiction between, on the one hand, the strategic necessity of supporting US 
agriculture in the competitive environment of capitalist geopolitics on the one hand, 
and a deeper (hegemonic) necessity to maintain minimal agricultural security and 
stability within other states on the other, lest these states become vulnerable to 
revolutionary social forces. This lesson came early to US foreign policy planners in 
the case of Mexico (one of only five states that were formally democratic during the 
inter-war period). With Roosevelt’s pressing desire to avoid both fascism and 
socialism in his southern neighbour, a partnership was brokered via the Rockefeller 
Foundations’ Mexican Agricultural Programme, which became “a crucial event in the 
transformation of agricultural science from a tool merely for industrial modernization 
into a device for power relationships between nations” (Perkins, 1997: 103). From the 
Mexican perspective, the national-popular regime headed by Lázaro Cárdenas 
similarly sought to carve out a middle ground for the state apparatus, which as Trotsky 
wrote, “seeks to defend itself on the one hand against foreign imperialism and on the 
other against its own proletariat” (cited in Morton, 2010: 24). A major part of 
Cárdenas’ balancing act between inherently contradictory class forces was the 
strategic partnership with the US and the Rockefeller Foundation, cemented for the 
purpose of importing up to date technologies and techniques, as well as agro-
ecological expertise. Indeed, this strategy was a major concern for virtually all Latin 
American states, desperately seeking to re-import the botanical and agro-ecological 
knowledge that had been taken by imperial-metropolitan elites during the colonial era, 
and which, once recaptured, could be harnessed in further consolidating their 
commercial-agricultural foundations (McCook, 2002). 
 These developmental dynamics, at both national and geopolitical scales, 
strongly shaped the subsequent pattern of Latin America’s foreign relations with the 
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emergent world hegemon. In the context of delicate, and potentially revolutionary, 
situations brewing in the South American continent, Adolf Berle, a member of 
Roosevelt’s ‘brain trust’, noted that, “We shall have to be either generous or 
imperialistic… and present history is showing that the generous policy is infinitely the 
more successful” (cited in Grandin, 2007: 33). Thus began the famed ‘Good 
Neighbour’ policy – a type of indirect imperialism that maintained “ideological as well 
as military and economic hegemony and conformity, without having to pay the price 
of permanent conquest” (Drake, 1991: 34), and which would form the major 
component of post-war US policy in the Western hemisphere.15 In essence, all of these 
developments rose up together, forming a cascading series of determinations that 
radically altered the political geography of world politics – the expansion of the 
productive forces via British-led industrialisation “increasingly forced the ‘closing of 
frontiers’” across the world system (Colás, 2008: 622), leading ineluctably towards a 
new form of strategic and spatial selectivity of an emergent US hegemony, more 
concerned with prising trade and investment doors open while still maintaining the 
formal integrity of sovereign frontiers.   
 And yet, the Western hemispheric system of domination was also reflective of 
a much deeper shift that was taking place throughout the political geography of the 
20th century world system. The fundamental contradiction of the capitalist mode of 
production – between the geographical expansion and socialisation of the productive 
forces, and their organisation by private and national interests (Mandel, 1986: 20) – 
culminated in a new spatial form seemingly adequate, yet unevenly distributed, to the 
immanent development of large-scale industrial capitalism, culminating in 
‘continent’-sized polities and regional spheres of influence. In many ways, the entire 
World War II conflagration could be seen as a global instance of geopolitical strategy 
attempting to adapt to the extensity and intensity levels of late industrial capitalism, 
expressed principally through the US continental space of accumulation (Moore, 
2002). Hence, German and Japanese expansionism, and the regional spheres they 
attempted to carve out (in the shape of Großraum and the Great East-Asian Co-
Prosperity Sphere) were fundamentally premised upon solving the first great ‘agrarian 
question’, in terms of adequate ecological space for the feeding of both voracious 
																																								 																				
15 Though the same cannot be said of the less fortunate (smaller and more spatially proximate) Central 
American and Caribbean states (see LeFeber, 1993). 
	 	 74	
national-imperial machines, and the concomitant expansion of urban populations 
(Tooze, 2008: 166ff; Matsumura, 2016). Thus, the first glimmers of regional 
formations were spatial expressions of capitalism’s socio-ecological fixes (cf. Mandel, 
1986: 12); in turn, “industrialisation was giving place to a new phase of ‘continental 
history’” (Puntigliano, 2011: 849; see also Smith, 2003: 48f.). 
Even after the defeat of these regional challengers to the West’s ‘Wilsonian 
universalism’, the emerging institutional architecture of global governance eventually 
ended up consolidating the regionalisation of world politics, rather than undermine it. 
Roosevelt’s notion of the regional ‘Four Policeman’ (US, USSR, Britain, China) 
eventually lost out to the State Department’s preference for universal multilateralism 
in the shape of the UN General Assembly (the Security Council, wielding the 
monopoly of legitimate force, was the basic compromise between these two extremes). 
Yet the rapidly escalating antagonism between the US and USSR, including the 
victory of communist forces in China that required the entrance of Japan as the 
regional ally of Asia (Katzenstein, 2005: 48), simply increased the necessity of 
regional forms of governance, even if under a somewhat narrower logic. This logic, at 
first conceived intellectually as ‘integration theory’ during the immediate post-war 
period, was not only a process of seeking adequate spatial complexes for the scale of 
capital accumulation during the 20th century (Cocks, 1980: 27), but also a fundamental 
tool in the Atlantic heartland’s quest for hegemony throughout the world system; as 
Murphy observes, for the early post-war theorists, “functional integration could be… 
an alternative solution to the problems that generated late nineteenth-century 
imperialism” (Murphy, 2005: 92). This latter strategy was in no small part aimed at 
checking the expanding influence of the Soviet Union and particularly against the 
highly significant and combative communist parties that peppered the European 
continent, particularly in France, Italy and Greece (Krige, 2008). Thus, the post-war 
project of regional integration was, like the inter-war period, premised on the 
exigencies of specific accumulation regimes and their spatial-agglomeration effects, 
yet this time refracted through the making of an Atlanticist hegemonic project 
underwritten by US ‘imperium’ (van der Pijl, 2014: 123ff.; Katzenstein, 2005). If 
policy planners wavered in their commitment to such a project, the very foundation of 
‘Western’ society would be prone to collapse, or at least succumb to the alternative 
communist development model (Cocks, 1980: 29; van der Pijl, 2006: 39-40). As 
Hurrell argues: 
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“during the Cold War both superpowers favoured those regionalist 
arrangements that reinforced the strength of their respective alliance 
systems or provided support for important clients. But where 
regionalism went against their geopolitical interests it was firmly 
opposed, as, for example, with US opposition to sub-regional 
cooperation in Latin America in the early 1950s” (Hurrell, 1995: 341).  
The containment of Soviet power that came to dominate US foreign relations during 
the post-war period formed the underlying logic for the various regional security 
communities throughout Asia and Latin America (Katzenstein, 2005: 45). US-Latin 
American relations became the principal laboratory from which emerged many of the 
ideas and practices undergirding this (regionalised) mode of global governance (cf. 
van der Pijl, 2014: 126-7). The signing of Latin America’s regional security ‘Rio Pact’ 
in 1947 would set the trend for other regional security regimes, from the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Grandin, 2007: 39).16 
From this geopolitical arrangement, “the US delightfully had the best of both worlds: 
the global organization it had sought since Wilson’s era, but also the freedom of action 
under the Monroe Doctrine” (LaFeber, 1993: 93). Yet the very fact that US policy 
makers favoured regional security regimes so early on (headed by the preeminent US 
position within them) revealed the underlying role that the Global South was supposed 
to play within the post-war order: as pliant spaces of raw material supplies or open 
markets to the three regional nodes of global capitalism (US, Western Europe and 
Japan). Economic integration among weaker states, by definition, dilutes this 
subordinate position in the international division of labour through the establishment 
of collective tariffs and common markets.  
Soon enough, it was realised that this limited role assigned to the Global South 
would be the undoing of US influence throughout the non-Western world. As the 
prominent policy advisor Walt Rostow remarked at the time, “Even if Marx and Lenin 
did not exist, we would still have a problem” (cited in Peck, 2010: 36). For all the 
intensity of Washington’s bid to portray the communist ‘menace’ as some 
international conspiracy, the fact remained that the continuation of US imperialism 
throughout the Global South would simply do the USSR’s bidding, by fostering 
continual subaltern rebellions that typically took the form of radical socialist or 
																																								 																				
16 The Rio Pact of 1947 and the subsequent Bogotá summit of 1948 would culminate in the Organization 
of American States (OAS), which effectively embodied the institutional expression of US imperial 
domination within the region (van der Pijl, 2006: 180). 
	 	 76	
communist social forces. And it is against this wider geopolitical backdrop that must 
be kept in mind when we consider the post-war trajectory of Latin American states 
and regional initiatives, as they attempted to exploit, through ever more intensive 
means, the ecological bases of their own territories in the struggle to survive the 
tempest of the capitalist world market. 
 
3.2 Creating (and Containing) Class Struggle: Between Imperium and Regional 
Autonomy 
The post-World War II order, spearheaded by the US’s ‘Fordist’ hegemonic project 
(Rupert, 1995), witnessed the establishment of a world-wide productivist paradigm of 
Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) that applied directly to those states in the 
Global South which for so long depended on foreign markets for their primary 
commodity exports and imported consumables. Yet it seemed clear to Latin American 
leaders that the ISI strategy could not solve foreign exchange constraints if left within 
the frontiers of the nation-state (Nogués and Quintanilla, 1993: 281). Thus, the first 
rumblings of a new post-war regional integration scheme emerged from Brazil’s 
proposal for Operation Pan-America – a diplomatic overture to US policymakers as a 
means of re-directing their gaze from the global ‘threat’ of communism and back 
towards the South American continent.  
However, these piecemeal moves towards a renewed pan-American space of 
development could not be extricated from the rumblings of revolution. With the 
adverse hemispheric impact stemming from the American recession of 1957-8, 
protests and urban riots greeting Vice President Nixon’s tour of the region, and the 
openly communist revolution in Cuba, had all brought home Walt Rostow’s earlier 
message to US foreign policy makers: that even without the existence of Moscow, 
Latin American states would be prone to genuinely popular revolutions. In many ways, 
they further vindicated Brazil’s intense desire to further Latin American 
developmentalism for the sake of achieving regional order. Nevertheless, and 
precisely because of the Cuban debacle, the Brazilian dream of a new Pan-
Americanism soon gave way to John F. Kennedy’s ‘Alliance for Progress’, launched 
in 1961, which sought to implement more fully the ‘generous’ side of US foreign 
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relations in the Latin American countryside, albeit coupled with an imperialistic “fist 
of steel” (Smith, 1991: 76; cf. Weis, 2001: 327).17 
  “[T]he first and necessary stage of [the Alliance’s push for] modernization”, 
notes McCormick (1989: 143), “was the commercialization of agriculture on a more 
large-scale, mechanised basis. Land reform was to be geared more to that goal than to 
any break-up of the haciendas and redistribution of land to the peasantry.” Thus, the 
switch to more modern forms of energy- and chemical-intensive production methods 
crucially marked this phase of agrarian transition (Petras and LaPorte, 1970). The 
‘green revolution’, which underwrote the fundamental productivist transition within 
the Alliance’s wider geopolitical project, was more than simply applying mechanised 
means of production to the landscape; it was significantly a revolution in agro-
chemical engineering. As a continuation of capitalism’s general extension and 
intensification of the earth’s ‘nitrogen cycle’ (Perkins, 1997: 211-18), and largely 
pioneered in the US, the ‘green revolution’ of the 1960s and beyond comprised a 
gargantuan increase in yields per hectare by combining more capital- and energy-
intensive technologies with synthetic chemical compounds and genetically enhanced 
seed varieties (see Tables 1 and 2). Reflecting a more ‘capitalised’ form of agriculture, 
successful chemical input-use was not simply premised on acquisition of the product, 
but of the knowledge and technical expertise needed to execute them in the right 
proportions. Again, the sheer weight of capital-intensive production, and the 
productivity differentials they opened up, meant that despite the hesitance of small 
farmers, “The question for growers became not whether to use the materials but when, 
how much, how applied, and for how much money” (Perkins, 1997: 216). Scale and 
scope meant that larger units of production could capture both larger capital inputs per 
unit of land and labour as well as the needed technical upgrading in knowledge and 
management; rarely did foreign advisers trek to the remote villages to help small 
																																								 																				
17 Kennedy was merely carrying forth an earlier instantiation of US discourse regarding ‘development’ 
as a major component in its foreign relations. The immediate impact of the Cuban revolution led 
Eisenhower’s ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, to argue that “We should focus on the 
Declaration of Independence rather than on the Communist Manifesto where [the focus] has been… 
and in doing so we should not endeavour to sell the specific word ‘Capitalism’ which is beyond 
rehabilitation in the minds of the non-white world” (cited in LeFeber, 1993: 14). In turn, Kennedy 
proclaimed to be building “a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and 
all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom… Let us once again transform the American 
Continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts” (cited in Grandin, 2007: 47). The 
discursive appropriation of the trope ‘revolution’ helped to infuse a popular idiom with the hidden 
metaphorical undertone of the capitalist revolution.   
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Table 1: Fertiliser (nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium) consumption in selected countries 
(annual averages in thousands of tons of plant nutrients) 
 
Source: Furtado, 1976: 146. 
 
 
Table 2: Tractors used in farming in selected countries (thousands of units) 
 
Source: Furtado, 1976: 146. 
 
 
 farmers become more accustomed to what they had just purchased in the new 
chemical input markets. As a consequence, both the land and people working on it 
were often at extreme risk from chemical exposure and toxification. 
 Despite these efforts at revolutionising Latin American agriculture, serious 
imbalances emerged: productivity per agricultural worker was only one-fourth of 
industrial workers, while agriculture grew at around 3.5 percent (1950-1967), 
compared to industry’s 6.3 percent growth rate. In comparison to average growth in 
the overall regional economy (5.2 percent), agriculture was under-performing while 
industry was moving in the opposite direction (Stevenhagen, 1974: 126, 129). This 
pattern can be largely explained via the territorial and geographical specificity of Latin 
America, marked primarily through enormous resource frontiers (extensive land tracts 
and rich mineral deposits), which offered statesman and industrial capitalists ample 
opportunity to avoid confrontation with their own working classes by simply seizing 
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a portion of ground-rent generated by large-scale agriculture or mining in order to 
support the relatively uncompetitive nature of industry (Philips 2004: 45; Grinberg 
and Starosta 2009: 767-8). The main upshot of these developments – of industrial ISI, 
agricultural revolutions, and the geopolitical offshoots of these socio-economic 
changes, such as the Alliance for Progress – was that they were all stop-gap measures 
for a fundamental contradiction that could not be solved unless approached at the most 
fundamental level (cf. Taylor, 2010: 44). In other words, the containment of class 
struggle, which comprised one of the central politico-discursive functions of Latin 
American populism and developmentalism, would only ever be a temporary 
possibility within the confines of traditional class structures.  
In light of these difficulties, it was recognised by the end of the 1960s that the 
time to move away from simple security communities was at hand. It was Latin 
American leaders themselves who were most attuned to the need for a re-boot of 
Operation Pan-America (Puntigliano, 2011). In his Foreign Affairs article of 1959, 
then ex-president of Ecuador, Galo Plaza, argued for the establishment of a “regional 
market” in order to further stimulate Latin America’s meagre push into producer goods 
and consumer durables sectors. In his view, the territories of the US, USSR, China and 
India were already “regional markets of enormous magnitude. Only Latin America 
remains divided into 20 separate economic units” (Plaza, 1959: 609-10). Some years 
later, at a conference held in 1966 at Georgetown University, Gustavo Lagos, a 
Chilean intellectual and later Minister of Justice under the Frei administration, noted 
the structural necessity of moving towards a larger politico-economic space for the 
South American nations. Like Plaza, he noted that the sheer scale of capital 
accumulation during the second half of the 20th century (marked primarily by the 
“continental federations” of the US and USSR) necessitated a concerted push towards 
tighter political and economic cooperation between the smaller South American states 
(Milenky, 1973: 10-11). 
 Subsequent to Richard Nixon’s inauguration in 1969, Plaza (then Secretary of 
the OAS) was contacted by Nixon to gain some insight into how US-Latin American 
relations could be placed on a stronger footing. Plaza’s response was to organise a 
fact-finding mission across the continent, of which he recommended Nelson A. 
Rockefeller to be the mission’s head. Yet Rockefeller’s grand tour of the region was, 
like Nixon’s a decade earlier, met with intense bouts of protests and civic unrest from 
the continent’s subaltern classes. It became immediately apparent where the region 
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would have to go in order to quell the growing social unrest. Like Plaza, Lagos, and 
other Latin American leaders, Rockefeller understood that regional integration would 
be the surest path to prosperity and stability. And yet, despite Rockefeller’s 
recommendation, the US had little interest in seeing a South American regional 
formation potentially dilute US economic dominance. Nevertheless (and perhaps 
because of this) the Tratado de Montevideo (Treaty of Montevideo) was signed in 
1960 by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, and later joined by Paraguay, Peru and 
Mexico, thus creating the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). In 1968, 
the number of member states reached 11. The idea was to institute a negotiated and 
gradual elimination of trade barriers (buffeted with countless clauses and concessions 
for particular countries on particular commodities), and the subsequent formation of 
the Latin American Common Market (LACM) within 12 years (Phillips, 2004: 48). 
By and large, the Association did produce results, but perhaps not those envisaged by 
Latin American developmentalist thinkers; agriculture and primary products 
accounted for 70 percent of intra-LAFTA trade, rather than manufactures, and by 1967 
the push for the LACM was all but abandoned. The principal reasons for LAFTA’s 
disappointing career was due to the sheer diversity in size, structure and socio-
ecological basis of the member states, the weak level of physical and communicative 
integration between them, and the concomitant concentration of trade between the 
biggest players, Argentina, Brazil and Chile (Phillips, 2004: 49-50; cf. Haas and 
Schmitter, 1964: 721).  
Yet these developmental bottlenecks merely stumped the LAFTA space, not 
integration itself. The spatial divisions that expressed differential development 
patterns re-emerged in subsequent integration initiatives that brought together groups 
of states that were closer in both geography and levels of development, such as the 
Central American Common Market, the Andean Pact and CARICOM (Fawcett, 2005: 
39). The overall strategic and spatial selectivity of early Latin American integration 
was therefore overdetermined by the relative dominance of agriculture, the only 
significant trade good within LAFTA, at the expense of industrial goods, thus leading 
to a further geographical fragmentation of the Latin American continent. 
Meanwhile, deeper transformations taking place within the world economy 
would go on to take a particularly heavy toll, which subsequently impacted on its 
structures of agrarian production and forms of regional integration. Indeed, the world-
wide turn to neoliberal ‘discipline’ engendered a new mode of social regulation and 
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economic organization that, at least within Latin America’s agrarian spaces, led to 
entirely new discursive conceptions, and patterns of mobilization, among political 
elites and peasant movements. 
 
3.3 The ‘Lost Decades’: Economic Liberalisation and Neoliberal Discipline 
The severe re-adjustments experienced by Latin American states during the 1980s 
were due to the conjunctural shift in the organisation of international capitalism. The 
general crisis of the capitalist world system, experienced as general falling rates of 
profit within the core states (US, Germany and Japan), forced the most sluggish of 
these three competitors, the US, to drastically change the rules of the global game in 
order to stave off unbearable competition and ensure its continued dominance (Kiely, 
2005: 56-64). Having severed the US dollar’s link to gold, the floating exchange rate 
mechanism freed the US from traditional balance of payment constraints, in which 
devaluation and expansion into foreign markets were buttressed by the international 
system’s continued reliance on the dollar as measure of value and medium of 
exchange. More significantly, the oil crisis of 1973 saw OAPEC states (the Arab states 
within OPEC), led by Saudi Arabia, instigate an oil embargo, precipitating a major 
earthquake throughout the world economy in the form of skyrocketing oil prices. The 
cash-flushed oil states would, according to the negotiations between Kissinger and 
King Faisal in 1974, recycle these dollar holdings back into the US banking system, 
which in turn was used as a lending mechanism to the Global South as a replacement 
of the dwindling aid programs (Spiro, 1999).  
 For Latin American states, such sources of funding were essential for covering 
their balance of payments problems, which had been traditionally financed through 
increasing volumes of ground rent appropriated from the countryside. The eventual 
‘Volcker shock’, which hiked US interest rates in the battle against domestic inflation 
and domestic class conflict, put enormous pressure on states in the Global South with 
respect to their debt repayment values, which correspondingly increased.  
 Yet the neoliberal turn in Latin America did not simply originate through debt 
crises and balance of payment constraints, even if this became the general trend by the 
1980s. Rather, the imposition of neoliberal discipline was from the start, and even into 
its ‘mature’ phase, as a class project seeking to break the power of organised labour in 
its traditional spaces of power in the cities and countryside. In other words, wherever 
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labour was a significant political force, it had to be put back into a position of social 
discipline. Hence the early arrival of neoliberal experimentation in Chile, which 
boasted a highly combative and well organised working class and peasantry, which 
finally achieved political hegemony through the election of Salvador Allende. Yet the 
Chilean case is a particularly notorious example of US imperial power in the region, 
exemplified by the ‘Operation Condor’ network of ‘anti-Marxist’ terror campaigns 
actively coordinated and funded by the US military establishment (McSherry, 2005), 
and in which the American ‘monetarists’ used this Latin American nation as a 
laboratory for untested economic ideas. Equally, if not more bloody than the Chilean 
case, Argentina’s ‘dirty war’ scarred the social landscape for almost a decade 
throughout the 1970s. As with Chile, Argentina’s new military junta conceived of its 
role in murdering, torturing and ‘disappearing’ political opponents (radical social 
forces) as a necessary component to rebuilding its economy, seeking “to solve the 
problems that the economy posed for political stability, at the cost of economic growth 
if necessary” (Romero, 2002: 221). This dynamic truly speaks to the underlying social 
logic of neoliberal transformation: while so often couched in the discourse of market 
‘efficiency’ and ‘growth strategies’, the class basis of neoliberal logic fell upon a 
notion of ‘the market’ that “appeared to be the instrument capable of equally 
disciplining all the social actors” (ibid; cf. Kiely, 2005: 63ff).  
 In terms of ecology, this new accumulation regime, based less and less on the 
introduction of new sources of wealth (land and labour productivity) entailed highly 
contradictory effects on the composition of Latin America’s agrarian spaces: “[t]he 
frontiers that could yield a cornucopia of nature’s free gifts were fewer than ever 
before, and the scientific-technological revolution in labor [sic] productivity, greatly 
anticipated in the 1970s, never materialised” (Moore, 2010b: 229).18 In the face of 
falling prices and productivity, it was ultimately the rural poor that suffered lower 
levels of consumption, which took a massive toll on the state of the agrarian 
population: the rural population went from more than half to a quarter between 1960-
1990, during which time the value of agricultural exports by one-half to one-fifth, and 
as a share of GDP from 17% in 1960 to less than 10% (Kay, 1995: 21; see also Table 
3). 
																																								 																				
18 The ‘closing’ of the frontier represents a significant structural barrier to Latin America’s traditional 
mode of agricultural growth, in which for the years 1948-1964, “two-thirds of the increase in 
[agricultural] output stemmed from bringing new land under cultivation” (Street, 1987: 203). 
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Table 3: Evolution of the Agricultural Labor Force in Latin America,  
 1970-2000 Selected Countries (000s). 
 
   Source: Long and Roberts, 2005: 63 
   aThe percentages are the percentage of the total labour force that works in agriculture. 
 
Contrary to economic orthodoxy, neoliberal economic reforms led to lacklustre 
growth in the agricultural sector, around 2 percent in the 1980s and 2.6 in the 1990s, 
compared to 3.5 per cent between 1950-1980 (Kay, 2004: 234). This highly uneven 
form of agricultural production has merely accentuated the earlier pattern of rising 
food imports during the 1970s, in which rural production became skewed in favour of 
remunerative products favouring urban tastes and foreign consumers (e.g., fruits, 
livestock, and sorghum) (Ortiz, 2014). Subsequently, the ratio of agricultural imports 
to exports was around 40 percent in the 1980s, and 60 percent in the 1990s (Kay, 2004: 
235). In the context of these changes, the composition of the peasantry has resulted in 
a type of ‘semi-proletarianization’ in which peasants devote more of their time to off-
farm activities, either in urban centres or from seasonal wage-labour on larger farms 
(ibid: 241). 
 As a corollary to this novel accumulation regime based less on new sources of 
wealth and more on higher rates of exploitation, the neoliberal hegemonic project 
much lower overall rates of urbanization. The predominant forms of mi-
gration become urban-to-urban migration and international migration.
Urban growth eases to be conce trated in one or two m jor primat cities.
There is a growth of intermediate cities and a more dispersed pattern of
urbanization. However, new forms of urban agglomeration emerge. These
are mega urban regions, such as the b sin of Mexico City or the state of
Sao Paulo metropolitan constellation. These agglomerations contain a cen-
tral metropolis, which is the location of the headquarters of large firms and
specialized services, several more specialized industrial cities, and a peri-
urban hi terland of villages and small towns, which mix iculture (often
market gardening) with crafts, services and outsourced production for for-
eign and national enterprises.
Urban labor markets appear less able t absorb migrants than in the past.
Levels of unemployment and underemployment are higher in the late 1990s
Table 1. Evolu ion of the Agricultural Labor Force in Latin America,
1970–2000 S lected Countries (000s).
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000
No. % No. % No. % No. %
Venezuela 829 26.0 751 14.6 874 12.0 805 8.1
Argentina 1,495 16.0 1,384 12.9 1,482 12.1 1,464 9.8
Uruguay 207 18.6 192 16.6 193 14.2 190 12.6
Chile 715 24.1 800 20.9 938 18.8 980 15.8
Brazil 16,066 47.2 17,480 36.7 15,232 23.3 13,211 16.7
Nicaragua 350 51.1 393 39.6 392 28.6 396 20.0
Costa Rica 243 42.9 290 35.2 307 26.1 324 20.2
Panama 211 41.6 197 28.9 245 26.2 251 20.3
Colombia 3,080 45.1 3,776 40.5 3,696 26.6 3,719 20.4
Mexico 6,541 43.8 7,995 36.3 8,531 27.8 8,551 21.4
Ecuador 997 51.5 1,013 39.8 1,201 33.3 1,249 25.9
El Salvador 673 56.8 697 43.6 709 36.4 775 29.1
Peru 1,915 48.3 2,183 40.3 2,654 35.7 2,965 30.4
Honduras 580 67.4 684 57.2 693 41.4 769 31.7
Paraguay 409 49.8 514 44.8 595 38.9 706 34.3
Bolivia 872 55.1 1,064 52.8 1,249 46.9 1,497 44.2
Guatemala 1,106 61.1 1,257 53.8 1,569 52.4 1,916 46.1
Totala 36,289 42.1 40,670 34.3 40,560 25.2 39,768 19.5
% Rural 10,6399.2 42.3 11,3679.7 35.2 11,2316.8 28.7 11,2835.4 24.4
Source: FAOSTAT Population data, February 2004.
aThe percentages are the percentage of the total labor force that works in agriculture.
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tended to relegate the role of the state in the process of economic development, even 
if the state as such did not necessarily see a ‘decline’ in its overall power (Lahiff et al., 
2007). Rather, “neoliberal enclosures required, in the first instance, fundamental 
alterations by the state in the structure of rights to property in the juridical and legal 
sphere that it monopolised” (Akram-Lodhi, 2007: 1446). Yet the distinctiveness of 
this new sovereign regime consequently led to the relative fragmentation of the state 
apparatus itself, in which various competencies become externalised towards private 
groups:  
“governments in the region enlisted the support of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to encourage peasant organizations and 
communities to make greater use of the ‘market mechanism’… and, in 
their politics, to eschew direct action and utilize instead ‘the electoral 
mechanism’ – in other words, to adopt peaceful/legalistic forms of 
struggle in pursuit of their interests” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002: 52-
3). 
This marked a substantial transformation in the strategic selectivity of state 
apparatuses, in which various competencies traditionally integrated into the state itself 
were ‘outsourced’ to more agile, formally independent organisations. Yet these groups 
were not simply boosters of the neoliberal project. For many NGOs, there was a 
dilemma as to whether or not participation in agrarian reform and social fund 
implementation under conditions of neoliberal adjustment conveyed a passive 
acceptance of these social dislocations, “which nearly all NGOs have criticized as 
socially regressive and unacceptable” (Beggington and Thiele, 1993: 51). On the other 
hand, it was the very nature of NGOs – as institutions that were more efficient and 
effective with limited funds – that condemned such groups to rules of reproduction 
that continuously pushed them into the arms of neoliberal hegemony; unlike the 
seemingly unlimited funds of a state budget, “[w]hen an NGO programme comes to 
an end, it is the NGO which must look for [external] funds to maintain its personnel” 
(ibid: 55). The effects of structural adjustment facilitated the propensity for NGOs to 
carry forward the new neoliberal discourse premised on a renewed neo-classical vision 
of markets, with state personnel leaving an atrophied public sector for the NGO sector, 
and carrying with them their university educated knowledge of classical sociology and 
biological science (ibid: 54; see also Silva, 2009: 25).  
In essence, the emergence of a near-universal turn to ‘neoliberal sovereignty’ 
in Latin America carried with it corresponding shifts in rights and territory. By 
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transforming state functions to a night-watchman mode and away from the post-war 
gran patron, ceding key industries and social service provision to domestic and 
foreign capitals that correspondingly shifted the terrain of rights away from the 
popular classes back towards property owners, Latin American states took on a new 
set of political technologies – principally enshrined in the discourse of liberal 
democracy, and thus from a positive rights guarantor to a negative rights guardian 
(Silva, 2009: 24-5). Changes in the productive forces and organisational strategies of 
accumulation led to variable degrees of “flexible accumulation”, creating an ever more 
flexible labour market and thus increased precarity within the ranks of the working 
class in both the factory and field (Spronk, 2013: 81; Kay, 2008: 924-5). The 
hegemonic project of neoliberal discipline was equally supported through the ‘de-
radicalisation’ of educational institutions (catered more towards business/industry 
oriented curricula), the establishment of enormous media latifundios (Dello Buono, 
2010), and the transformation of a once-radical cadre of intellectuals into a loyal choir 
singing the praises of neoliberal discipline. Strategic and spatial selectivities thus 
unfolded along a type of “de-nationalisation” (Jessop, 2002), transposing socio-
economic power above and below, typically through sub-national decentralisation, 
forging “economies of agglomeration” within urban centres (though wracked with 
informal work and barrio peripheries) (de la Cruz, 2011), as well as through 
foreignization of space through increased Foreign Direct Investment and profit 
expatriation (Robinson, 2008).  
 As with the challenges faced by Latin American states during the closure of 
the ISI boom, the systemic pressures of neoliberalism were met with a wider push 
towards regionalisation. Gustavo Lagos’ prophetic remarks concerning the continent 
sized confederations of the US and USSR were now borne out by the increasing 
regionalisation of the global trade regime, seeking to economise on geographical 
distance and transaction costs (Coleman and Underhill, 1998). Unlike the previous era, 
however, the US was attempting to consolidate a wider regional role through the 
creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in which the 
concerns for increased regional competitiveness over the rival regional poles led by 
Germany in the European Community and Japan’s ‘flying geese’ model always 
trumped other concerns over the potentially negative effects on labour or ecology 
(Fairbrother, 2009: 148; Ciccantell, 2011). From the emergence of this trilateral 
economic space arose a re-articulation of the long-standing contradiction between the 
	 	 86	
fragmentation of sovereign equality, and capitalism as a global mode of production; 
in terms of the particularly unequal partnership between the US and Mexico, “The 
NAFTA discourse allowed the simultaneous existence of both the possibility of 
economic integration with Mexico as an equal partner and the established image of 
Mexico as a dependent other” (Skonieczy, 2001: 451, emphasis added). Discursive 
constructions of this kind were (as with social discourse in general) internally related 
to the politico-economic reality of the NAFTA space, which quickly yielded a ‘peso 
crisis’ in Mexico, and lacklustre macro-performance in both Mexico and Canada 
(measured in high rates of unemployment and declining real hourly wages, not to 
mention ecological degeneration), leading ultimately to “a discredited NAFTA” 
(Pastor, 2001: 120).  
Yet US designs for the western hemispheric region went far beyond the mere 
trilateralisation of cross-border flows – it fundamentally harked back to the Monroe 
doctrine vision of an entire hemisphere premised on US hegemony. The Miami 
Summit in 1994 thus presented the diplomatic platform for the US’s proposed Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would stretch from Alaska to Tierra del 
Fuego (with projected completion by 2004). Yet for Latin America’s biggest 
economy, Brazil, “this could only signal that there was a premium on diversification 
of its economic and political links. For Brazil, MERCOSUR is therefore a political 
vehicle for larger ambitions rather than a goal in itself” (van der Pijl, 2006: 197).   
 The origins of Latin America’s most developed regional project, the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR), goes back to the earlier round of regional integration 
agreements in 1986 between the two largest players, Argentina and Brazil (Gardini, 
2010). It finally came to fruition as ‘Southern Cone Common Market’ in 1991, signed 
by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. The economic content of the 
MERCOSUR space was not so different from the neoliberal pattern, yet its socio-
political effects certainly deviated from the norm of subservience to Atlantic capital, 
an institutional ensemble “located somewhere between NAFTA and a common 
market” (Katzenstein, 2005: 231). MERCOSUR could offer a more stable platform 
for trade and production given the much lower levels of unevenness across its 
members states than what would be the case if they had joined the proposed FTAA (or 
even bilateral agreements with the US). Trade levels among member states grew 
moderately, from 4.1 to 20.3 billion USD (1990-1997), with the percentage of intra-
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MERCOSUR trade relative to members’ global trade at 14 to 25 percent (1992-1997) 
(Muñoz, 2001: 83).  
Nevertheless, MERCOSUR is hobbled by a number of intervening factors. 
Firstly, it is entirely premised on inter-governmentalism, which leaves inter-state 
relations at the level of diplomacy, rather than region-wide legislation (Phillips, 2003: 
220; Katzenstein, 2005: 231). Secondly, this pattern of relations between members 
leads inevitably to a democratic deficit with respect to the citizenry of the bloc, who 
may have formal channels of consultation (Consultative Social and Economic Forum), 
yet in practice have little influence on policy. Thirdly, and despite the more level 
playing field within MERCOSUR as opposed to integration with the US, the levels of 
development, and the specificities of each member’s economy, creates asymmetries 
of opportunity and cost, leading either to unequal benefits or to treaty agreements that 
remain too vague and indeterminate to have any region-wide effect (Malamud, 2005: 
427-9). As a result, regional integration within the MERCOSUR space has been 
limited to either “resource seeking” or “market seeking” behaviour by the largest 
continental firms, which precludes any region-wide integration of value-added 
production chains whose final products may compete within the wider world market 
(Burges, 2005). The material substratum of the region’s economies, focused largely 
on a renewed impetus towards agro-industrial expansion, therefore produces an 
accumulation regime premised on the national capture of value-added processing 
activities coupled with uneven demand for energy resources (particularly the 
enormous demands pursued by Petrobras, the Brazilian energy giant). What appears 
as a rational hegemonic project for each national space in fact adds up to an irrational 
result of depressed regional integration.   
 Given the turbulence MERCOSUR has had to endure with Brazil’s devaluation 
of the real in 1999, and the Argentine economic collapse of 2001, it became 
increasingly clear that member states’ cooperation had to ensure the stability of its 
social fabric. With the ascension of Lula da Silva to the Brazilian presidency in 2002 
from a “developmentalist front” coalition within the Workers’ Party (PT), a new social 
compact between the “grand bourgeoisie” and the subaltern classes would enable 
Brazil to endure the strains of region building and insertion into the world market on 
a potentially more solid (and popular) footing via an altered alignment of the state 
towards the promotion of social production and real accumulation, rather than 
allowing the relatively autonomous forces of finance capital free reign (van der Pijl, 
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2006: 198; Boito and Berringer, 2014). As such, Brazil’s approach to regional 
integration was far more substantial during this time in comparison with the high 
watermark of the neoliberal 1990s, reflective of Lula’s strategic aim to forge its 
regional leadership in opposition to the Northern colossus (Phillips, 2003). The Lula 
‘enigma’ was thus reflective of a much deeper fissure that began to emerge between 
the Latin American continent and the Atlantic core.  
 
3.4 Reclaiming ‘Nuestra América’: Contradictions of the New Latin American Left 
Our analysis of neoliberalism in the previous section was relatively muted on the 
nature and impact of popular movements and anti-systemic mobilisations during the 
‘lost decades’. However, the social turbulence produced by this new form of market 
discipline gave a glimpse of things to come. Latin America’s subaltern classes were 
experiencing the systemic crises of the world system under particularly harsh political 
conditions. The disintegration of the traditional Left, as a consequence of authoritarian 
repression, therefore produced a social vacuum throughout the region. Added to this, 
the specific changes in class structures tended to shape new modes of social 
organisation, which obtained in almost all social formations in the region. In contrast 
to the turn of the 20th century, in which peasants often preferred the more manageable 
and less risky exploitative relations with their patrones to the precarious form of wage-
labour in urban centres, the late 20th century saw an entirely opposite dynamic – with 
capitalism in fully blown (yet inherently uneven) form, the evisceration of the 
campesino pattern of everyday life changed the calculus of survival: “People moved 
to the cities because urban conditions, for all their horrors, were better than those in 
the rural areas” (Gilbert, 2004: 99). Coupled with the already numerically small 
working classes,19 the incidence of the rural-urban migration, and the consequent 
squeeze on those already employed created a burgeoning underclass characterised by 
informal work, ‘micro-entrepreneurialism’, violent crime, underemployment, or 
outright unemployment (see Portes, 1985; Portes and Hoffman, 2003). Across the 
entire region, these stress fractures unleashed wave upon wave of anti-systemic 
resistance in the form of “austerity protests” and “food riots” (Walton and Seddon, 
1994: ch. 4). 
																																								 																				
19 The peak of trade union density, as one proxy for working class size, was around 22 percent during 
the height of the ISI period, compared to about 13 percent in the 1990s (Spronk, 2013: 80).  
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 These socio-structural tendencies help explain the rise of ‘new social 
movements’ throughout the region, who no longer had recourse, or even good reason, 
to pursue class struggle of the classical sort. Disenchanted with political parties and 
the capture of state power, these movements tended to be defensive in their forms of 
resistance while bringing issues of ‘justice’, ‘dignity’, ‘identity’, ‘solidarity’ and 
traditional cultures into the centre frame of their struggles, even if they found common 
cause in resisting neoliberal reform (Silva, 2009).  
 Perhaps the most prominent example to capture the attention of academics and 
activists was the Zapatista uprising in 1994. What started out as an armed revolt by 
the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) in rejection of the NAFTA 
accords, and after taking heavy casualties from the Mexican army’s counter-offensive, 
the Zapatista resistance repertoire quickly transformed into a more symbolic struggle 
for the world’s attention towards the plight of agrarian communities in Chiapas. The 
Zapatistas’ demands strongly resonated with the aspirations of other ‘advocacy 
networks’, in and beyond Mexico, by constructing a “master frame” of democratic 
participation, emphasising diversity and horizontalism in decision making, linking 
injustice to neoliberalism, and utilising the internet to disseminate its message (Olesen, 
2006). Such transnational linkages helped put external pressure against the Mexican 
government on issues of human rights and the militarisation of the Chiapas region. 
The nature and evolution of the EZLN struggles carried various commonalities with 
other agrarian movements during this time. Probably due to the increasing rural-urban 
migrations, and the relatively stronger presence of indigenous communities remaining 
in the countryside, it was during this time that “the struggle for land has been 
accompanied by a distrust of the state in rural areas”, a pattern that can be seen with 
CONAIE in Ecuador, the Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca in Colombia, and the 
many indigenous movements that make up the social base of Bolivia’s Evo Morales 
(Teubal, 2009: 15-6). 
 If these rebellious currents were no longer enamoured with the traditional 
methods of class struggle and compromise, they were, at least nominally, also much 
less beholden to the nation-state as the exclusive space of struggle. In addition to the 
‘new social movement’ discourse, Latin America’s social movements tended to 
intersect with another academic fashion known as ‘transnational activism’ (Tarrow, 
2005). Noting the transnationalisation of Latin American social movements became 
increasingly common as the neoliberal years rolled on: prominent examples include 
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the Foro Mesoamericano network, which formed in 2001 in response to the neoliberal 
integration projects Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) and later expanded its target of 
resistance to the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (Spalding, 2008). 
At a region-wide scale, the Hemispheric Social Alliance emerged in 1997 in order to 
challenge the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which would extend the 
institutional logic of neoliberal restructuring over the entire hemisphere (Saguier, 
2010). Thus, whether it is struggles for labour rights in maquiladoras (sweatshops) 
(Carty, 2006), indigenous rights struggles (Mato, 2000), or the resurgence of rural 
social movements (Deere and Royce, 2009), contentious politics in Latin America 
appeared to have an ever-greater transnational articulation (Silva, 2013). Highlighting 
this new spatialisation strategy undertaken by the region’s social movements is 
particularly important when tracking the trajectory and changing character of agrarian 
struggle. For what emerged during the 1990s was not simply a new found militancy 
among those in the countryside, but an entirely new field of discourse and practice that 
would be relevant to the changing contours of world (dis)order. 
 No doubt the most prominent of these transnational movements has been La 
Vía Campesina (LVC). Its official birth came out of the Mons conference in 1993, 
wherein numerous peasant organisations from around the world banned together under 
a new name ‘the Peasant Way’ (la vía campesina). A few months after this 
inauguration, dozens of peasant movements marched under the LVC banner against 
the GATT meetings in Geneva. Later in 1996, LVC was a prominent participant in the 
World Food Summit held in Rome and sponsored by the FAO. Since then, LVC-
affiliated groups have participated in a score of anti-neoliberal protests, in Geneva 
(1998), Seattle (1999), Cancun (2003), and Hong Kong (2005) (Desmarais, 2007: 8).  
And yet, the central contradiction of LVC’s discourse – crystallised in the 
slogan, “our resistance will be as transnational as capital” – was that its greatest ally 
would come in the form of a new state-apparatus. At the most immediate level, 
therefore, this renewed cycle of resistance among subaltern forces pointed towards a 
bottom up form of strategic and spatial selectivity, though an inherently complex one. 
On the one hand, resistance to neoliberal sovereignty – which in essence had displaced 
the classical locus of sovereignty away from the nation-state and hence the citizenry 
as such – brought with it a renewed emphasis on sovereign independence (Silva, 
2009). On the other hand, radical social forces were keenly aware of the fact that 
neoliberal sovereignty expanded its territorial and spatial extent, insofar as the 
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transnationalisation of capital required the territorial expansion of popular struggle. 
Popular struggles from below thus congealed simultaneously around the nation-state 
and regional society, by engendering the first traces of a renewed imaginary of ‘Our 
America’ (Nuestra América). For peasant movements in particular, the types of 
transnationally organised counter-spaces emerged from the much longer lineage of the 
Campesino-a-Campesino movement begun in the 1970s and 80s, culminating in the 
formation of the Latin American Agroecology School in the Brazilian state of Paraná 
in 2005, and the latter establishment of the Latin American University Institute for 
Agroecology ‘Paulo Freire’ (IALA) in Venezuela (Chapter 5). Hence, the novel pincer 
movement constituted by a new wave of electoral victories for anti-neoliberal parties 
and a new resurgence of popular struggle came together to lay the groundwork for a 
new Latin American left-wing hegemony.  
Under the politico-discursive project of Venezuela’s Bolivarianismo, the 
fusion between the state apparatus and the people itself, leading to what Ciccariello-
Maher (2014) calls the “insurgent government” and “communal state”, created ideal 
conditions for the cultivation of a new peasant radicalism. Although we will look more 
closely at the potentials and limits of Venezuela’s agrarian reforms in Chapter 4, it is 
important to note that, from the long history of class struggle in Venezuela’s urban 
and rural spaces (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013), Chávez set about to transform (in 
partnership with his radical social base) the socio-ecological space of the nation, 
through land redistribution, free transport infrastructure, and the formation of entirely 
new ‘socialist cities’ that would encourage the redistribution of the population through 
the vast space of the country as a means of combating hyper-urbanisation and social 
exclusion (see Massey, 2009). With respect to agroecology, the Bolivarian regime has 
been noted by some authors as seeking to transform its agrarian base into a foundation 
for ‘food sovereignty’ and sustainable ecological practice which is organised in 
partnership with peasant groups (Schiavoni and Camacaro, 2009).  
In different ways, Chávez’s geopolitical allies in Bolivia and Ecuador are 
formally attempting to minimise and eventually dissolve the antagonism between 
social production and the ecological base through the pursuit of food sovereignty (cf. 
McKay et al., 2014). Ecuador’s long-standing legal battle with the US-based energy 
multi-national Chevron over the ecological and human destruction wrought by oil 
drilling has constituted a major battle against foreign imperialism, and a central plank 
in President Correa’s political platform (Rushe and Carroll, 2011). As well as seeking 
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compensation from transnational capital, the state is seeking to reverse its predatory 
relationship with the ecological base; as Correa stated in 2007: “Ecuador seeks to 
transform old notions of economics and the concept of [exchange] value… The 
Yasuní-ITT Project is based on the recognition of use and service of non-chrematistic 
values of environmental security and maintenance of world biodiversity” (cited in 
Rival, 2010: 358). The central discursive reference point that informs the inter-related 
practices of government and social movements in Ecuador revolves around this radical 
promotion of use-value over exchange-value: buen vivir (living well), or sumak 
kawsay (in the indigenous Kichwa language) (Villalba, 2013). Thanks to the legacy of 
anti-neoliberal class struggles waged by Ecuador’s indigenous and peasant groups, 
which took on marked intensity after 2001 in response to the FTAA and proposed 
bilateral trade treaty with the US, Correa’s re-drafted constitution in 2008 made the 
achievement of food sovereignty a major goal of the new government (Giunta, 2014).  
 In Bolivia, the major discursive framework of action emerges from the largely 
peasant-indigenous base of Morales’ constituency, which maintains a strong cultural 
and social connection with ‘Mother Earth’ (Pachamama). The Morales government 
has passed several laws (The Law of Mother Earth) that seeks to heal the ‘metabolic 
rift’ among Bolivia’s plurinational constituencies and the ecological base, in which 
the right to nature will “not be affected by mega-infrastructure and development 
projects that affect the balance of ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities” 
(cited in Vidal, 2011). These policies intersect with broader reforms to the country’s 
agricultural production system, which forms Bolivia’s own version of ‘living well’ 
(Suma Qamaña, in the indigenous Aymaran language). When large landowners in the 
eastern regions of the country attempted to block Morales’ proposed reforms, 
indigenous and peasant-led protests marched on the capital, La Paz, and formed a large 
demonstration outside the parliament building for several days and nights, until the 
‘Law of Communitarian Renewal of the Agrarian Reform’ was finally passed in 2006. 
A central aspect of the law revolves around the multiple socio-economic and cultural 
functions land performs for given communities, and the priority given to communal 
forms of property rights (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 540). Finally, Bolivia’s new 
constitution, adopted in 2009, contained a specific priority to the building of food 
sovereignty within the country.  
 Returning to the regional perspective, it is from these conditions linking the 
uneven development of agricultural spaces, resistance by radical social forces 
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pursuing intense cycles of struggle across the strategic terrain of the state, and the rise 
of new regimes born from these new cycles of resistance, that forms the fundamental 
source of the ALBA region, as well as the foundational potential for the regionalisation 
of food sovereignty. The rise of ALBA constituted merely the most radical fraction of 
Latin America’s new left, who were unsatisfied not just with the imperialist powers of 
the world system, but also the potential regional hegemons (particularly Brazil, but 
also Argentina and Chile) who were constructing their own independent forms of 
capitalist ‘developmentalism’ (Ebenau, 2014), largely inimical to the building of 
‘socialism in the 21st century’.  
 However, when focusing on the ALBA space, and particularly its largest 
members (Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador), we must move past mere discourse 
analysis (e.g., constitutional amendments, legal proclamations, etc.) and examine the 
ways in which ecological, social and political conditions and struggles shape the 
degree to which social realities converge or diverge from the stated goal of a given 
discourse (e.g., buen vivir, ‘food sovereignty’). At the most fundamental level, the 
radical discourse characterising the ‘Bolivarian’ states (at least those formally 
included within ALBA) rely to a predominant degree on the continued exploitation of 
their natural resources, whether agricultural or mineral. Too often development 
projects, whether in the form of new commercial or transport infrastructures, or 
through extending (both vertical and horizontal) resource frontiers, confront 
indigenous and other subaltern communities as major threats to the ecological 
sustainability of their ways of life and claims to sovereignty over their ancestral lands 
(Bebbington, 2009). The class character of these frictions boils down to the continued 
struggle over the capture of ground rent between rentier classes comprising state 
managers and national/foreign owned capitals. However, it is important to note that 
within this politico-economic terrain, it is the social content of a particular state’s 
hegemonic project, rather than the material character of accumulation as such, that 
determines the relative developmental direction. As Higginbottom (2013: 200) 
observes, this struggle over the domestic capture of ground rent has been far more 
successful within the ALBA space as compared to non-ALBA states. Yet ‘success’ in 
these terms cannot simply be read off from the domestic acquisition of foreign 
exchange, for the development of society’s productive forces – whether in technology, 
knowledge or the soil itself, as well as the accumulation of hard currency – cannot be 
taken as autonomous agents in their own right, but rather as a specific limit whose 
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extension and direction of change will be determined by the outcome of social 
struggle. This is no less true for agriculture as it is for mineral deposits and, indeed, 
for this group of radical states attempting to revolutionise their agricultural base via 
the redistribution of ground rent (surpluses generated by mineral exploitation), these 
two vectors of resource frontiers are intimately related. Thus, the central political 
tension for those states that actively pursue (or at least proclaim to be pursuing) food 
sovereignty hinges on the embedded structures of resource mobilisation whose 
proceeds become the very stuff of political struggle between, on the one hand, a 
potentially unitary and cooperative discourse of regional (transnational) production 
under the banner of 21st century socialism, and on the other, the reality of geopolitical 
fragmentation between states whose options are overdetermined by the wider world 
market.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has charted a historical reconstruction of Latin America’s long arch of 
regionalism from the inception of US hegemony. As with much else during the early 
Cold War years, US geopolitical strategy was refracted through containing the 
communist ‘menace’, which more often than not appeared in the active formation of 
regional ‘security communities’. Yet neglect of development diplomacy would simply 
stoke the fires of subaltern resistance against the new global order. It was precisely 
this danger of subaltern insurgency that informed the economic and geopolitical 
strategies of the US ‘Fordist’ compact. In response to the Cuban rupture in the US 
corpus imperium, the ‘green revolution’ – as the ecological arrow in Kennedy’s 
geopolitical quiver – unleashed the enormous power of capitalist agriculture upon the 
Latin American region, with devastating effects on both human and ecological 
landscapes; the uneven balance of forces between nature on one side, and the state and 
capital on the other, had entered a particularly intense and destructive phase.  
 Born from the systemic crisis of the capitalist world economy beginning in the 
late 1960s, there occurred a transition away from discourses of national development 
and political inclusiveness (however fleeting these may have been in practice) and 
towards a new form of rights, territory and sovereignty that spoke to the invisible hand 
of (global) market discipline. The inter- and trans-national class offensive against 
subaltern groups in Latin America launched by the US and fractions of Latin American 
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ruling classes led to a reorganisation of the region’s class structures, which reflected 
deeper transformations in the increasingly ‘globalised’ world economy. The push 
towards regionalisation, with MERCOSUR leading the way, sought a way out of this 
state of affairs, yet could not extricate itself from the same social contradictions of 
capitalist development. 
 Yet the severity of neoliberal discipline had merely ensured its own downfall. 
The myriad social struggles that wracked the Latin American continent laid the 
foundations for a renewed left wing insurgency in both the streets and at the ballot 
box; thus, neoliberal discourse emphasising the efficacy of electoral politics over 
direct action ultimately backfired. The outcomes of these struggles resulted in a 
notable rebalancing within many Latin American states towards a 
rights/territory/sovereignty regime of ‘post-liberalism’, in which capital would, in 
theory, become far more subordinate to the state apparatus itself, and the popular social 
forces constituting its radical constituency. However, Latin America’s new left are 
caught within a contradictory bind of furthering the accumulation of rent-bearing 
capital for the sake of social development and technical upgrading. This accumulation 
strategy has, unfortunately, been overwhelmingly reliant on further exploiting mineral 
resources, often in confrontation with the state’s social base. Understanding the nature 
of these contradictions and struggles, and their bearing on the path to food sovereignty 
in ALBA, and Venezuela in particular, will therefore constitute the central focus for 
the remaining chapters of the thesis.  
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4 From Magical State to Magical Region: The Social Origins of ALBA 
The previous chapter sought to build a ‘long’ historical context to the emergence of 
Latin America’s new left at the turn of the 21st century, and thereby trace the genealogy 
of the structural preconditions of ALBA’s counter-hegemonic regionalism. The 
following chapter will therefore comprehensively analyse the nature and evolution of 
the ALBA region. As both the geopolitical centre and the concentred site of ALBA’s 
agricultural productive initiatives (in the form of “Mixed Socialist Enterprises of 
ALBA”), deconstructing Venezuela’s development model offers the cipher for 
ALBA’s political economy. In terms of the regional institution itself, two lines of 
analysis will be pursued. Firstly, we will examine the state-social movement 
relationship as it is articulated via strategic state-society alliance building, as well as 
the contradictory integration of social movements into the ALBA institution itself. 
Secondly, we will examine the various contours of ALBA’s political economy, 
specifically through four vantage points that emerge from ALBA’s ‘Grandnational 
Concept’: cooperative advantage, map of goods, endogenous development, repairing 
the metabolic rift. In analysing each dimension in turn, we will better understand the 
potentials and limits of ALBA’s political economy of food sovereignty and the social 
forces that animate its development.  
 
4.1 Dictatorship, Democracy and Class Struggle in the ‘Magical State’ 
As the post-colonial theorist, Fernando Coronil, argued in his influential text on 
Venezuelan state formation, it was the presence of vast oil reserves, representing 
seemingly unlimited wealth, that culminated in a contradictory fusion of material and 
mental constructs. Through the exploitation of natural wealth beneath its subsoil, the 
Venezuelan state apparatus created the material basis for its remarkable capacity to 
absorb “within itself the multiple powers dispersed throughout the nation’s two 
bodies” – the political and ecological ‘bodies’. (Coronil, 1997: 4). Thus, “As a 
‘magnanimous sorcerer,’ the state seizes its subjects by inducing a condition or state 
of being receptive to its illusions – a magical state” (ibid: 5). Put more concretely: 
“The Venezuelan case shows the historical development not of classic 
market ‘spontaneity’ but of a different second nature – the 
‘spontaneous’ recognition of the need to control state intervention as a 
result of the formation of capitalist society whose major source of 
	 	 97	
monetary wealth rests not on the local production of surplus value but 
on the international capture of ground-rent” (Coronil, 1997: 227). 
 
As Coronil and others note, the discovery of oil was also the death knell of 
Venezuelan agriculture, as new mining opportunities continually absorbed capital and 
labour away from an uncompetitive agricultural sector, which simply undermined the 
already flagging agro-export economy further (Carlson, 2016; Brown, 1985: 375). As 
a percentage of Gross National Product, petroleum jumped from 9.5 to 34.7% (1925-
1936), with agriculture falling from 34.6 to 18.8% (McBeth, 2002: 112, 114).20 From 
Venezuela’s early caudillo led modernization emerged an accumulation regime and 
hegemonic project that singularly fused around the turning of the oil-spigot: 
“Although the land and its products were celebrated in poetry as well as in the visual 
arts, music, and popular songs, agriculture did not provide a common source of 
national identification in Venezuela” (Coronil, 1997: 88). Despite the emergence of 
democracy in 1945, with the ascension of Romulo Betancourt and the Acción 
Democrática party (AD) on the back of a previous cycle of class struggles throughout 
the cities and countryside, the AD’s more ‘pluralistic’ political regime could not 
entirely solve the contradiction of administering a landlord state (and in turn mobilise 
its hegemonic force through the circulation of oil rents) within what remained a 
militant identity among the peasantry. Even with the dwindling agrarian population 
due to petroleum-induced urbanisation, the agrarian sectors were a political force that 
could not be ignored.21 Agrarian reform was thus high on the list of priorities for AD 
leaders, yet refracted through a specific strategic and spatial selectivity that oriented 
rural development away from a general array of social support policies for peasants, 
and towards the strategic integration of agricultural production as a mere support for 
the expansion of urban populations and spaces (Powell, 1971: 292; Huizer, 1973: 70-
																																								 																				
20 Though during this time, the weight of the oil industry did not produce inflationary effects because 
profits were mostly repatriated (McBeth, 2002: 115). Indeed, by Löwy’s estimation, during the first 
seven years of AD government rule, some $504 million had been expatriated, “an amount that was 
equal to almost half of the total income of US investment in Latin America” (Löwy, 1981: 182-3). 
21 A substantial fraction of the social base of Acción Democrática (AD) was based in the countryside, 
and represented a newly enfranchised segment of the population with the proportion of citizens voting 
in national elections jumping from 5 to 36%. And despite the interruption of Venezuelan democracy 
between 1948 and 1958 (the reign of Pérez Jiménez), rural support for AD remained strong, leading to 
a string of electoral successes (Powell, 1971: 287-8). Indeed, as Powell suggests, the agrarian classes’ 
“cohesion as a support group for the reformers was decisive, since the urban electorate proved to be 
highly fragmented, diffusing its majority power through a large number of splinter groups, personalist 
parties, and vague coalitions of various ideological hues” (ibid: 291). 
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2; cf. Angotti, 1998). Yet with a new push towards economic diversification in 
consumer durable exports, Carlos Andrés Pérez had entirely neglected the agricultural 
sector, or at least the most numerous and vulnerable parts of it, with virtually all state 
directed development and credit lines extended towards large agribusiness firms. 
During this time, agriculture’s share of GDP dropped from 7.0 to 6.1% (1961–1980), 
with food imports increasing by a factor of 10 throughout the decade in parallel with 
increased smuggling of goods across the border to Colombia and elsewhere for the 
sake of price speculation, and finally a bout of food shortages in 1977 across a range 
of basic goods (rice, sugar, milk and coffee) (Petras and Morley, 1983).  
With the onset of the debt crisis of the 1980s (afflicting states in the Global 
South), a new regime of social discipline in the form of neoliberalism came to 
dominate the region as a whole through the institutional power of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Coming to power a second time in 1989 on 
an anti-IMF platform, Carlos Andrés Pérez subsequently embarked on the Gran Viraje 
(the Great U-Turn) by implementing a harsh series of IMF-backed neoliberal reforms, 
decimating most economic sectors (particularly agriculture) and ushered in the 
characteristic forms of social dislocation and destruction typical of neoliberal 
discipline (Lander and Fierro, 1996; Di John, 2005a). With the utter evisceration of 
society’s social and ecological fabric, in the form of both land and labour that could 
find no productive outlet, except in the petroleum or construction sectors (Lander and 
Fierro, 1996: 58) the common pattern of sporadic fighting between subaltern actors 
and the state apparatus had transformed into something radically more intense in the 
form of the caracazo riots (López Maya, 2003).  
This signalled the deep “organic crisis” fracturing Venezuelan society by the 
late 1990s. As Gramsci understood it, an organic crisis constitutes a fundamental 
material contradiction in the prevailing accumulation regime, one that cannot be 
moved out of stasis without an entirely new set of political forces ready to temporarily 
overcome the socio-economic impasse through new hegemonic projects and class 
alliances. Under such conditions, “social classes become detached from their 
traditional parties” (Gramsci, 1971: 210). Consequently, “the immediate situation 
becomes delicate and dangerous, because the field is open for violent solutions, for 
the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic ‘men of destiny’” (ibid). 
As it happens, the decade of Venezuela’s organic crisis witnessed both potentialities, 
and carried out by the same charismatic man of destiny – while Chávez’s attempted 
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military coup in 1994 was ultimately unsuccessful, his subsequent turn to the electoral 
option in 1998 would help to finish what he had started years earlier: the ouster of 
Venezuela’s crisis-ridden punto fijo bloc. 
 ‘Elite-outliers’ from the realm of Venezuelan capital were from the start keen 
participants in the project of Bolivarianismo. Because the strategic terrain of the 
Venezuelan state penetrated entirely throughout the ‘realm’ of the economy, there is 
no conceivable way for Venezuelan capitals (of any kind) to prosper without 
establishing organic links to state apparatus. Thus, the number of business elites who 
voted for Chávez did so precisely because of the position they occupied within the 
organised bloc of the dominant classes; in other words, a government dominated by 
Chávez’s Movimiento V [Quinta] República (MVR) party would provide better 
prospects for state access (Gates, 2010). Yet while the new constitution introduced in 
1999 formally reflected the contours of this somewhat delicate balance within the 
hegemonic bloc that had brought Chávez to power – particularly Articles 112 and 115 
guaranteeing economic freedom and private property, as well as central bank 
independence – it also stipulated a more expansive role of the state in the national 
economy (Orhangazi, 2014: 223). The introduction of new constitutional reforms 
during the first two years of Chávez’s administration further pushed to breaking point 
the integrity of the power bloc. And while areas of reform were relatively moderate – 
including participatory democracy and strengthening the state’s control over its 
sovereign wealth, culminating in the passing of 49 new laws in 2001, including the 
Organic Hydrocarbons Law, the Land Law, and the Fisheries Law (Webber, 2010: 24) 
– the fact that they were passed by Presidential Decree, without consultation or 
deliberation in the National Assembly, and nor with the Chávez’s own party, created 
a certain sense of trepidation on part of the dominant classes (Brading, 2014).  
 
4.1.1 Popular Power, Land Reform, and Resource Sovereignty 
The new constitution proposed by Chávez in 1999 tipped the scales decisively towards 
“democratic, protagonistic democracy”. As Alvarez (2004: 152) observes: “The 
‘Bolivarian’ constitution even failed to make mention of political parties anywhere in 
the text. Instead the document used the vague expression of ‘associations with political 
ends’.” This nascent structure of vertical territoriality thus formed a compromised mix 
between “absolutely direct” democracy (which Chávez believed to be an impractical 
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approach) and its “representative counterpart”, settling instead upon the mixed regime 
of “protagonistic” democracy (ibid: 154). Yet in transforming the political basis of 
politics as such towards that of a protagonistic democracy, the “constituent power” 
based upon the will and agency of the people was, paradoxically, internalised within 
specific branches of the state apparatus itself, which “opened channels for direct 
participation at the same time that it enhanced the power of the national executive” 
(ibid: 155). 
 These constitutional changes thus laid the politico-juridical basis for the rise 
of popular power in the Bolivarian republic. Previous initiatives, such as the Consejos 
Locales de Planificación Pública (Local Councils for Public Planning) had envisaged 
a new form of decentralized politics in which protagonistic democracy could take root, 
but encountered a litany of problems (particularly with the reproduction of traditional 
representative politics embedded within these new spaces). Consequently, the place of 
Consejos Comunales (Community Councils, CCs) became more prominent (Azzellini, 
2016: 87). Thus, while the CCs were far more grounded in (and often initiated from) 
the grassroots level, they ultimately consolidated their institutional status and rapid 
expansion from the state (ibid: 94). Such a form of popular power was inscribed within 
Chávez’s ‘five motors’ of revolutionary change, one of which referred to the “new 
geometry of power” in which the territorial re-arrangement of political rights and 
territorial decentralisation of powers would help to facilitate new spaces of public life 
(see Massey, 2009; Menéndez, 2013). It is therefore important to note that while CCs 
have become one of the more radical hallmarks of Venezuela’s transformed legal 
structures, they emerged quite spontaneously – outside of juridical codes – and were 
pushed towards the National Assembly for their institutionalisation, a clear case of de 
facto agency transformed in de jure agency. And in line with the general flavour of 
the 1999 constitution, the CCs maintained a direct line of support and financing from 
the state and its immediate apparatuses, rather than from the less trustworthy local 
authorities at the municipal level (Azzellini, 2016: 96). 
The introduction of the 2001 Land Law (Ley de Tierras y Desarrollo Agrario) 
saw a new push against the large landowning class (latifundios). Its political 
orientation brought to the foreground the underlying premise, established in the 1999 
Constitution, that “the regime of large landholdings [latifundista] is contrary to the 
social interest” (Article 307, RBV, 1999). Thus, not only did Chávez embark on a 
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substantial process of land confiscations against the landlord class,22 he had also 
effectively internalised peasant struggles on the land into law. Article 471 of the 
Venezuelan Penal Code de-criminalized small farmers occupying private lands 
(Isaacas et al., 2009), and in turn closed the gap between the informal powers of 
peasant struggle into the formal realm of juridical discourse. And yet, the use of the 
law as a means of not simply reforming Venezuelan agriculture, but also of 
strengthening the political power of the peasant class, was mobilised in a highly 
diffuse and sometimes indeterminate manner. Thus, the modified land law, 
promulgated in 2005, deemed expropriation necessary for the purposes of maintaining 
“food security” (Article 68), in accordance with “public utility and social interest” 
(Article 69) or simply “exceptional circumstances” (Article 84) (RBV, 2005; cf. 
Lavelle, 2013: 142). Legal discourse concerning land rights therefore shifted 
somewhat beyond the abstractly verifiable codes of conventional jurisprudence, and 
towards a grey area of (arbitrary) executive right, which was nonetheless couched in 
legal discourse. In this instance, the Law/Terror binary was decisively blurred, albeit 
embedded within a social content favourable towards popular rural classes. 
With respect to the oil industry, the new law stipulated that foreign capital 
could capture no more than 50 percent of joint ventures (which stipulates the ratio of 
returns to partners), and doubled royalty rates to 30 percent (Lander and Navarrete, 
2007: 26). Increases in royalty payments (based on unit price) where thus facilitated 
through the new metric used by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, which was based 
upon the international price of oil, rather than the much lower ‘transfer price’ PDVSA 
set for its foreign affiliates (Mommer, 2004: 141). This move significantly augmented 
state power over the surveillance of PDVSA, which had traditionally managed to 
manipulate its true share of taxes based upon reported profits and net income (i.e. 
‘transfer mispricing’), which was markedly opaque given the ability to manipulate the 
appearance of cost structures (Wilpert, 2007: 96). Yet with the subsumption of 
PDVSA under the state, particularly the executive branch of the state apparatus, the 
practice of misreporting figures, or at least inventing new accounting methods to 
augment certain flows of funds, was re-established. The official state budget thus 
																																								 																				
22 The land law stipulated that any farms of over 100 hectares (ha/s) on high quality soils, and those 
over 5,000 ha/s on lower quality soils were eligible for expropriation. Later, in 2005, the criteria shifted 
towards that of ‘productivity’, wherein any latifundio not producing above 80% capacity could be 
subject to expropriation (Lavelle, 2013: 142). By 2011, these reform policies had seen 2.5 million 
hectares ‘rescued’ from latifundios and turned over to landless peasants (Wilpert, 2014: 6). 
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pegged expected oil prices at a considerably lower level than the international market 
price, which allowed the executive branch to capture significant surplus funds without 
institutional oversight (Rosales, 2016). 
 
4.1.2 Class Conflict and the Struggle for Bolivarianismo 
From the above considerations on the transformation of the state apparatus, 
particularly the balance of power between its various branches, it is clear that the rapid 
and profound changes taking place throughout the legal and policy domains was 
facilitated through the equally rapid accumulation of power within the Executive 
branch, expressed principally through Chávez’s rule by decree for the first year. Yet 
within the wider strategic field of political struggle, this re-organisation of institutional 
power within the state was not enough to offset the leverage of the leading fraction of 
Venezuelan capital (still concentrated within PDVSA) and the remaining power bloc 
under their leadership.  
Thus, Venezuela’s traditional ruling classes, outraged by this meagre assault 
on their privilege, organised a business strike in December 2001, with the principal 
players including then privately owned oil company, PDVSA, FEDECAMARAS (the 
national business association), and the CTV (Venezuela’s largest union organisation). 
Having re-instated the PDVSA managers responsible for the strike that Chávez 
previously dismissed (a calculated gamble that sought to minimise the possibility of 
repeating the short-lived coup in April 2002 coup) the oil company once again 
possessed a managerial cadre dedicated to bringing Chávez’s political programme to 
a halt. Now grouped under the name Coordinadora Democrática, their strategy of 
sabotage was significantly assisted by US capital, itself working in close partnership 
with the US state (Golinger, 2007: 102-3). As a result of the 2002-2003 ‘bosses strike’, 
around 24 percent of GDP and $6bn in revenues had been lost (Weisbrot and Sandoval, 
2007; Webber, 2010: 26). The severity of the crisis was of course due to the sheer 
weight of the oil sector within the national economy, which shed an unusually high 
volume of wealth in such a short period of time. 
Yet soon enough, cracks within the opposition bloc were steadily widening due 
to a coordinated effort between the Bolivarian state and various sections of skilled and 
un-skilled workers to regain control over the national economy. Various workers 
inside PDVSA actively began to seize control of operations and collectively choose 
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their own supervisors. Indeed, this conjuncture helped to push Chávez into a more 
radical stance, and to usher in the Bolivarian Revolution as we know it today: a 
political project that seeks to build socialism in the 21st century (Brading, 2014). 
However, despite early examples of spontaneous worker control and self-
management, the state decided that such moves towards socialism were premature in 
an industry that was so strategically central for the economy as a whole (Webber, 
2010). Thus, with Chávez firing over 19,000 personnel from PDVSA’s ranks of 
managers and engineers in response to the strike, and thus sacrificing a huge amount 
of technical knowledge, it was believed that the oil sector was too vulnerable at this 
stage to allow the full flowering of worker self-management.  
This moment of confrontation between capital and the state presents a crucial 
conjuncture in the political economy of chavismo, which must be fully addressed at 
this point of analysis (insofar as its qualitative and quantitative features will have a 
continuous presence throughout the next two chapters). Preventing a chronic wave of 
capital flight, and thus diluting a potential weapon wielded by Venezuelan capital, was 
seen as a major priority after the bosses’ strike.23 From 2003, the state imposed strict 
exchange rate controls, through the introduction of a new state-led institution, 
Comisión de Administración de Divisas. With the vast over-valuation of the national 
currency, the bolivar fuerte (BsF), which came to USD1.90/BsF,24 domestic capital 
may apply to the government for dollars at preferential (official) rates for the sake of 
maintaining imports and satisfying domestic consumption (Purcell, 2016: 113). 
Between 2003 and 2012, some USD317 billion has been sold to the private sector at 
preferential rates, yet with the historically structured disincentives to engage in 
domestic investment (particularly through the purchase of up-to-date means of 
production in the world market, which would be made considerably easier with an 
over-valued domestic currency), many of these companies engage merely in a type of 
fraudulent exchange, in which goods are either imported yet never brought to retailers 
(instead often ending up in Brazilian or Colombian markets at a higher price), or 
simply through the falsification of import papers, in which shipping containers arrive 
to Venezuelan ports empty (Yaffe, 2015; Lampa, 2016).  
																																								 																				
23 The phenomenon of capital flight was in fact a relatively ‘normal’ feature of the Venezuelan 
economy, which reached USD14 billion during 1994-2000 (di John, 2005b). 
24 This again is a normal feature of Venezuela’s oil-dominated economy, whereby the influx of dollars 
due to oil exports creates pressures to revalue the national currency, which would benefit national 
commercial capitals in their quest for cheaper imports (Purcell, 2013: 150). 
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Even with the presence of price controls on a number of key consumables, 
mostly in the food sector, companies often skirt such regulations through minute 
adjustments to production specifications, thus pushing a given product outside of set 
categories for controlled goods. Finally, with access to preferential dollars, a rapid 
expansion in a parallel currency market offers other avenues of currency speculation, 
in which cheap dollars buy up large amounts of bolívares, in turn used to access 
dollars, and so on. As a consequence of this artificial squeeze on the domestic supply 
of consumables, a vicious ‘inflation-depreciation’ spiral has wracked the Venezuelan 
economy in recent years, with the annual inflation rate hitting 63.4% in 2014 (Lampa, 
2016: 13). Since 2014, the Venezuelan Central bank has been reluctant to release its 
usual annual statements on the national inflation rate (undoubtedly based on political 
considerations); only in January 2016 was the next statement released, indicating that 
for 2014-15 the accumulated rate of inflation had reached 141%, with the cost of food 
showing the greatest inflationary pressures at 254.3% (Dutka, 2016). 
These macro-economic indicators, and their underlying class dynamics, form 
the basic contextual background for the proceeding analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. But 
they also present a systemic contradiction that severely affects the overall political 
economy of the ALBA region. For while these tendencies amount to a series of 
unintended consequences of Chávez’s anti-neoliberal drive, the struggle against 
neoliberal capitalism has undoubtedly emerged through a concerted geopolitical 
strategy to unite the Latin American region around the wider principles of 
Bolivarianismo. For Chávez, the immediate priorities for his multi-scalar strategy – 
between nation and region – focused on shoring up the state’s capture of oil wealth, 
and to consolidate Venezuela’s position internationally as a buffer against further 
imperial aggression. It was in constructing the ALBA regional space that Chávez 
sought a solution to this latter problem.  
 
4.2 Oil Diplomacy and the Emergence of a ‘Bolivarian’ Foreign Policy 
The dramatic change in Venezuela’s foreign policy outlook under Chávez can best be 
understood as constituting a significant challenge to US regional primacy and 
domination, which became particularly marked under the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism. The Bolivarian vision for international affairs emphasised one of Latin 
America’s long-standing norms in the form of sovereign equality. One of the primary 
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means through which Venezuela sought to forge a new system of international 
relations was through the deployment of its extraordinary wealth. In a speech delivered 
to the OAS by the Venezuelan representative, Jorge Valero: “Oil can be, as our 
Government realizes, a powerful lever to drive development, integration, cooperation, 
solidarity, and the economic complementarity of our countries” (cited in Burges, 2007: 
1345). What truly consolidated this stance, however, was the confrontation with the 
US-sponsored regional project, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Indeed, 
as Nelson (2015) points out, foreign policy was not at the top of Chávez’s agenda upon 
assuming office in 1999, but rather the re-organisation of the country’s socio-
economic structures and institutions. It was only after attending the various 
international summits convened for the negotiations over the FTAA that the strategic 
selectivity of the Venezuela state began to crystalise around foreign policy and 
regionalisation concerns, which significantly informed its early opposition to the 
FTAA negotiations during the 3rd Summit of the Americas in April 2001. Yet such a 
perspective was not confined to the lofty heights of sovereign statecraft. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, the numerous social movements that had sprung up during the 1990s had 
finally consolidated into a series of transnational advocacy networks whose discourse 
and activism had significantly boosted the rationale for Chávez’s anti-neoliberal 
regionalism.  
 
4.2.1 ALBA’s Council of Social Movements 
In contrast to the other great regional block of Latin America, MERCOSUR, which 
contains a far smaller place for social movement actors (Jelin, 2001), the ALBA space 
was from the start infused with the deeper understanding of popular participation as a 
key driver of the region building process. According to Ruben Pereira, Coordinator of 
the Council of Social Movements in the Executive Secretariat of the ALBA 
headquarters in Caracas, “there is no international organisation that has called out to 
the social movements and collectives to be incorporated into the organisational 
structure relating to the mechanisms of regional integration” (Interview, RP, 
05.04.2016). While the role and function of social movement participation would only 
come into signed effect sometime later, it was during 2002 that Chávez outlined the 
ways in which the Bolivarian movement could move forward beyond the strictures of 
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neoliberalism. During the 2006 World Social Forum in Caracas, Chávez extolled the 
strategic virtues of forging a more robust regional Bolivarian state-society complex: 
“We have to link up all our causes, unity, unity, unity, movements 
united respecting diversity, respecting the autonomy, no one is planning 
to impose anything on anyone, only coordination, unity, because if we 
don’t work together we will never triumph not even if we fight for 500 
years, only united can we do it, united our moral and intellectual forces, 
our ideas, our diversity, our physical strength, our social movements, 
our political movements, our local governments” (Chávez; cited in 
Martinez, 2013: 63). 
In the subsequent year, during a parallel session at the 5th ALBA Summit with the 
respective heads of state, a wide grouping of social movements from across the 
continent affirmed their official alliance with the ALBA institution. In addition to 
proposing a raft of social measures designed to bolster the struggle for women’s rights, 
environmental protection and food sovereignty (to name just a few), the convened 
group of social movements called for official institutional spaces for their concrete 
participation within ALBA, which would “permit the achievement of participatory and 
protagonistic democracy in accordance with socially organised popular interests” 
(Movimientos Sociales del ALBA, 2007). The proposed body was therefore initially 
styled as the ‘Consultative Planning Council of Social Movements’.  
 However, the relatively slow pace of progress with respect to fully 
consolidating the Council of Social movements (CSM) lead to a twin strategy on 
behalf of civil society actors. A year after the initial meeting in 2007, at the VI Summit 
of the ALBA-TCP, social movements were given only a brief acknowledgement, 
without any sustained proposals for their further establishment (ALBA-TCP, 2008b). 
It was precisely because of this slow pace of institutional change that the Movimento 
dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), La Vía Campesina and other assorted 
social movements proposed and agreed a parallel initiative in July 2008, embodied in 
“a hemispheric articulation of social movements and organizations around the 
principles of ALBA” (Movimientos Sociales del ALBA, 2009). From this meeting 
came the final crafting of the Charter of Social Movements of the Americas, 
announced during the 3rd Social Forum of the Americas (October, 2008), which was 
conceived as the struggle for “building the integration of peoples form below” 
(Movimientos Sociales del ALBA, 2008), and marking the inauguration of the 
‘Continental Articulation of Social Movements Towards ALBA’. At the 1st Summit 
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meeting of the Intercultural Plurinational Council of Social Movements of the 
Countries of the ALBA-TCP in October 2009, it was acknowledged that due to 
“realities and challenges that some member countries have experienced”, as well as 
the influence of “other priorities and efforts within the ALBA-TCP”, there had been a 
relative brake on the process of forging the CSM within the architecture of ALBA 
since 2008 (Movimientos Sociales del ALBA, 2009), which made the creation of 
alternative structures all the more necessary. 
 In this way, social movements attempt to straddle an often-precarious 
“inside/outside” divide of contentious politics, which Martinez (2013) dubs the 
“double-turn” of social movement counter-hegemony, articulated through their 
institutional inclusion within the CSM, and a wider socio-spatial rendering that seeks 
autonomy from both neoliberal globalism and the official institutionalism of ALBA’s 
inter-state architecture. Each strategy embodied in this ‘inside/outside’ positionality 
fulfils a specific function that animates and strengthens movements’ internal cohesion 
and external capabilities (cf. Gürcan, 2010; Emerson, 2013). The ‘outside’ position 
helps to strengthen the movement’s identity with respect to its self-conscious 
formation as a proto-typical form of ‘post-liberal’ politics embodying principles of 
self-organisation, participatory democracy and decentralised modes of sovereignty. 
The ‘inside’ position, on the other hand, seeks to harness the existing institutional 
structures of regional inter-governmentalism in order to maintain proximity to the 
main channels of power and decision-making. As Martinez suggests, “[o]nce the 
Council is fully consolidated it will, in theory, act as a mechanism to mutually 
coordinate the work of social movements and the ALBA-TCP project, exchanging 
information up and down the hierarchy of the ALBA-TCP structure, as well as 
horizontally across countries” (Martinez, 2013: 65). 
However, by the time of the 10th Summit in 2010, the CSM was still framed as 
more of a proposal rather than an institutional reality. As noted in the Bicentenary 
Manifesto of Caracas: 
“…the time has come to install the Council of Social Movements. This 
entails establishing national Chapters in each country and that social 
movements assume, as proposed, not only sector struggles of the 
working class, peasants, women, youth, etc., but that they also move 
forward and join the development of economic and social projects for 
the specific construction of alternatives to the predatory capitalism 
existing in our continent” (ALBA-TCP, 2010). 
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It is notable that, three years later, during the most recent ALBA Social Movement 
Summit, the collective statement noted that, “Integration of peoples and for the 
peoples… requires the redesigning of the decision-making bodies… We urge, 
therefore, to move forward with a full and organic incorporation of People’s Power in 
the decision making process of ALBA” (ALBA-TCP, 2013). 
This somewhat contradictory picture underscores the ways in which social 
movement participation in ALBA is a highly uneven affair. While the importance of, 
and proposal for, the CSM was understood early on, it would take many years, and as 
many Summits, for this idea to take any kind of shape; indeed, as one member of a 
prominent Venezuelan peasant movement noted, the independent organisation of 
social movements themselves have done far more than the many ministerial meetings 
in terms of consolidating the social space and organising principles of the CSM 
(Interview, NG, 18.07.2015). Much of the impetus for independent movement 
organisation – in terms of forging a transitional identity, organisational capacity and 
the formal outline of institutionalisation (primarily in the shape of national ‘Chapters’ 
across the ALBA and non-ALBA states) – emerged directly out of the “rhythms” of 
movement mobilisation in order to fully capture their “organic forces” (Interview, 
ALBA TV, 20.06.201). Yet despite the institutional outline of the CSM’s role during 
the 9th Summit in 2009, the direct relations between ALBA’s core institutional 
elements (mainly at the political/ministerial level) remain quite ambiguous. For 
although the CSM enjoys an institutional position at the same level is the Council of 
Presidents, the idea that the CSM should wield the same types of decision making 
powers was not firmly entrenched at the elite level (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.201). 
There is, therefore, a critical tension between the enthusiasm among social 
movement actors concerning the institutional inclusion of the CSM within the top 
layer of the ALBA architecture on the one hand, and the relative exclusion of social 
movement demands on the other, a trend that has been duly explored elsewhere (see 
Aguirre and Cooper, 2010; Cutler and Brien, 2013; Martinez, 2013; Stevenson, 2014). 
As I was informed by one interview participant from the ALBA TV network, a 
Caracas-based communication hub by activists that create content for, by and about 
various social movements across the continent, the existence of the CSM is 
unparalleled in the history of regional organisations, beyond anything present in 
MERCOSUR or the European Union: “never before has such participation been given 
to social movements as ‘actors’, as well as what this implies semantically and 
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conceptually” (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.2016). But it is possible that the substance 
of the CSM merely stops short at the semantic and conceptual limit. For on the one 
hand, social movement actors are in no doubt as to the necessary, and quite particular, 
relationship with the sovereign state. There is a clear recognition that unequal powers 
exist between the states and social movements, yet one that is almost dictated by the 
institutional materiality laid down by representative democracy. Hence movements do 
not have “factual power”; through the course of popular elections, the state is imbued 
within a “constitutionalised series of powers” making it the legitimate actor of 
representation (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.201; Interview, RP, 05.04.2016). In this 
way, movement actors often look to defend the constitution, and thus the state itself 
as a means of enshrining popular power (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.201). On the 
other hand, member states of ALBA can turn this form of political legitimacy to their 
advantage, by excluding from the CSM social movements they deemed too hostile to 
national policy, as in Ecuador (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015), or to the point of outright 
criminalization, as in the case of CSM-member social movements in Peru (though the 
Peruvian state is not a member of ALBA) (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.2016).  
As I was informed, such tensions continue to mark the relationship between 
Venezuelan social movements and the Bolivarian state, particularly over issues 
pertaining to mining projects (beyond the petroleum sector). Problems associated with 
the contradiction of “ecological mining” – as a supposedly sustainable form of mining 
that respects ecological integrity and the participation of local communities (RBV, 
1999: 24; RBV, 2001: 82-3) – can only be dealt with effectively if there is openly 
accessible information and data on the impact and consequences of such projects: 
“even in having so many resources, we have not developed our own methods… we 
need concrete data, concrete standards, and concrete categories in order to be able to 
know what the underlying fundamentals are with respect to the exploitation of the 
Arco Minero” (Interview, ALBA TV, 20.06.201).25 
 These aspects of information control, and the various ways in which these 
forms of control manifest in the obscured litany of “state secrets”, are some of the 
central characteristics of the modern bureaucratic capitalist state. This is not to suggest 
that all such information is forever hidden from view, for some portions of information 
																																								 																				
25 A problem clearly acknowledged in the last CSM statement, imploring the organisation to “ensure 
transparency in their dynamics” (ALBA-TCP, 2013). 
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and statistics will become part of the strategic selectivity of the state (Poulantzas, 
2014: 32); thus, the Venezuelan state will frequently speak of its various successes in 
the realm of poverty reduction, improved levels of equality, health care and so on (see 
Frajman, 2014). Yet as soon as these fragments of information touch upon areas 
sensitive to the reproduction of the state’s accumulation regime, then the underlying 
divide between intellectual and manual labour (i.e., in maintaining a critical distance 
between the dominated classes and various modes of knowledge which may empower 
them beyond a desired point) becomes further entrenched. Thus: “that structural mode 
of functioning of the state administration, bureaucratic secrecy… perfectly embodies 
the distance between leaders and led, as well as the hermetic insulation of power from 
democratic control” (Poulantzas, 2014: 226). In turn, such an accumulation regime 
comes into direct conflict and contradiction with the wider hegemonic project of 
Bolivarianismo, in terms of fostering broader popular participation in the overall 
reproduction of the social formation itself.  
 The above considerations on the place and function of social movements 
within ALBA therefore touches heavily upon the wider socio-economic strategies 
pursued by those states formally committed to socialism in the 21st century. We will 
therefore examine in more detail the specifically economic-developmentalist side of 
the ALBA space in order to delineate the precise contours of power and organisation 
that significantly shape the wider project of food sovereignty.  
 
4.2.2 ALBA’s ‘Grandnational Concept’ and ‘Grandnational Enterprises’ 
While the first official invocation of Grandnational Projects (GNPs) and 
Grandnational Enterprises (GNEs) was outlined during the 5th ALBA-TCP Summit in 
2007, it was in the subsequent year during the 6th Summit of the ALBA-TCP, held in 
Caracas, Venezuela, that a new productivist paradigm was declared, under the label of 
‘Conceptualization of Grandnational Projects and Enterprises in the Framework of 
ALBA’ (ALBA-TCP, 2008c). In many ways, the significance of this summit, in 
particular the section declaring the creation of the Grandnational Enterprises (GNEs), 
emerges from the concerted effort to move towards a concrete form of cooperation 
that mobilises the material wealth of the region (in ecological, technological and 
human terms) towards the real satisfaction of human need, and thus finally bringing 
to life the early philosophical content of the first ALBA summit of 2004, in which: 
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“Trade and investment cannot be conceived as ends in themselves, but instruments to 
reach a just and sustainable development” (ALBA, 2004). As the statement noted: 
 “[t]he Grandnational concept can be assimilated to that of a Mega-
State, under the joint declaration of broad and common political lines 
of action between the States that share the same vision of exercising the 
National and Regional Sovereignty, through developing and showing 
each of them their own social and political identity, without this 
involving – at the moment – the construction of supranational 
structures” (ALBA-TCP, 2008c). 
The strategic rationale for constructing the ALBA space, which in fact largely echoes 
the common theme found throughout the history of modern regionalism, comes down 
to the goal of “overcoming national barriers to strengthening local capacities by 
merging them into a whole and to be able to face the challenges of the world reality… 
dominated by the big industrialized powers and the hegemonic, economic [regional] 
blocs” (ALBA-TCP, 2008c).  
Thus, the rationale of GNEs resides in their specifically productivist function, and 
as the materialisation of ALBA’s inter- and trans-national framework for the 
production of goods directly towards the satisfaction of the popular masses. In a sense 
(and as we shall see further below), the structural formation of trans-territorial 
production, distribution and consumption takes its cue from the prevailing standard of 
transnational production among multi- or trans-national corporations, but from the 
angle of Keynesian state management. Put simply, it is a call for the centrality of the 
state in the process of transnational production ensembles, even if these ensembles 
contain various private enterprises operating at any place in the Grandnational chain. 
From within this organisational rationale, four operational values are listed as part of 
the Grandnational Enterprise concept:  
1. Cooperative Advantage: Productive integration viz. complementarity, with a 
view to “making the most of the capacities of each country.” 
2. Map of Goods: Production oriented towards internal (intra-ALBA) 
consumption – that of material autonomy proper, with any remaining surpluses 
re-directed towards the world market.  
3. Endogenous Development: GNEs “base their existence upon productive 
efficiency”, not only as a logical consequence of the ALBA principles, but also 
“to be self-sustainable.”  
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4. Repairing the Metabolic Rift: Production must entail not only the re-
commensuration of nature and the community, but also redress the robbing of 
wealth and value from (respectively) the earth and labour. (ALBA-TCP, 
2008c) 
The above category titles are couched in terms not found within the 
‘Conceptualisation’ statement; rather, they reflect the specific historical materialist 
approach pursued in this thesis. Nevertheless, these dimensions substantially express 
the fundamental vision underpinning the four values of GNEs within ALBA. To recap, 
then, we can see that these values touch upon four analytically distinct yet internally 
related aspects associated with the political economy of ALBA: (1) Cooperative 
Advantage, (2) Map of Goods, (3) Endogenous Development, and (4) Repairing the 
Metabolic Rift. The first two points, relating primarily to the moment of circulation, 
will be addressed together, while the latter two pertaining to production will be dealt 
with separately thereafter.   
 
Cooperative Advantage and the New Map of Goods 
As has been widely understood among ALBA studies, the dynamic of cooperative 
advantage structures the commercial relations between member states (Muhr, 2010a; 
Costoya, 2011; Broadhead and Morrison, 2012; Pearce, 2013; Gürcan and Bakiner, 
2015). This concept stands in contrast to the prevailing ideas of classical political 
economy (comparative advantage), in which free trade among nations will lead to an 
idealised equilibrium in the balance of trade between all participants. Yet the reality 
of international trade, as clearly recognised by the ALBA institution, reveals the 
operation of competitive advantage in which the uneven development of capitalism 
tends to form geographically concentrated clusters of capital and technical leads, 
which tend towards the re-production of trade imbalances (Shaikh, 2007). Thus, 
ALBA’s philosophy in terms of international trade focuses less on the accumulation 
of capital for its own sake, and towards the enhancement of the socio-economic 
wellbeing of the ALBA states (and peoples).  
It was during the 2009 Cuba-Venezuela Mixed Commission meeting that 
Chávez laid out his metaphorical vision for the material transformation of ALBA, by 
proposing “the creation of the map of goods [el mapa de las mercanías] to advance 
toward new forms of production, complementarities and trade among nations” (cited 
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in Aponte-García, 2011: 182). As indicated above, it is through the materialization of 
the GNEs that this map takes on a concrete manifestation beyond the cartographic 
imagination. According to Maribel Aponte-García, ALBA’s ‘map of goods’ is 
navigated via “sustainable value chains”, which can be broadly understood through 
politically established regulatory structures, civil society involvement, local 
institutional factors, and societal values (Aponte-García, 2011: 186; see also FAO, 
2014). This form of productive network is further explicated by Aponte-García in 
terms of “strategic regionalism”, which can be conceived analogously to the central 
parameters of the ‘new regionalism’ paradigm – including the advancement of extra-
economic goals (political harmony, cultural exchange, regional social policy) and the 
participation of a variety of social actors (Aponte-García, 2011: 186). Through such 
characteristics (sustainable value chains / strategic regionalism) Aponte-García claims 
that the ALBA space is “inserted between capitalism and twenty-first century 
socialism”, in terms of its “diversity and plurality of property forms” (ibid: 187, 188; 
see also ALBA-TCP, 2008c). Yet despite the range of property forms within any given 
Grandnational chain, it is the state itself that sits front and centre across both upstream 
and downstream components of economic organisation (see Figure 4).  
With such qualitative features in place, we must enquire into the concrete data 
generated from the operation of GNEs within the ALBA space. Yet it is the 
quantitative side of the analytic coin that is most difficult to ascertain. Aponte-García 
has, however, by far gone the furthest among ALBA scholars in offering a first-cut 
approximation to the magnitudes of trade among ALBA states. By coding various 
figures from UN Comtrade data sets, Aponte-García has managed to construct a series 
of trade tables based around each GNE (e.g., energy, food, etc.), the contents of which 
refer to exports per country within the ALBA space (Aponte-García, 2011: 190).  
Form a broad perspective her data show that intra-ALBA trade almost doubled 
from $5bn (2000-2004) to $9bn (2005-2009). Interestingly, the highest growth 
category from this trade was within the ALBA-Food Grandnational, rising from 12 to 
32 percent of the total (ibid: 193). This Grandnational Enterprise formed the 
culmination of the prior agreement within the ALBA bloc to internalise the values of 
food sovereignty and security into their forms of agricultural cooperation and mutual 
development. In response to the world food crisis beginning in 2007 (see McMichael, 
2009), ALBA’s first official call for the development of food sovereignty and security 
policies encompassed the creation of the ALBA Food Security Fund, with an initial  
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Figure 4: Model of grandnational enterprises and projects. 
Source: Aponte-Garcia, 2011: 189. 
 
capital injection of $100 million (ALBA-TCP, 2008a). The following year, the ALBA-
Food Grandnational Enterprise was signed into agreement, endowed with $49 billion 
from the existing ALBA Food Security Fund, which laid out a series of objectives – 
including the sharing and exchange of technical/scientific innovation in agricultural 
production, identifying specific productive units for collaboration, and stipulation of 
key areas of production (rice, corn, beans, oil seeds, vegetables, fruits, meat, milk) – 
all of which were to take place through inter-governmental agreement and diplomatic 
negotiations in accord with each member state’s national legislation (ALBA-TCP, 
2009a, 2009b). 
 In seeking to gain a handle on the specific trade patterns of this Grandnational 
Enterprise, Aponte-García has disaggregated her data as seen in Table 4. However, 
this is merely an approximation of ALBA’s map of goods, which of course contain 
various deficiencies: firstly, it is not clear from the UN Comtrade data whether or not 
it is in fact public or private entities that produce/export goods to ALBA members;  
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substitute the fuel exporting model; redefining the destiny of energy rent and the 
beneficiaries ofthese processes of recovering property of hydrocarbons, building 
financial autonomy and conciliating Venezuela's entry into MERCOSUR (South 
American Common Market) with ALBA. 
The Model of Grandnational Enterprises and Projects 
Based on the conceptual framework and these reflections on the commonalities, a 
model of grandnational enterprises and projects is proposed. Figure 1 illustrates 
the basic components of the model. GNEPs serve as lead firms that control and 
coordinate the production-distribution chain. Upstream, government involvement 
Figure1 Model of grandnational enterprises and projects 
IJCS Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals cubanstudies.plutojournals.org 
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Table 4: Intra-ALBA trade in food, by economic category to analyse regional production chain 
potentials. Sub-period 2005-2011, in US dollars at constant prices (2005=100) 
 
 Source: Aponte-García, 2014: 243-4. 
 
secondly, as the author herself notes, “I am assuming [each numeric value] reflects 
what is locally produced, although this doesn’t necessarily imply that consumption 
goods are being produced by local or public entities; for that matter, it could be MNCs 
[Multi-National Corporations] producing… export[s]”,26 and thus whether or not 
profits are retained within the host country. Despite these deficiencies, the table 
produced by Aponte-García for the Food-Grandnational is revealing. As we can see 
from the table above, the author has broken down the component parts of each state’s 
export category: primary production, intermediate processing, and consumption. From 
these figures, we can see that the intermediate processing component of ALBA’s 
production spaces are by far the most significant, comprising around 89% of the total 
value. In the process of capturing more value within the overall production sequence, 
the intermediate phase tends to contribute towards constructing regional productive 
capacity and employment growth (Aponte-García, 2014: 243). At least from the 
perspective of Venezuela, the epicentre of the ALBA space, it is clear that the country 
sits just below the median line in the ranking of ALBA’s total export value column. 
More important, however, is the changing dynamics of Venezuelan agriculture and 
the impacts they have on the evolution of ALBA’s space of flows. 
As Table 4 shows, the three weightiest countries in the table are Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Nicaragua, all of which are among Venezuela’s top ten import partners. 
Taken together, the value of all Venezuelan imports of agricultural products from 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua comes to roughly $665 million, which dwarfs the total  
																																								 																				
26 Aponte-García, Personal communication with author, 18 August 2015. 
Intra&ALBA*trade*in*food,*by*economic*category*to*analyse*regional*production*chain*
potentials.*Sub&period*2005&2011,*in*US*dollars*at*constant*prices*(2005=100).""
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 Figure 5: GDP at market prices (current US$). 
 Source: World Bank 
 
 
 Figure 6: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP). 
 Source: World Bank  
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value of Venezuelan agricultural exports to ALBA ($20.2 million).27 Again, it is 
assumed, by virtue of the ALBA principles, that intra-ALBA exports between 
members are complementary, roughly corresponding to goods that are relatively 
scarce and therefore sought from outside partners. Nevertheless, despite the positive 
growth in intra-ALBA trade, there remains a huge level of uneven development 
between ALBA states, with Venezuela continuing to hold a marked imbalance 
between agricultural imports and exports. We can appreciate the nature of ALBA’s 
uneven landscape by comparing Figures 5 and 6, showing comparative figures of GDP 
among several ALBA states, and the ratio of agricultural value added to total GDP. 
As we can see, Venezuelan GDP clearly outstrips the other four ALBA states, yet its 
share of agriculture as a percentage of GDP is at the bottom end, comparable to Cuba. 
Furthermore, Venezuela’s annual growth rate of food imports remains at a constant 11 
percent from 2001-2011, while food exports contracted by 6.68 percent (2001-2006) 
and 36.53 percent (2006-2011). Added to this, it should be noted that, despite doubling 
its rate of imports from ALBA states, these ALBA-imports represent a mere 4.9 
percent of Venezuela’s total imports (2006-2009), while the US represents 28%, China 
11%, Brazil 10%, Colombia 6% and Mexico 4.7% (Yaffe, 2011: 137). 
While ALBA remains committed to enhancing the region’s independence from 
mineral extraction and constructing a more balanced socio-economic structure, the 
short- to medium-term remains locked within the older patterns of oil-rent circulation 
(either through direct trade in petroleum, or through the channelling of ground-rent in 
the form of hard currency transactions). As Chávez stated in 2012, “[w]e should 
increase oil production from 3 to 3.5 million barrels a day, and by 2014 we should be 
at 4 million barrels. This is going to allow us greater flexibility in all of these [ALBA 
related] projects” (Chávez, cited in Boothroyd, 2012; cf. Dabène, 2009: 210).28 When 
oil was at $70 a barrel, Chávez offered his Caribbean allies a principal payment of 
50% of the total price, with the rest to be paid off over 20 years at 1 percent interest; 
when the oil price reached over $100, he offered 40%, and promised to further lower 
the principal to 30% should the price of oil go over $200 (Dabène, 2009: 184, 240 fn. 
29). What will happen now with the current price of oil at around $50? From one 
																																								 																				
27 The following data for Venezuela is derived from the FAO Country Profile (2015), available at 
http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E  
28 It seems that Venezuelan production levels have fallen well short of Chávez’s goal. As of 2014, 
current production levels stand at around 2.7 million b/pd (OPEC, 2015: 27).   
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angle, it is clear that the allure of Petrocaribe will be less pronounced for the smaller 
Caribbean states, whose previous price advantage via cheap Venezuelan oil is now 
almost matched by the current world market price. From another angle, the chief 
source of Venezuela’s extraordinary wealth will produce an adverse impact on the 
capacity for ALBA operations, given Chávez’s explicit link between oil revenue and 
“greater flexibility” for ALBA projects. 
Of course, this need not mean that the ALBA project itself is unviable, but 
merely that “[t]his is not an easy task” (ALBA-TCP, 2008c). The priority will be to 
maintain strong links within the ALBA trade bloc, which will help to enhance 
complementarity and self-sufficiency for the region as a whole, in terms of 
establishing a region-wide space of endogenous development that progressively 
phases out the necessity of purchasing capital or consumer goods from extra-regional 
sources. And yet, it is equally clear that the very nature of ALBA’s current map of 
goods (in terms of geographical distribution between imports/exports and commodity 
frontiers) must be radically transformed. Significant social transformation cannot 
come about purely through quantitative changes; i.e., through the ‘balancing of trade’. 
Indeed, as we will see further below, trade as such is a somewhat peripheral aspect to 
the very political economy of the ALBA bloc, whether in the case of food or otherwise. 
For the ultimate goal is not so much self-sufficiency for the region as an 
undifferentiated space, but to foster various spaces and scales of agrarian production 
that are in essence self-sufficient and hence independent, even while inter-linked 
through a cascading structure of regional cooperation and solidarity. As such, tracking 
particular movements in trade can only give us the faintest glimmer as to the 
potentialities of strengthening the spaces of agrarian production throughout the ALBA 
region. And as we have already noted, precise data on the nature of intra-ALBA trade 
is extremely scarce, leaving open any number of questions regarding the precise 
entities involved in ALBA members’ production, and whether productive entities are 
in fact linked in any way to Grandnational production chains. We must therefore 
confront the central premise and goal of the Grandnational Concept as one that is 
fundamentally bound up with the transformation of the Latin American regional 
society. And yet, this vision is not substantially explicated within the 2008 
Declaration. Rather, it is within the development of the ‘Economic Space of ALBA-
TCP’ (2012) that we begin to find the outlines of a specific socio-economic 
transformation that is capable (in theory) of moving beyond the quantitative aspects 
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of international trade, and towards the qualitative aspects of a new mode of social 
production.  
 
Endogenous Development  
The notion of ‘endogenous development” (desarrollo endógeno) has become one of 
the cornerstones of Venezuela’s Bolivarian development policy. It can be situated in 
a broader lineage of developmentalist thinking that emerged during the 20th century, 
under the conditions of US productivist hegemony. From the Cocoyoc Declaration 
(1974) issued by experts within the United Nations development units, to the various 
strands of thought concerning “alternative” development models, the post-war era was 
principally one of re-thinking the social, political and ecological impacts of Western 
development theory (Gudynas, 2013: 19-20; Rist, 2008: chs. 7-10). However, the more 
specific notion of “endogenous development”, which later emerged from the same 
intellectual network within the UN, became oriented around: 
“the identification of potential human resources, divides 
responsibilities between self-reliance and international collaboration, 
seeks to grade regional projects and national objectives, and establishes 
permanent communication between a downward and an upward flow 
of information, representing not merely the transmission of orders and 
reactions to those orders but also a circuit of trust between governors 
and governed” (Perroux, 1983: 202). 
While Venezuela’s development model became oriented around these values from 
early on, principally embodied within the first 6-year plan (RBV, 2001), these ideas 
have subsequently come to encapsulate the underlying rationale for the overall 
development objectives of the ALBA bloc. It was noted during the 11th ALBA Summit 
in Caracas, Venezuela, in 2012, under the implementation of the ‘Economic Space of 
the ALBA-TCP (ECOALBA-TCP)’, that the realisation of the GNEs must be 
premised on the enhancement of productivity as a function of self-sustainability. This 
priority contains three strategic elements. Firstly, ALBA must insulate itself from the 
competitive pressures of the capitalist world market, via a “shared-development 
process under the perspective of a bloc and not as a mere aggregation of individual 
countries, which will also allow its international positioning” (Article 1.1, 
ECOALBA-TCP, 2012, emphasis added). Secondly, the development of productivity 
and economic diversification also pertains to the internal satisfaction of each state’s 
development goals: 
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“All countries can become industrial countries and diversify their 
production in order to achieve the integral growth of all sectors of their 
economies. Rejection of the ‘export or die’ premise and questioning of 
the development model based on export strongholds. The privilege of 
production and a national market that fosters satisfaction of the needs 
of the population through internal production factors, importing what 
is necessary and exporting surpluses in a complementary fashion” 
(Article 2.4, ECOALBA-TCP, 2012). 
Finally, ALBA states will seek to augment this trend through consolidation of their 
technological frontiers, through the cooperative exchange of research, innovation and 
development: 
“The constant scientific-technical exchange, cooperation and 
collaboration as a form of development, taking into consideration the 
strengths of member countries in specific areas with a view to constitute 
a critical mass in the field of innovation, science and technology” 
(Article 2.3, ECOALBA-TCP, 2012). 
Taken together, these two priorities represent (1) the external defence of the ALBA 
bloc, and (2+3) its internal consolidation – strategically speaking, the former will be 
strengthened and reinforced through the realisation of the latter. However, ascertaining 
the precise dynamics and data for point 3 poses particular difficulties. If we recall 
Aponte-García’s data on intra-ALBA trade in the Food Grandnational (Table 4 above), 
it should be noted that the UN Comtrade category for ‘capital’ (i.e., exchange of 
technology/capital goods) is null for all countries listed in the table.29 This lack of data 
for such a category therefore presents certain difficulties in assessing the impact of 
“productive complementarity and technological advancement” within the ALBA bloc 
(Aponte-García, 2014: 243). To better understand the material embodiment of 
endogenous development within the ALBA Grandnational Concept, it is first of all 
necessary to delineate the precise form in which this materialisation takes place.  
 As we have seen, the primary task of cooperative advantage and the strategic 
map of goods that emerges from it is to forge a type of “productive integration” 
between member countries (ALBA-TCP, 2008c). And while the political rationale of 
constructing region-wide GNEs centres on combatting the negative effects of 
(Western dominated) transnational capitalism, the very notion of productive 
integration takes its cue from the specific technological and organisational frontiers 
																																								 																				
29 This explains why, in the reproduction of Aponte-García’s table above, this category has been left 
out.  
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carved out by contemporary transnational firms. As Chávez himself noted with respect 
to the formation of the ALBA-Food GNE, “We are going to create a supranational 
company, like a transnational company, but in this case with the concept of a great 
nation, to produce food with the goal of guaranteeing food sovereignty to our people” 
(Chávez; cited in Suggett, 2009a). However, at this point we reach a relatively large 
ambiguity in exactly how the GNEs function and thus what organisational form they 
actually assume. As Califano (2013-14: 86) points out:  
“[p]art of the misunderstandings is directly caused by the ALBA-TCP 
official documents, or by constitutive treaties of enterprises which are 
not GNEs… such as the Venezuelan based socialist mixed enterprises 
– which even in official documents are sometimes considered Grand-
National Enterprises.” 
Thus, when we turn our attention to those productive enterprises that fall officially 
under the ALBA mandate, there is a potential split within the overall GNE building 
processes as two relatively distinct entities emerge from a supposedly ‘organic’ 
process: on the one hand, the “Empresa Mixta Socialista del ALBA” (Mixed Socialist 
Enterprise of ALBA, EMSA), and on the other hand, a transnational GNE proper. 
Thus, EMSAs are characterised by the establishment of a single production centre 
(factory system), which may well forge its own links with surrounding upstream 
suppliers and downstream entities yet nevertheless inscribed within the national 
territory. As a bilateral investment, the ownership structure is legally prescribed by the 
majority ownership (51%) assumed by the host country, with the participating country 
holding the remainder (49%) (Solórzano Cavalieri, 2012: 146).  
A GNE, on the other hand, is quite literally “a compound entity composed by 
more than one mixed enterprise. Thus, it is structurally bound to act regionally” 
(Califano, 2013-14: 88, emphasis in original). Given the relatively less complex nature 
of the EMSAs, it is little wonder that they are “much more developed… in terms of 
number of operating firms, of their longevity, financial resources, etc.” (ibid: 87). To 
date, there is no such transnational GNE, which would imply the differentiation of 
productive tasks across borders under the aegis of a ‘parent company’.30 One of the 
few GNEs of the EMSA variety located outside Venezuela is in Bolivia. The bilateral 
																																								 																				
30 To the best of my knowledge, the only GNE that is in multilateral (rather than bilateral) ownership 
is the Soy Processing Plant ‘Eulalia Ramos’ in Venezuela, established through an agreement between 
Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia (El Universal, 2007). The plant was intended to supply Venezuelan 
schools with flavoured soy milk. 
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agreement to establish a food Grandnational, signed into each state’s respective 
national legislation in 2011, aims to invest in a number of agricultural goods, including 
soy, corn and rice, with the intention to forge industrial processing centres for their 
production (América Economica, 2011; Gaceta Oficial 39.719, 2011). By May 2013, 
the status of the productive entities was still in the diplomatic stage, with official 
pronouncements for the company’s creation but little evidence of its materialisation; 
though the following October, it was announced that all necessary steps had been taken 
for the final realisation of the firm (El Mundo, 2013; La Razón, 2013). Nevertheless, 
it is unclear as to the current status of this EMSA.  
 Through a bilateral accord with Venezuela and Nicaragua, the ALBA 
Alimentos de Nicaragua GNE was formed in 2007 between the Venezuelan Food 
Corporation (CVAL) and the Nicaraguan-based ALBA Alimentos company. The 
accord stipulates a basic bilateral trade deal, whereby the ALBA company will supply 
Venezuela with a variety of food products, including beef, ‘long-life’ packaged milk, 
coffee and beans. In turn, Venezuela would supply its trade partner with plantain jam, 
dairy products, tuna and powdered cocoa (El Universal, 2011). Here again, precise 
data mapping the trade patterns and volumes within this agreement are hard to come 
by, particularly given the institutional and financial opacity surrounding the 
ALBANISA holding company (COHA, 2010).31 
All other EMSAs charged with the production of foodstuffs are located in 
Venezuela, under the auspices of the Venezuelan Food Corporation (La Corporación 
Venezolana de Alimentos, CVAL), with a focus on the following products: rice, 
legumes, pork, chicken, fish, and dairy (Gaceta Oficial 39.494, 2010).32 It is therefore 
apparent that, contrary to Chávez’s aim to forge a truly “transnational” food company 
within ALBA, we find that the entire thrust of Bolivarian endogenous development is 
to nationalise developmental dynamics by satisfying the internal consumption needs 
																																								 																				
31 However, according to a diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Managua, trade between 
Venezuela and Nicaragua had grown considerably under the ALBA accord, from $2 million for all of 
2006 to $102million for just the first ten months of 2009 
(https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09MANAGUA1164_a.html)  
32 These enterprises are (respectively): Empresa Mixta Socialista Arroz del ALBA; Empresa Mixta 
Socialista Leguminosas del ALBA; Empresa Mixta Socialista Porcinos del ALBA; Empresa Mixta 
Socialista Avícola del ALBA; Empresa Mixta Socialista Pesquera del ALBA; Empresa Mixta Socialista 
Lacteos del ALBA. There is also one other EMSA stipulated in the same Gaceta Oficial, oriented 
around the production of timber - Empresa Mixta Socialista Maderas del ALBA. The only other 
Venezuelan-based food EMSA not contained in this decree is the ALBA-Cacao company, which was 
signed into law a few months earlier (Gaceta Oficial 39.410, 2010). 
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of the country in question, rather than the systematic expansion of markets and 
territorial differentiation in production. There is, then, a certain tension with respect to 
the first element in of the ‘Grandnational Concept’ – cooperative advantage – in terms 
of how its content (referring to “productive integration”) should be understood. From 
the above considerations, this term takes the form of ‘fair trade’ (comercio justo), 
rather than the progressive integration of productive activities across borders. In this 
way, the second element – map of goods – assumes its shape largely around the map 
of state territoriality, and thus amounts to a mere “aggregation of states”, rather than 
an integrated “bloc”. It is therefore the general logic of the third term – endogenous 
development – that shapes the first two, by subordinating capital to the needs of the 
community, and thus fixing capital more thoroughly to the territorial specificity of the 
community itself. And it is precisely this subordination of capital to society that opens 
up the last element of the 4-part conceptualisation of ALBA’s Grandnational Concept. 
 
Repairing the Metabolic Rift 
The notion of ‘metabolic rift’ was a central aspect of Marx’s thinking with respect to 
capital’s revolutionary effects exacted on both the natural and human landscapes 
(Foster, 2000). Writing during the time of the second agricultural revolution, which 
witnessed the introduction of fertilizer industries and the application of soil science, 
Marx began to see how large scale industry and ecological cycles entered into a 
contradictory relationship. The transition to capitalist agriculture, which more and 
more becomes an appendage to the needs of industrial production (primarily in the 
production of cheap food for an urban labour force), steadily seeks to increase 
agricultural productivity by squeezing more and more fertility out of the land with 
scant regard to the relative limits set by the nitrogen cycle and other ecological 
barriers; thus, “all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a 
progress towards ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility” (Marx, 1981: 
638). Contemporary peasant movements seek to mend this rift in an effort to not only 
heal the relationship between society and nature, but also for the sake of consolidating 
a new concept of ‘agrarian citizenship’, which goes beyond the notion of mere political 
rights in the countryside, but of the general responsibility and obligations of citizens 
to mend society-nature relations and in doing so, forge new types of social relations 
(Wittman, 2009). Yet the notion of the metabolic rift was more than a mere critique of 
capital’s destruction of the ecological basis of life, but also of the degenerative effects 
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on the human body. In addition to separating the labourers from their means of 
production (primarily the land), exacting a stark divide between town and country, and 
progressively robbing the soil of its natural foundation, the development of capitalist 
relations of production aggravates another rift between the worker and the products of 
her labour, and in turn degrading the integrity of the human body and mind (Marx, 
1981: 638).  
While the entire thrust of Western development has favoured the power of 
capital to ‘develop’ the capacities of labour, in reality it is labour’s subservience to 
capital that continuously robs humanity of its creative, developmental powers. In this 
way, the type of endogenous development promoted by the ALBA space comes far 
closer to what Ben Selwyn calls a ‘labour-centred development’ (Selwyn, 2016a; 
2016b). Consolidating this form of development can run through several stages 
(though by no means ‘inevitable’ in sequence): workers can extract concessions from 
capital even while remaining subordinate to it; they can similarly confront capital 
directly (as well as the political institutions from which it derives power) either by 
expelling the despotic power of capital from the shop floor (worker cooperatives) or 
by mounting a frontal assault on the capitalist state itself through extensive political 
mobilisations; finally, under propitious conditions, labour can take hold of the 
productive process, become more empowered within the strategic field of the state, 
and in doing so re-direct the idea of ‘productive efficiency’ towards a radically 
different notion – from the accumulation of capital to the development of individual 
capacities and general social satisfaction (see Selwyn, 2014: 192-205). 
These two components of the metabolic rift (ecology and labour) speaks 
directly to this fourth aspect of the Grandnational Concept, with the aim of “executing 
environmentally sustainable projects, [and] promoting conditions for decent 
employment and equitable distribution of wealth” (ALBA-TCP, 2008c), a political 
goal that should be read alongside the further elaboration of the ECOALBA space, 
stating that, “the equitable distribution of wealth and the socialization of the means of 
production constitute two powerful tools to ensure social justice and the progress of 
our societies and economic systems” (ECOALBA-TCP, 2012). By focusing on this 
revolutionary goal in the context of Venezuela, we can begin to see some of the 
potentials and challenges with regard to this aspect of social transformation in ALBA. 
We will therefore deal with each of these axes (ecology and labour) in turn, despite 
the fact that they intimately connected. 
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On the ecology front, Venezuela’s adoption of food sovereignty, as a specific 
plank in the national development plan, seeks to go beyond traditional forms of 
capitalist agriculture. In June 2008, two separate Extraordinary Laws were passed 
(Organic Law of Food Security and Sovereignty [RBV, 2008a]; Law of Integral 
Agricultural Health [RBV, 2008b]), each of which carries a different register in terms 
of society-nature relations. For the former, the role of ‘food sovereignty’ is explicitly 
conceived as: 
“the inalienable right of a nation to define and develop agrarian policies 
appropriate to its specific circumstances, starting from local and 
national production, respecting the conservation of productive and 
cultural biodiversity, as well as the capacity of prioritised self-
sufficiency, guaranteeing the timely and sufficient access of food for 
the entire population” (Article 4, RBV, 2008a: 46). 
This broad policy is to be enacted through “the transformation of the relations of 
exchange and distribution, from the co-management in planning with the participation 
of all actors involved in agrarian activity”, as well as with “the identification and 
recognition of the social relations of production and consumption, within the concrete 
necessities and possibilities of every one of those actors of distinct agrarian chains” 
(ibid: 47). As a corollary, it is stated that in the effort to ensure “sustainable 
production”, practices of “intensive monoculture”, as well as excessive market 
dependence, were contrary to the present law (Article 10, ibid: 52-3). With the Law of 
Integral Agricultural Health, the legal text is equally emphatic, though this time with 
reference to the application of “agroecology” as a “scientific base of tropical and 
sustainable agriculture” (Article 49, RBV, 2008b: 42). And while the OLFSS makes 
various references to the presence and use of agro-chemicals in the process of agrarian 
production (Articles 79, 80, 81, RBV, 2008a: 91-2), the LIAH explicitly states the 
intention to “progressively prevent” (phase out) the use of such chemical and toxic 
agents, as well as prohibiting their furthered use, production or importation (Article 
56.3, 57.12, RBV, 2008b: 45). Despite this stated goal, Venezuelan agrarian 
development has tended to favour traditional methods of production (particularly the 
use of agro-chemical inputs) at the expense of agro-ecological approaches (Schiavoni, 
2015; Lavelle, 2016; Enríquez and Newman, 2015) (see Figure 7).  
 In terms of labour relations and enhanced decision making power for the direct 
producers, Venezuela has come to be known, perhaps more than any other ALBA 
state, as one of the region’s principal examples of worker control and self-management  
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Figure 7: Kg/s of fertiliser consumed per hectare 
Source: World Bank. 
(autogestión). The call for the democratisation and socialisation of the means of 
production had already made their mark in two of Venezuela’s 6-year plans, as well 
as the ECOALBA-TCP statement above (RBV, 2007; RBV, 2013). By the time of 
Chávez’s inauguration, there were some 813 cooperatives in existence. With the 
creation of a special law for cooperative associations in 2001, in which the process of 
starting a cooperative was significantly streamlined (and the benefits derived from 
cooperative status were greatly enhanced), the number of registered cooperatives 
expanded rapidly. The national cooperative supervisory department (Sunacoop) 
registered around 262,904 cooperatives by the end of 2008 (Azzellini, 2009: 172). 
Thus, the flowering of a cooperative movement throughout Venezuela was thought to 
represent the underlying social values of the National Constitution (1999), stipulating 
the importance of human centred development, comprising self-management, co-
management, and cooperatives forming the institutional expression of Bolivarianismo 
(Article 70, RBV, 1999). These institutional forms were envisioned as a means 
through which the “rights of workers, as well as the communities” can “develop 
associations of a social and participatory character”, and where “these associations 
will be able to develop any type of economic activity, in conformity with the law” 
(Article 118, ibid).  
However, the zeal with which the Bolivarian state sought to encourage the 
growth of cooperatives produced unintended consequences that severely undermined 
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the early success of their existence. As the governmental supervisory body, Sunacoop, 
later divulged after a closer examination of its data, it was found that only around 
70,000 cooperatives were legally certified, of which 49.38% were engaged in services 
(tourism, cleaning, industrial maintenance, hairdressing, etc.); 25.3 productive 
cooperatives (agriculture, livestock farming, fishing, manufacturing, industry); 11.48 
transport; 7.64 banks of consejos comunales (Azzellini, 2009: 173). The remainder 
were found to be “ghost cooperatives” – established in order to obtain favourable terms 
of credit and other lines of state support, or even in some cases existing only on paper 
in order to defraud the state (Rojas, 2006). In the agrarian sector, many cooperatives 
failed due to a lack of prior training, insufficient levels of knowledge exchange with 
more experienced peasant groups, while cooperative participants were often 
unaccustomed to arduous work, instead merely re-selling various means of production 
on the market in an attempt to move back to urban centres with cash in hand (Page, 
2010; Lavelle, 2016; Purcell, 2016). Yet even when cooperatives were well organised 
internally, the relationship between them and the central state itself has been a strained 
one, with frequent complaints on behalf of individuals within their community 
councils concerning “length of proceedings, delays because of incomplete 
information, bad accessibility, unfulfilled promises, lack of coordination and 
competition between different institutions, insufficient support, and attempts at co-
optation” (Azzellini, 2015: 145; cf. Enríquez and Newman, 2015).  
 The larger, mostly industrial scale ‘Social Production Companies’ have seen a 
number of successful cases of worker control, but elsewhere tend to reproduce the 
traditional hierarchal structure of power and decision making inside the capitalist firm, 
thus maintaining the divide between manual and intellectual labour, and hence the 
power of capital (even if state-owned) over labour (Kappeler, 2013; Larrabure, 2013). 
The still ongoing class divisions within the Bolivarian process thus highlights the 
divergent visions that often accompany a given Social Production Company, in which 
the working class tend towards more concerted strategies to maintain the integrity of 
the firms’ operations for the sake of fulfilling the goals of a socialist mode of 
production (Azzellini, 2015: 150).  
 Arguably, the notion of the ‘social economy’, and the concrete class praxis 
involved with the formation of cooperative workplaces, has gone further in Venezuela 
than elsewhere. This again points towards the rationale for using Venezuela as a 
central case study and proxy for the development of the ALBA space, and the degree 
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to which spaces of production in Venezuela that have been established under the 
ALBA banner are in fact moving towards novel modes of social production.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
The chapter has offered a historical and documentary analysis of the ALBA 
regionalisation project in order to preface our contextual understanding of the way in 
which food sovereignty is refracted through this regional space. However, the 
specificity of food sovereignty as such was not the central focus of the Chapter. 
Rather, as a study in the politics of food sovereignty, and how such a politicization 
expresses itself in a range of material/institutional settings, it was necessary to sketch 
the precise delineation of ALBA’s relationship to various social forces (primarily 
through the Council of Social Movements), as well as the institutional embodiment of 
its politico-economic vision and policy (Grandnational Enterprises). In short, 
clarifying the parameters of ALBA’s agrarian politics help to situate the nature and 
content of the subsequent chapters.  
From the historical point of view, it is near impossible to sufficiently 
understand the antecedents of this regional space without further understanding the 
lineaments of state formation in Venezuela. There are three reasons for this: firstly, 
the material power of oil had left its mark on the process of Venezuelan state formation 
from the beginning, leading to the rise of a ‘magical state’ administered by the national 
landlord (though always in a contested relationship with foreign capital); second, the 
very birth of ALBA was indisputably a Venezuelan vision, though no doubt in 
conjunction with ideological convergences among political allies in the region 
(initially the Cuban state and the various Latin American social movements); thirdly, 
and as a consequence of these first two points, the materialisation of the ALBA space, 
particularly in the form of productive enterprises, are largely concentrated within the 
Venezuelan territory.  
 Casting a long shadow over the processes of Venezuelan state formation, the 
presence and production of oil has significantly shaped both the class structures and 
political discourses constitutive of this ‘magical state’. The various social 
contradictions that have accompanied this process simultaneously formed the strategic 
rationale for Chávez’s campaign for the presidency, and his subsequent vision for a 
new type of Bolivarianismo, rooted in the elevation of national independence and 
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popular sovereignty. Undoubtedly rooted in a confrontation against neoliberalism, and 
a re-emphasis on a fair and just form of economic development, Chávez’s plan for 
national rejuvenation was hardly a radical break from previous ISI discourse and 
policy, as seen in the first major document produced during the run up to his 
candidacy, the Alternative Bolivarian Agenda (Chávez, 1996). This measured plan 
would therefore skilfully unite an electoral bloc composed of both the popular sectors 
yearning for change, and sections of Venezuelan capital eager to maintain, or gain, 
strategic access to the state apparatus. Yet the ways in which this apparatus was 
transformed during the first years of Chávez’s presidency ultimately fractured this 
power bloc beyond breaking point. From the plebiscitary re-drafting of the new 
constitution in 1999 to the emergence of ‘enabling laws’ permitting the passage of 
various economic changes by presidential decree, an irreparable rift had emerged 
between Venezuela’s traditional dominant classes and the mass of popular sectors that 
maintained strong support for chavismo (López-Maya and Lander, 2000; Brading, 
2014).  
The expansion of state power, particularly concentrated in the executive 
branch and the newly created institutions linked organically to it, thus reflects a 
peculiar type of what Poulantzas called ‘authoritarian statism’, though with a raft of 
new political spaces conducive to protagonistic democracy. These expanded functions 
of state practice characteristic of authoritarian statism tend towards the relative side-
lining of other fractions of the state apparatus: “legitimacy embodied by parliament 
which had as its frame of reference a universal rationality is gradually passing over 
into a legitimacy characterized by the institutional rationality of efficiency and 
embodied by the Executive-administration” (Poulantzas, 2014: 218-9). This trend 
could be read early on when Chávez addressed the constituent assembly in 1999 with 
the words of Símon Bolívar: “Fortunate the citizen… who, under the protection of 
arms, calls on national sovereignty to exercise its unrestricted will” (Simón Bolívar; 
cited in Gott, 2005: 125). At the same time, however, the Bolivarian state appears to 
be directing its unrestricted will towards the deepening of radical democracy, and 
empowering the previously disenfranchised popular classes with novel forms of state-
society relations in the making. Combining the strong state with the flowering of 
popular democracy therefore sets the scene for the slow but steady emergence of 
ALBA’s underlying strategic and spatial selectivities.  
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 Our examination of ALBA therefore focused on two specific dimensions: 
state-social movement relations, and the specific political economy of the ALBA bloc. 
On the first count, the creation of the Council of Social Movements (CSM) was a 
genuinely novel feature of regional building, in which social movement actors enjoyed 
a formal presence in the highest echelons of the institutional architecture. The slow 
pace of consolidation for the CSM was equally matched by the (strategically 
necessary) self-organisation of transnational social movements across Latin America, 
all of which recognised the staggered progress of their incorporation, yet never 
relinquishing their desire to forge a truly anti-neoliberal (and anti-capitalist) regional 
space. However, various examples in which ALBA states and their respective social 
forces were meant to work together tend to reveal a marked imbalance of power 
between the two. From bargaining leverage in international forums to the more 
localised examples of mining production in Venezuela, social movements find 
themselves in a contradictory position of deriving their agency and power from 
nationally constituted ‘sovereign powers’ – the simultaneous source and limit of social 
movements’ transformative capacity.  
Thus, as we have noted only in theoretical form (§2.2.2), the general conditions 
of ALBA’s strategic and spatial selectivity find common root in the specific mode of 
region-building, of which the raison d'être is the reassertion of raison d'État. This 
reassertion of sovereign power contains an uneasy fusion of specific political rights 
and territorial practices – the expanded inclusivity and territorial decentralization of 
agency. Yet the balance between centralized and decentralized powers typical of post-
liberal regimes remains compromised precisely because of the material foundation of 
its own accumulation regime, principally in the form of mining extraction. In a 
contradictory fashion, the democratization of social wealth thus requires a 
centralization of powers within the national executive, in order to cut-across other sub-
national fractions of the state that may obstruct such distributional channels. From the 
regional perspective, this strategic and spatial terrain of post-liberal sovereignty 
therefore amounts to a mere aggregation of states, rather than a region wide “bloc”, 
somewhat contrary to the stated aims of ALBA. Consequently, it is also for this reason 
that many of the social forces involved in the regional project of food sovereignty 
expend most of their energy in political organization and struggle within their own 
national territories, rather than at the level of a region-wide ‘organised society’ 
(Chapter 5). 
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The political economy of ALBA thus finds its institutional materiality confined 
in a similar manner. ALBA sought to consolidate this political economy through the 
instantiation of several conceptual markers, which, drawn from the ‘Grandnational 
Concept’ (2008c) through to the ‘Economic Space of the ALBA-TCP’ (2012), 
amounted to a region-wide ‘social economy’. The four component parts of this concept 
were categorised as the following: cooperative trade, map of goods, endogenous 
development, repairing the metabolic rift. Broadly defined, the first two centred on 
aspects of circulation, with the latter two on production. Thus, cooperative trade and 
the new map of goods sought to identify not only the modality of exchange between 
ALAB states, but also a select number of products to which the new trade regime 
would be oriented. In the agricultural sector, these trade dynamics have recently come 
to light through Aponte-García’s careful analysis, yet the qualitative nature of such 
data come with certain drawbacks. Thus, no real data set for intra-ALBA trade 
currently exists, making it difficult to distinguish between the types of industry 
involved in the flow of goods (whether from state, mixed, or private industry). The 
true measure of ALBA’s political economy must therefore come from the materially 
grounded instantiations of its productive base, specifically in the form of the Mixed 
Socialist Enterprises that dominate the economic side of the ‘Grandnational Concept’.  
Despite the stated aim of forging a truly transnational form of cooperatively 
integrated production chains across the ALBA space, the absence of this form is the 
result of more than the mere difficulty of constructing such institutions. For the very 
logic of endogenous development effectively prioritises not only the satisfaction of 
the national market, but also the progressive accumulation of the means of production 
subordinated to national popular ends. This helps explain the conspicuous absence of 
“productive integration” and the “transnational production” that this would entail. 
Such an absence should not imply that there exists no cross-national cooperation in 
the field of economic development; the establishment of EMSAs are legally predicated 
on at least two national states cooperating in the formation of these firms, albeit the 
‘foreign’ partner owning a minority stake. As a result of this legal architecture, the 
direct control (if not legal ownership) resides with the home state, subject to national 
legislation, and therefore subject to change only through diplomatic negotiation. In 
light of these two dimensions of exploration, these subsequent chapters will further 
analyse the concrete actors involved in Venezuela’s consolidation of food sovereignty 
under the auspices of ALBA.  
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5 Territorial Struggles and Modes of Knowledge: 
New Political Technologies of Food Sovereignty in Venezuela 
 
This chapter will examine the specific strategies, struggles and challenges facing Food 
Sovereignty (FS) protagonists in Venezuela in the context of ALBA principles and 
institutional arrangements. The analysis will develop through two main sections. 
Firstly, we will explore the more specifically Venezuelan dimensions of the struggle 
for food sovereignty via an engagement with various grassroots protagonists 
attempting to transform the political technology of agrarian life in Venezuela. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, political technologies encompass bundles of powers and practices 
that congeal into a specific regime of sovereignty. Peasant struggles within and across 
the strategic terrain of the Bolivarian state thus seek to re-organise the legal, territorial 
and political balance of forces and the institutional materiality of the Venezuelan state 
itself. Through the use of semi-structured interview data, we will be better able to fully 
capture the potentials and challenges faced by agrarian movements under the Fifth 
Republic. 
 Secondly, the chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the Latin American 
University Institute for Agroecology ‘Paulo Freire’ (IALA), located in the Venezuelan 
state of Barinas. IALA’s formation represents a unique example of states and 
transnational social movements acting in collaboration, and under the principles of 
ALBA, to further the ideas, values and practices of a regional character, namely the 
“agroecological revolution” in Latin America (Altieri and Toledo, 2011). Through a 
critical analysis of interviews conducted with participants located within the IALA 
institution, as well as participant observation in the field, it will show how even formal 
alliances and points of ideological convergence between states and social movements 
may run into various obstacles and tensions. Such contradictions are, as we will see, 
merely the inescapable conditions for the deeper struggle to transform modes of 
knowledge and practices that are weaved into both territorial and social relations.  
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5.1 The Making of Popular Power in the Countryside: Class Violence and Political 
Organisation 
Nerson Guerrero, one of the main national coordinators for the Frente Nacional 
Campesino Ezequiel Zamora (FNCEZ), describes this group as “a social movement, 
distinctly popular, [and] very autonomous” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015), and has been 
maintaining its struggle for peasant rights for roughly 18 years. The origins of FNCEZ 
have their roots at the end of the 1980s, in the frontier region between Venezuela 
(Apure) and Colombia (Arauca). The key turning point came with the Massacre of 
Amparo in which 14 Venezuelan fishermen were killed by Venezuelan security forces 
on the maritime border with Colombia (Romero, 2016). From that time onwards, and 
with the collaboration of university student organisations, a new peasant movement 
began to slowly emerge from self-organised strategies and interventions against large 
landowners (particularly through land occupations) as well as marches and road blocks 
(Settembrino, 2012: 87). Later in 2004, two of the main groups that emerged from this 
cycle of popular resistance – Frente Campesino Revolucionario Simón Bolívar 
(FCRSB) and the Frente Campesino Revolucionario Ezequiel Zamora (FCREZ) – 
came together to form the FNCEZ (Longa and Wahren, 2009: 110).  
 Chávez’ land reform law thus provided much needed validation to the previous 
wave of peasant struggle; with the law passed in 2001, the FCRSB and FCREZ had 
organised over 3,000 peasants to claim 60 rural settlements that were deemed 
‘unproductive’ or ‘idle’ (McKay, 2011: 109). In broader terms, between 2003-2005 
some 2.3 million hectares of state-owned land had been redistributed to 116,000 
families, while the 2005 reform to the Organic Law of Lands and Agricultural 
Development pushed even further with the identification of privately owned lands to 
be expropriated that exceeded the average-size land-holding in the (sub-national) 
region, as long as its yield was 80% or less than its maximum potential (Wilpert, 
2014). Originally the FNCEZ was in fact sceptical of Chávez, but when they better 
understood his background and political project, they eventually threw in their full 
support (Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016). 
Nerson was unsure of the exact number of members in the FNCEZ – “but we 
are a movement of masses, politically speaking”. He estimated that the FNCEZ 
represents around 2,500 peasant families just in the neighbouring vicinity of Barinas 
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city (around 4-5 people per family),33 with some 1000-1,200 dedicated militants 
engaged in permanent agitation and organisation. In terms of political organisation, 
the FNCEZ is but one part of a larger cluster of movements that come together under 
the umbrella group of the Corriente Revolucionaria Bolívar y Zamora (CRBZ), a 
revolutionary current comprising the Simón Bolívar National Communal Front, Simón 
Rodríguez Centre for Training and Social Study, the FNCEZ, and various popular 
worker movements (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). As Nerson explained to 
me, this diverse corpus of social forces is brought together into a participatory 
hierarchy of delegation: 
“Each of these currents puts forward delegates, each of which works 
together in conjunction with a specific state functionary (at the 
ministerial level), which is then composed as an Executive Commission 
whose purpose is collectively defined. The Executive Commission is 
always made up of 5 or 7 people, but always an odd number in order to 
avoid the problem of split voting deadlocks (I was told that at one point 
the Commission had 11 delegates, but that the process tended to work 
better with 7). At the base of this democratic hierarchy are the Núcleos 
Zamoranos – grassroots working groups that take up specific tasks 
within the overall process of popular politics (e.g., land reclamation 
projects, politico-ideological training workshops, educational spaces), 
each of which was headed by a coordinador del núcleo [group 
coordinator].” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015) 
Such group coordinators represent delegates from the first rung of this cascading 
political geography of popular power. At the lowest level is the parish, within which 
working groups are formed among residents. Among this group, a delegate team is 
then sent to the municipal level (composed of representatives from all parishes in the 
municipality), which then in turn moves up towards the regional level. Typically, these 
working groups will function through the (lower-level) communal councils and 
upwards towards the (higher-level) communes. According to one national coordinator 
of the CRBZ, their cadres are active in 260 communes out of the country’s 1,500 total, 
and perhaps even up to 300 (including those that are not officially registered as 
communes) (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). The final level of this vertical 
territoriality consists in the recently formed Socialist Presidential Council of Peasants 
and Fishermen (Consejo Presidencial Socialista de Campesinos y Pescadores), 
creating a direct line between locally based delegates (voceros) and the executive 
																																								 																				
33 However, it is generally understood that FNCEZ comprises about 15,000 peasant families nation-
wide (Ciccariello-Maher, 2013: 202). 
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branch of the state in order to cooperatively plan the transition to food sovereignty. 
According to a representative of the Coordinadora Agraria Nacional Ezequiel Zamora 
(CANEZ), one of the two primary peasant organisations in the country along with the 
FNCEZ, these councils are integrated by municipality with 5 delegates from each – 
the state of Portuguesa alone contains 70 such delegates (Interview, CANEZ Apure, 
27.06.2016).34  
 For Marelis Ramirez, one of the national coordinators for the CRBZ, there is 
a qualitative difference between community-level politics before and after Chávez’s 
arrival: “Before the Law of the Communes, we simply had neighbourhood 
associations” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016), local corpuscular groups that 
were largely fragmented and unable to achieve significant political weight (Ellner, 
1999). From Marelis’ perspective, however, popular power is not formed through 
some mystical force emanating from Miraflores palace, but is crucially made through 
autonomous social forces, which often creates facts on the ground that subsequently 
become enshrined in law,35 such as with the prior construction of the Socialist 
Communal City of Simón Bolívar, autonomously formed through the self-organisation 
of 38 communal councils and 5 communes. The formation of this communal city 
(Ciudad Comunal Socialista Campesina Simón Bolívar, CCSCSB) marks a significant 
example of what has come to be termed “insurgent planning”, a set of grass-roots 
practices that subverts the traditional power structures constitutive of modernist 
planning techniques (Beard, 2003). This set of insurgent practices thus seeks to 
“disrupt the attempts of neoliberal governance to stabilize oppressive relationships 
through inclusion” (Miraftab, 2009: 41). As such, these bundles of agency tend 
towards an immanent critique and praxis from within the confines of the old society: 
“they are not about fighting for utopian future, but are precisely about bringing into 
being or spatialising what is already promised by the very principle upon which the 
political is constituted, i.e. equalitarian emancipation” (Swyngedouw, 2014: 129).  
Through a series of ‘encounters’ between 39 communal councils (CCs) in the 
state of Apure, facilitated through the organisation of the FNCEZ and the Frente 
																																								 																				
34 It is reported that, nation-wide, there are 736 peasant delegates for this council, working across 5 
Work Commissions (El Universal, 2014a) 
35 This in fact sharply dovetails with the sentiment carried in the original 2007 constitutional reform 
referendum, which refers to popular power as “not born of suffrage nor any election, but out of the 
condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population” (cited in Spanakos and 
Pantoulas, 2016: 8)   
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Nacional Campesino Símon Bolívar (FNCSB), the communal city was legally 
established in 2008, with the added formation of 7 communes comprising a middle 
layer between the CCs and the city level. As a self-organised collective of peasant 
families, workers, and peasant movements, the communal city helps to form 
cooperation and collaboration between its members in the areas of agricultural 
planning, knowledge exchange and the acquisition of means of production as well as 
legal advice (O’Brien, 2014). This collective had subsequently made a significant 
impact in shaping the legal content of the Law of the Communes: “this is what popular 
initiative looks like” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016).  
However, the FNCEZ remains a somewhat limited movement in terms of its 
overall size: “there are not enough people to permanently take care of or manage what 
we suggest as projects that would be sufficient for the construction of popular power, 
of the organization of the communities, and in strengthening the communes” 
(Interview, NG Barinas, 18.07.2015). As another FNCEZ coordinator intimated, while 
the size of its membership may be growing, it is doing so under conditions of class 
violence on behalf of the old hacendados and their allies in the security services 
(Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016). As I was told, over 300 peasants have been 
killed over the past decade, 100 from the FNCEZ alone (Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 
10.06.2016). Yet it is difficult to ascertain the precise number of murdered peasants in 
the country; as others suggest, this is possibly due to the reluctance of the state to open 
up substantial lines of legal inquiry into extra-judicial killings, given that a portion of 
current personnel within the government have been tied to such crimes against peasant 
leaders over the past two decades (Lopéz-Sánchez and Rodríguez, 2014). Thus, it has 
perhaps within the judiciary where the most intense forms of struggle between the old 
dominant classes and the emergent Bolivarian power bloc have taken place, signalled 
by the fact that not one landowner has been charged with respect to these killings, not 
to mention the near continuous counter-rulings issued by the supreme court against 
the legal possession of land held by peasant communities and movements, as well as 
the violent eviction of peasant families from the land carried out by local fractions of 
the state apparatus (Ellis, 2011; Correo del Orinoco, 2014; PROVEA, 2016; 
Boothroyd Rojas, 2017b). 
An added challenge to the making of popular power is the specific geography 
and topography structuring Venezuela’s rural spaces: “[the Ministry of Communes] 
began creating many communal councils but in the urban neighbourhoods. But for us, 
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we had to begin in those communities that were the most remote, those who didn’t 
have cars, and where there was no transport or even roads – effectively places that 
were very difficult to access” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). It was 
conceded that this was a serious ongoing challenge, and that in spite of all of the 
advances represented by such participatory spaces as the Simón Bolívar city, there was 
a great deal left to do in terms of sufficiently organising those rural spaces in which 
the only point of access was through horseback.36 
 Beyond these sporadic setbacks, the major structural weakness was clearly 
identified: “We are an organisation, a popular movement, that effectively has no 
resources. Neither the state nor NGOs provide us with resources” (Interview, CRBZ 
Caracas, 26.04.2016). One anecdote related to me in this context was of the local 
initiative spearheaded by the CRBZ in a local town. Movement cadres came into 
contact with a small community that had access to a recovered latifundio (“a bundle 
of territories that were abandoned”), of which the community were willing to cede (at 
least part of it), in order to permit the CRBZ to continue their organisational work. 
Having completed the legalization process with the National Institute for Lands 
(Instituto Nacional de Tierras, INTi), the CRBZ moved one of their local schools into 
the infrastructural spaces of the old latifundio, in order to solve the long-standing 
problem of heavy rains that periodically halted teaching hours. As a consequence of 
this move, the CRBZ school now had the agricultural resources to better support its 
educational work, through the self-supply, and partial commercialisation, of produce 
grown on the productive land of the old latifundio: “This is how we generate resources 
for the costs of our organisation. So our weakness is that we have no hard resources, 
beyond what our own families produce. But in terms of organisation we are doing 
quite well” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). 
 As well as the barriers of geographical space, it was emphasised that peasant 
organisation is subject to problems of organisational momentum once certain major 
victories have been secured. Particularly with respect to the push for land reform and 
redistribution among the peasantry, movement activists encountered some resistance 
on the part of their social base in terms of pushing forward the broader struggle for 
agrarian citizenship and political power (Interview, NG Barinas, 18.07.2015). A type 
																																								 																				
36 Even the problem of weather, such as torrential downpours during the rainy season, seriously hinders 
organisation drives, as when their initiative to register 5,000 new cadres was halted due to 
inaccessibility caused by flooding (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). 
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of cooling off might be expected after the arrival of such a far-reaching reform, yet 
once this stage of struggle had attained substantial results, various fissures began to 
appear across the Venezuelan peasantry. As O’Brien notes, subsequent to one of the 
first big FNCSB occupations in 2002 of a cattle ranch owned by the widow of former 
president Carlos Andrés Pérez, the INTi had issued a carta agraria (land titles 
recognised by the executive branch yet not necessarily cleared through the judicial 
system) to those who had taken the lands under occupation. However, once the land 
had been divided amongst peasant families, some had simply disengaged from the 
movement, partly due to their insistence on maintaining private property for family 
smallholdings, whereas a large number of active movement cadres sought to 
implement systems of collective ownership (O’Brien, 2014: 63).37 At a broader level, 
other social movement actors noted the relative dominance of this type of small-
holding private property, which “has barely scratched the surface” in the struggle for 
a socialist mode of agrarian life (Interview, CANEZ Apure, 27.06.2016). 
Representatives from CANEZ thus maintained that their “fundamental objective” had 
always been the formation of “new relations of production, which should be based on 
social property in production”. In their view, however, this lack of progress was 
largely the fault of institutional inertia, and particular policies that were never intended 
to forge this type of agrarian order (Interview, CANEZ Apure, 27.06.2016). These 
types of class differentiation within seemingly united peasant movements are therefore 
of great consequence for their political organisation, a fact not sufficiently 
acknowledged by FS scholars (however, see Bernstein, 2014; Henderson, 2016).  
For the FNCEZ, however, the occupation of rural space, in the guise of land 
reform, was only the first step: 
After the struggle for land came the roads, health, education, schools 
and so on… So we had to incorporate the communities, that the 
communities know how to mobilize, how to put themselves into action, 
and that generated a dynamic mobilization… So the peasant movement 
had to be a voice, and a vote, it had to have rights. We were maintaining 
that it had to occupy spaces, spaces inside the institutions that permitted 
us to have representation… Before the revolution arrived, there was no 
participation, because everyone was hand-picked, it was an apolitical 
																																								 																				
37 According to O’Brien’s account, which is derived from participant interviews among members of the 
Símon Bolívar communal city, it is apparently this split that led to the formation of the FNCEZ (those 
advocating collective property), though this is something that I am unable to verify independently, 
either form my own interviews or from the few academic sources on the formation of this peasant 
movement. 
	 	 139	
movement, it understood nothing about anything…. Yet, day after day, 
it became more participatory, though always very critical, and from 
there began a convening of popular movement power.” (Interview, NG 
Barinas, 18.07.2015) 
Even within this challenging context, Nerson was adamant that Venezuela “is one of 
the countries that is most organized amongst the peasants.” This may, on reflection, 
represent a somewhat exaggerated claim, at least in terms of other, far weightier 
peasant movements in the region, for instance, those found in Brazil or Mexico (cf. 
Vergara-Camus, 2014). Yet Nerson’s pride stemmed from a more qualitative 
perspective in terms of how various movements interact and, in turn, create wider 
networks of support and mutual solidarity. Such movement-building strategies 
crucially turn on the painstaking negotiation with political allies, who may well be 
differentiated on the basis of culture or class (property ownership), yet may also find 
common cause over certain basic principles – “in the struggle against the large tracts 
of privately owned land, in agricultural production, in the struggle against toxic 
inputs” (Interview, NG Barinas, 18.07.2015) – while also offering bases of solidarity 
and assistance to communities that seek further deepening of their political 
strategisation.  
 Nevertheless, it is important to highlight some of the continuing divisions 
within the movement itself, often over questions of property relations. As Marelis 
pointed out, the question of property is loaded with broader cleavages along lines of 
gender: 
 “Before the promulgation of the land law the landowners were looking 
for workers to put in charge of running the haciendas, so they would 
bring you and your wife and children to work on the land. Your wife 
cooked all the food for the workers of the hacienda, as well as cleaning 
and taking care of the children of the owners, the animals and the 
orchard, but this was all unpaid work. The only salary was with the 
husband. So we as an organisation are attending to this theme of gender 
inequality, to promote gender equality in all areas… We say that 
women can have the same responsibilities as men in the community. 
Inside the communes the majority of those we help are women, some 
of which don’t even leave their houses. But these days women are often 
leading the campaigns and have participated in communal parliaments, 
they go to Caracas and participate in different conferences and 
meetings.” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016) 
This expanding role of women in the countryside therefore finds articulation within 
the wider discourses on gender equality of the LVC that have emerged in recent years 
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(Desmarais, 2007: 161-80; Park et al., 2015). Yet when I sought to broach this topic 
with a male participant from the FNCEZ, I received a quite different response. For 
him, there was something not only secondary about women’s struggles, but something 
that seemed relatively unproblematic from the perspective of the movement as a 
whole: 
“We have to understand something, and I would say this something is 
cultural. It is that all of a sudden you have feminist movements that 
have to have equality. Speaking directly for myself, I am a child of 
peasants; our culture is chauvinist but it is the woman that primarily 
promotes it. It is more in the home of my grandfather, that to enter the 
kitchen is synonymous with homosexuality… It is a cultural thing and 
it is the woman that should be here. Even in the case of my father, if he 
arrives late back home my mother will still serve him, making sure she 
eats her meal with him, but she does not do it by coercion. She does it 
because she feels good taking care of him or simply doing her role. A 
feminist says this is humiliating, that she should not be like this, that 
she should eat anyway, and if he is not home on time, well… It is 
something with which we have to deal with, but I don’t think that this 
should be a foundational problem for a peasant family to function well. 
The peasant family is a loving family, but there are some cultural 
aspects that are not going to change overnight. If you go and say to a 
black woman in Guanarito that she has to talk firmly with her husband, 
it is you that will be running, not her! Of course, from the point of view 
of a socialist at some level and at some moment it is important, but for 
now I don’t think that this is something that hinders the plan for the 
participation of the family.” (Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016) 
Two points of discussion immediately emerge from the above considerations on 
gendered divisions of power within rural social forces. Firstly, the variegated role and 
importance of gender as a coordinate for political transformation will obviously 
depend a great deal upon how gendered divisions of power become refracted and 
substantiated in and through wider structures of social power, expressed through the 
inter-related dimensions of class (property) and state (law) (Bernstein, 2010: 117). 
Indeed, the very struggle alluded to above with respect to transforming the old pattern 
of hacienda workers and their patterns of familial reproduction speaks to the concerted 
focus that some female activists pin on the transformation of state policy and 
legislation as a means of redistributing the structure of social property relations. 
Secondly, and as we saw in Chapter 2, ‘the state’ does not simply begin and end with 
the official cluster of government institutions (ministries), nor with the simple 
promulgation of formal legal proclamations. Rather, the molecular structures that go 
into the making of everyday life, including those pertaining to gender relations, also 
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represents the material substratum of the idea of the state (cf. Fernandes, 2007). In 
other words, to the extent that radical social forces, as part of the “constituent state” 
(Azzellini, 2010), represent the more decentralised forms of socio-political power – 
now more embedded within and articulated with the Bolivarian state apparatus – the 
struggle to concretely materialise politico-legal forms into real social contexts will 
necessarily take place at the local, community or social movement level. In this way, 
both de jure and de facto agency become enmeshed through complex combinations of 
state institutions (formally committed to the empowerment of women),38 and rural 
class structures organised around the male property owner (particularly during 
moments of state credit transfer, property titling, etc.). And as these co-constituted 
forms of agency become entrenched, there is the danger in which patriarchal attitudes 
within the peasant movement – concerning the ‘proper’ place of women within rural 
life – become inadvertently reproduced and consolidated. Thus, despite the fact that 
the preferred unit of production within peasant movements and agrarian reform 
programs is towards the ‘family unit’, without further radicalisation of this process in 
the form of equality of ownership and control of assets within the family, such units 
remain subject to specific strategic selectivities in which the male property owner 
becomes the family capitalist – monopolising possession and control of productive 
assets, including female labour (cf. Jacobs, 2015: 179). Transforming these established 
practices will be further conditional upon the production of more concrete data 
concerning land reform and patterns of property ownership pertaining to it; currently, 
there do not exist comprehensive data sets that disaggregate land reform beneficiaries 
according to patterns of land rights, nor to the ways in which such holdings are divided 
between genders (see Deere, 2017: 271). Peasant struggles throughout the strategic 
terrain of the state are therefore as much about gender as they are about class.  
 
5.1.1 The Making of Food Sovereignty in Venezuela: Territory, Culture and Class 
“Here very little is known about food sovereignty”, said Marelis. “Yet Chávez left us 
this principle, enshrined within our constitution, that food sovereignty was to reside 
within the people, and that we understand this as the livelihood of those same people 
																																								 																				
38 The Bolivarian state has made a number of institutional innovations in this area, including the 
Ministry for Women and Gender Equality (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Mujer y la Igualidad 
de Género) and the Women’s Development Bank (Banco de Desarrollo de la Mujer).  
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to guarantee food to the community” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). As she 
further told me, a great deal of her work within the CRBZ and peasant movement more 
widely is based upon convincing the population to rely more heavily on what they 
produce: “we have to produce what we eat, and eat what we produce.” 
Echoing the above, for Nerson, food sovereignty carries all the hallmarks 
associated with the philosophy of LVC, particularly its steadfast resistance to being 
dependent on external powers for the necessary inputs of agriculture – “transnationals 
and their technological packets” – and the concomitant capacity to choose what is 
sown, grown, consumed, all within the cultural specificity of the people occupying the 
territory (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015). In this way, the common cry among FS 
protagonists against the power of transnationals was not seen as an end in itself: “I am 
an enemy of the transnationals, but we have to have an alternative as well” (Interview, 
FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016). There are several examples of how new alternatives 
are becoming improvised and articulated into everyday practice. One of the projects 
carried out by the CRBZ is the establishment of countrywide exchanges between 
different spaces of production – principally articulated through encounters in the local 
commune – comprising a network of local produce markets, with each locality 
bringing to market those products in which it specialises (and from which other 
participating communities, which do not grow said products, will benefit). At its most 
basic, these exchanges work along a type of barter-exchange system. Money still 
changes hands – indeed, these markets provide valuable financing that make up a 
significant proportion of the operating funds for community councils, communes and 
other independent producers – yet does so in a manner set by personal interaction, 
rather than impersonal market forces (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016); thus 
resembling what van der Ploeg et al. (2012) dub “nested markets” – nested both in 
specific normative frameworks and inter-personal connections and exchange.  
  One prominent market of this type is organised every weekend in Caracas; yet 
all exchanged products are raw produce, without any type of processing. This, Marelis 
tells me, is a major gap in the scope of their work, while the expansion in general 
education and training in the processing of agricultural goods (albeit at the “artisanal” 
level) is greatly needed (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). In this respect, there 
was a certain recognition that operating at this scale of production was somewhat of a 
challenge in the face of environmental constraints, as with the El Niño phenomenon 
and the lack of rainfall (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). As she went on to 
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explain, a major gap in Venezuela’s agricultural infrastructure is the lack of irrigation 
systems, which apparently cover only around 10% of the country’s productive land 
(located across Portuguesa, Barinas, Guanare); the remaining 90% must rely on a 
combination of hoses, pipes, lakes and rivers, presenting an additional set of pressures 
on agro-ecological farming (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). This debility 
represents an historic neglect of one of agriculture’s key infrastructural inputs 
(irrigation), where in Venezuela such systems are around 40 years old with very little 
maintenance on behalf of the state, and hampering the potential level of output: “We 
were reduced from 7,000 kilos of rice per hectare to 3,000 because there was no water, 
at least in the case of my family” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016).39 
Related to these aspects of ‘scaling up’ agroecological practice was the more 
specific role that technology might play in the building of a food sovereignty regime. 
Though the use of ‘technology’ remains a contentious aspect of FS debates (Altieri, 
2010) – not least because of the nebulous meaning associated with this term – FS 
protagonists expressed a qualified support for the ways in which technology should be 
both used and thought about: 
“We don’t want to live in backwardness [atraso] where you cannot use 
a tractor, or any machine. Yet we cannot become human just through 
the production of capital, or mere money. The theme of sovereignty and 
technology has to proceed according to guaranteeing food for 
humanity, to be human, to live well, more than producing food through 
the use of combustibles. I think that the key is to produce together with 
technology and artisanal culture according to guaranteeing food in 
order to be human.” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015) 
There is therefore a fine balance to be struck between the use of high technology – 
even in the form of conventional means of production (tractors) – and the maintenance 
of ecological balance. Again, the reference to “artisanal culture” represents a continual 
theme that cropped up among interviewees with respect to the processing part of 
agrarian production. However, this does not mean that the rural landscape should be 
populated with a thousand disconnected, relatively independent centres of artisanal 
production. As Marelis explained, one of the prime reasons for the establishment of 
the ALBA factories was for the direct purpose of linking various small-scale 
operations into a centred space of industrial level production (Interview, CRBZ 
																																								 																				
39 This area of investment is one that has been clearly recognised by rural development agencies in 
Venezuela, which has led to the implementation of a four-year plan (marked ‘Phase 1’) for the radical 
rehabilitation of the nation’s irrigation system (MAT/INDER, 2015). 
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Caracas, 26.04.2016). As she recalled, her family farm (oriented mainly around the 
production of rice) yields around 6 tons per hectare (ha) on a 10ha piece of land. Yet 
the processing of this crop is a laborious affair in the absence of machinery (6 family 
members threshing 6,000kgs of rice). Thus, unlike fruit and vegetables, specific 
‘strategic’ crops, such as rice and sugar, require significant infrastructures for their 
production (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016).  
However, the wider struggle towards this type of endogenous development is 
as much political as it is technical. As she recalled, the state’s acquisition of the Central 
Sugar Refinery ‘Ezequiel Zamora’ (Barinas) had failed to achieve its goal of 
substantially strengthening the productive chain – between direct producers in the field 
and factory processing – due to political corruption in the factory. As a consequence, 
failing enterprises such as this hold out the risk of turning such infrastructures back to 
the private sector as a last-ditch effort to raise production volumes (Interview, CRBZ 
Caracas, 26.04.2016; cf. El Universal, 2014b; El Mundo, 2016).40 Representatives 
from CANEZ specifically singled out the ALBA rice producing factories, which did 
not come through on their responsibilities to process the raw material that had been 
produced and ready to deliver from the surrounding fields. One of the surrounding 
fields directly owned by the ALBA-Arroz firm, Caño Seco, has been idle for some 
time, with abandoned tractors and other machinery. Such means of production, either 
in the form of land or machines, “do not belong to the peasants, nor to the ‘point and 
circle’41 that surrounds the ALBA factories, it’s their property. They have personnel 
that are there only to cover their own weekly salaries” (Interview, CANEZ Apure, 
27.06.2016). 
The overriding perception is one of a raft of ‘functionaries’ (funcionarios) 
populated throughout the productive system and the state apparatus more broadly that 
tend to exhibit narrow self-calculation: “De 15 y último” (Interview, CANEZ Apure, 
27.06.2016).42 The strategic logic therefore rests upon the creation of a truly social 
																																								 																				
40 Yet very often, handing productive infrastructure to the ‘more efficient’ private sector does more 
harm to national production that perhaps assumed, given that some companies will hoard state-credits 
(at a negative real interest rate given the high rate of inflation) rather than invest them productively, as 
a means of waiting out for a better political climate with which they can finally invest their capital 
(Purcell, 2017: 309). 
41 This phrase refers to a specific political geography of the social economy, which we will see further 
in Chapter 6. 
42 Most salaried jobs in Venezuela are paid bi-monthly, on the 15th and last day of the month (15 y 
último). This common Venezuelan expression thus describes a worker that is motivated by the 
acquisition of a wage, and little else.  
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economy in which productive power (and hence the possibility to augment the 
collective intellect of the workforce) is vested in the hands of the direct producers 
beyond the strictures of wage-labour: 
“If one allows a company to transform from employing peasant 
wageworkers to protagonistic subjects, then the logic changes. If an 
animal dies here or there, I still get a wage, but if I am the one profiting 
directly from the company, then this profit depends on the welfare of 
the animal, and so I will put enthusiasm into my work – and this 
principle goes into the practice of popular government.” (Interview, 
NG, 18.07.2015) 
Hence, the process of popular participation is seen as a practical activity transecting 
each ‘sector’ and level of everyday life, from socio-economic production to political 
decision-making. Overcoming the economic alienation associated with the 
manual/intellectual labour divide typical of wage-work thus assumes a critical first 
step. Popular movements therefore see the direct benefit stemming for more 
substantive participation and power within the workplace, as well as the concomitant 
necessity to weave such spaces of popular power into a concrete institutionality that is 
not relegated to a subordinate position within the state apparatus. 
Within other topics covered in the conversations on food sovereignty, a sharp 
distinction was made between discourses of ‘endogenous development’ and the idea 
of FS. As we saw in the previous chapter, the notion of endogenous development was 
a key driver in not only rebalancing the economy away from oil-dependence, but in 
establishing a host of economic linkages in which “skills and materials… [would] 
come from within the country or community being developed” (Wilpert, 2007: 80). In 
this way, the Bolivarian state outlined five key dimensions to the formation of an 
endogenous development model: 
1. Based in existing capacities and necessities 
2. Motivates community participation in the planning of the economy, via new 
forms of organization, such as cooperatives and social networks 
3. Is organized from below towards above 
4. Is based on the values of cooperation and solidarity 
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5. Uses appropriate technologies of the region without compromising the 
ecological equilibrium.43 
Strikingly, this list shares a large number of similarities with the wider FS philosophy, 
particularly with regards to the role of popular, grass-roots participation as the driver 
of socio-economic development. Yet for one participant, there is a crucial dimension 
that is missing from this list:  
“[Endogenous development] involves merely the social but without 
taking into consideration true sovereignty. Rather, you are producing 
in order to give satisfaction to society, to improve quality of life, but 
without necessarily impinging on the struggle for sovereignty, which is 
already a territorial, cultural struggle – to safeguard nature, 
conservation of the planet and its environment, of human life itself, 
which implicates what sovereignty is as a concept, beyond that of 
endogenous development.” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015) 
It was clear that a particular conceptualisation of sovereignty did not adequately 
emerge from the more common project of endogenous development or indeed ‘food 
security’. Rather, while endogenous development is clearly one crucial component of 
the food sovereignty model, it requires supplementation with labour-centered 
development, with all of the social and spatial parameters that go with it (territorial 
autonomy and the multiplication of sovereignties). Part of this conceptual specificity 
can be parsed from the ways in which FS is framed as a “re-culturalisation of the 
countryside”, which links with the reclaiming of rights to territory beyond the mere 
promulgation of abstract laws: 
“I cannot decree by law a product, and I cannot say that tomorrow you 
are a graduated producer, a producer that functions beyond what you 
already know… You need a culture of production. And that has been 
taken away from us, leaving very little behind, which have been taken 
up by the large producers and transnational companies.” (Interview, 
FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016) 
The above considerations resonate sharply with many other studies showing the 
relative failure of productive units (‘endogenous nuclei’) that have been created from 
above, and without the necessary expanse of popular participation that would be 
required to help retrain other members of the community which lack the requisite skills 
and cultural acclamation (Page, 2010; Purcell, 2011). More broadly, these politico-
																																								 																				
43 This criteria set was derived from a presentation given by the Ministry for the Popular Economy in 
2004 (Wilpert, 2007: 80). 
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economic dimensions are but one part of the much wider struggle for creating a new 
regime of rights, territory and sovereignty in Venezuela – one that is not universally 
premised on state-led endogenous development, but on a more diffuse proliferation of 
multiple sovereignties that are territorially embedded within ecological systems, 
modes of knowledge and production, and autonomous forms of political organisation 
based on both horizontal-outreach and vertical-territoriality. Because of these contours 
of power and agency, it is necessary to further examine the strategic relationship 
between the peasantry and the state. 
 
5.1.2 In and Against the State: Continuing the Struggle for Food Sovereignty 
Though the FNCEZ had become a fully active social force before the Fifth Republic, 
it was only with the arrival of Chávez that the group had been actively welcomed into 
the corridors of power, and to participate in the crafting of national legislation. As 
Nerson went on to explain, just 3 days before our interview, FNCEZ delegates had 
been in negotiations with high-level officials (Elías Jaua, Carlos Osorio and Iván Gil) 
in order to plan the way forward in the implementation of peasant-led food sovereignty 
through new sources of financing and government support. However, this relationship 
with the state was at the same time a precarious one, subject to all sorts of ambiguities 
stemming from the ways in which the state apparatus becomes prone to a type of “wax 
and wane” (suba y baja). The movement’s relationship with Elías Jaua, for instance, 
fostered a continual flow of contact, meetings and communication, while the 
subsequent minister, Juan Carlos Loyo, maintained only sporadic contact with the 
group: “If they miss a meeting, or do not call one, then we must put pressure on them 
to step up” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015). Again, strategic lines of contact with state 
personnel are subject to the same pressures of inertia as those within peasant 
movements themselves: “we have not had contact at the level that there was before, 
because before it was motivated by the struggle for land. Now that land reclamation 
has fallen to an ebb [reflujo]… the dynamic is not the same” (Interview, NG, 
18.07.2015). The struggle now focuses more closely on the need to establish peasant 
holdings as sustainable units of production, with access to necessary inputs and price 
stability.  
  However, a more significant problem arose in terms of diversification: “you 
can go to the state looking for credits to grow rice and corn, but not for papaya, 
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xanthosoma [ocumo], yucca, roots and tubers, or passion fruit” (Interview, FNCEZ 
Guanare, 10.06.2016). Thus, the tendency for many Venezuelan state-led 
commercialisation networks was towards the concentration of “flagship products”, 
such as corn (Enríquez and Newman, 2015: 614), which tends to tip the scales towards 
the ‘food security’ end of the food security/sovereignty balance. As one participant 
bemoaned, many of these practices end up replicating previously failed models of 
agrarian development, which heavily depend on state largesse and a consequent 
dominance of bureaucratic structures, often leading to time lags and inefficiencies in 
project execution: “the government comes with a wallet, but no plan… it’s as if the 
bureaucracy is trampling on the institutions, it becomes a kind of personification that 
creates all these obstacles on our way towards achieving food sovereignty” (Interview, 
NG, 18.07.2015). Reference to state bureaucracy and the associated confusion around 
state competencies speaks to the marked proliferation of new agencies tasked with the 
implementation of Venezuela’s agrarian reform, most notably for credit and technical 
assistance and infrastructure (FONDAS, INDER, BAV, INTi, CIARA, Misión Che 
Guevara), agroecology (INIA, INSAI), and marketing (CVAL, MERCAL) (see 
McKay et al., 2014: 1182).44 As both Enríquez and Newman (2015), and Page (2011) 
point out, this plethora of state institutions amounts to a potential redundancy 
permeating the state apparatus, with increased propensity for intra-agency conflict and 
confusion over the distribution of state competence (cf. Poulantzas, 2014: 155). More 
specifically, these types of institutional bottle-necks take a particularly heavy toll on 
agrarian production in the context of Venezuela’s current economic crisis; very often, 
credit packages allocated by FONDAS incur a severe time-lag between approval and 
actual transfer, where the time in between has incurred a marked rise in factor prices 
due to inflation, which thus renders the original credit amount drastically short of 
current financial needs (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 26.04.2016). 
  At a more micro-foundational level, it was also noted that a further 
contradiction of the state apparatus emerged through a relatively fractured ensemble 
of political allies within it. In some respects, not only does the state display some of 
																																								 																				
44 These institutions are, respectively: Development Fund for Socialist Agriculture, Rural Development 
Institute, Agricultural Bank of Venezuela, National Land Institute, Foundation for Training and 
Innovation for Rural Development, National Institute of Agricultural Research, National Institute of 
Integral Agricultural Health, Venezuelan Food Corporation, Food Markets (Mercado de Alimentos). 
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the trappings of old agrarian reform practices, but also in terms of the clientelistic 
relations that inhere between peasants and state personnel: 
“We also had problems under Chávez, well not necessarily with him, 
but with the people below him, because in this country people are 
accustomed to a certain way of being; for instance, being the minister 
of Agriculture and Lands somehow makes you the ‘owner’ of the 
peasants. So if you are irreverent, they categorize you as 
‘undisciplined’, or ‘counter-revolutionary’.” (Interview, FNCEZ 
Guanare, 10.06.2016) 
As Poulantzas noted, as a social category state personnel “is not a social group existing 
alongside or above classes: it has a class place and is therefore internally divided” 
(2014: 154). And while such personnel may be embedded within the formal 
appearance of a state-in-revolution, they nevertheless maintain a certain internalisation 
of latent hegemonic subjectivities and practices, subject to the always-present class 
struggle within the state apparatus itself, that predispose them towards the 
maintenance of old class alliances (ibid: 156): 
“There are people inside these institutions that have 30 or 40 years 
there, and continue to respond to the policies of the Fourth Republic, 
because they were never convinced of what Chávez said and were never 
in agreement with the socialist project or perhaps changed because they 
had other interests. So they thought: ‘I’m better off with the large 
landowner who will continue giving to me, rather than a peasant who 
is going to produce only their 10 hectares and is going to be in a 
collective, and I’m not going to get my share, or I won’t benefit because 
this socialist project is going to fail.’” (Interview, CRBZ Caracas, 
26.04.2016) 
Practices of bureaucratic corruption, in the form of clientelistic class alliances, thus 
cropped up with some frequency during my conversations: “There’s a very common 
saying here among the people: that if you are employed in the public sector and you 
leave without money, you’re an idiot – that is to say, you have to rob in order to make 
your foundation [para hacer pilas]” (Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016).  
Despite these old bureaucratic ramparts, the executive branch continues to 
innovate new mechanisms of popular participation in the struggle for food 
sovereignty, most recently through the creation of Presidential Councils of Popular 
Power (Consejos Presidenciales del Poder Popular), comprising 12 different councils 
across a range of issues, including councils for women, youth, workers, indigenous, 
peasants and artists (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015; see also Ladera, 2014). First 
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announced in 2014, these councils were only passed into law a year later, though the 
lack of previous legal standing did not stop the congregation of movement 
spokespersons with officials at the presidential and vice-presidential level (Gaceta 
Oficial Extraordinario 6.209, 2015). However, such encounters between the popular 
sectors and the more concentrated centres of power within the state apparatus carry 
their own tensions: “Though we might have the structure of a council there may not 
be substantial participation, perhaps because there is some fear on behalf of the ‘boss’ 
[jefe] that power may be lost” (Interview, NG, 18.07.2015). There is, then, a continued 
struggle within the institutional spaces of the state apparatus – to “occupy spaces… 
inside the institutions that permitted us to have representation” (Interview, NG 
Barinas, 18.07.2015) – as well as within the more marginal spaces of the state’s 
strategic terrain, a struggle that crucially informs the general approach to peasant 
mobilisation and tactical thought:  
“The relation with the state has, for a while, been a critical one. I have 
been very critical of the state, even though I defend it. I am one of those 
who says that if the fight is internal, we fight, we fight amongst 
ourselves; and when the fight is ‘outside’, we fight together, struggling 
against the other” (Interview, FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016). 
 
5.1.3 Transnationalising Agrarian Struggle: Venezuelan Peasants and the LVC 
All participants spoke of the importance of international organisation, particularly 
with reference to the Latin American bloc (La Coordinadora Latinoamericana de 
Organizaciones del Campo – CLOC) within the wider LVC movement. However, one 
line of contention that arose was the issue of gender equality and the struggle of rural 
women to make their voice heard and rights respected within the wider transnational 
movement. As Marelis explained to me: 
“You know that we are women of the countryside, but the topic of 
feminism is very sensitive in the countryside… In the CLOC congress 
we had the Fifth Assembly of Women and when we came to the topic 
of feminism the Bolivians, or a section of the Bolivians, stopped 
everything and said, ‘we’re not going to participate in this topic 
tomorrow because it’s about feminism, and we’re not in agreement with 
this.’ We spoke with our female comrades and said, ‘look, we are 
forming our own feminism, it’s not European feminism, it’s ours, of 
women from the countryside.’ I consider myself a feminist because I 
have the capacity to decide on my own, as a woman, to participate in 
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politics, in economics, as well as the family.” (Interview, CRBZ 
Caracas, 26.04.2016) 
It is clear that the differentiation of power relations among genders – whether 
expressed in material, subjective or discursive forms – takes place at every moment 
within the scalar space of peasant struggle: from the global/transnational, right down 
to the local/household unit. While the push for consolidating women’s participation 
and visibility within the transnational movement remains, lines of contentious 
perspectives continues to divide the movement throughout a multitude of scales, 
spaces, and sites of encounter. For the FNCEZ, there exists a broader ideological 
dissonance between themselves and the wider transnational movement: 
“Where other regions are talking of agrarian reform we are talking of 
agrarian revolution, that is to say transforming everything, not just 
modifying one article of one law but to make laws that permit the 
guaranteeing of what peasants actually suggest, promote and do… We 
continue and are going to continue contributing to the LVC and among 
our comrades in the CLOC on the themes of socialism, for at least 
within the CLOC its core principles already imply socialism. But for 
some that was a taboo, as it happened to us in Jakarta where the 
commission said that it went to the CLOC demanding that it cease 
talking about socialism. One of them said to us that, well, if they [the 
CLOC] try to veto this it is going to be difficult for them to stay inside 
the LVC. However, one must have a certain amount of common sense 
[cordura], as well as patience, in order to move forward. We do not 
intend that everyone says we are going to be socialist, but with facts 
and proposals we are going to grow, and this is assumed now in the 
ongoing project of the CLOC.” (Interview, NG Barinas, 18.07.2015) 
These comments display a sharply Gramscian tone, whereby the struggle for a socialist 
counter-hegemony is one that must be continually pursued in the interest of 
consolidating a united, corporate body of popular sectors into the principles of socialist 
transformation. The reference to ‘common sense’, therefore, is one that does not 
simply refer to an already formed constellation of ideas, but rather to the iterative 
process of movement building and of patiently negotiating with one’s comrades in 
order to establish an organic process of persuasion (Gramsci 1971: 181-2). Other 
interviewees from FNCEZ were even more adamant about the potential tensions of 
transnational peasant struggle:  
“There are small disagreements, but we have also achieved small 
agreements as well… But I think that we have been lacking a certain 
aggressiveness. There is a component at the level of the CLOC and of 
LVC that is very detrimental even to the point where I would say it has 
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been timid, such as the MST. Without wanting to underestimate them, 
there is a sense in which they are carrying the baton, but at the same 
time have subordinated the framework of internal reconstruction to 
their own internal growth and accommodating their internal logistics 
which is detrimental to the type of struggle that we have in the 
community. At the very least when they killed Berta [Cáceres]45 we 
could have been more forceful… But I think that we lack a regional 
leader; those leaders, like João Pedro Stedile has been dedicated more 
to other things. I don’t want to be too critical of João… but one must 
do things more in common because the imperial powers are not going 
to be afraid of you if you are disunited – they are going to be afraid if 
you are more united… So our struggles in Latin America from the point 
of view of the organic peasantry is still very incipient” (Interview, 
FNCEZ Guanare, 10.06.2016). 
 
Yet this assessment carries a somewhat contradictory content. The lamentation on the 
‘lack of a regional leader’ sits somewhat uncomfortably with the broader 
understandings of a counter-hegemonic apparatus, which seeks to narrow the gap 
between a cadre of elite intellectuals and the popular masses by “construct[ing] an 
intellectual-moral bloc that renders politically possible a mass intellectual progress 
and not only a progress of small intellectual groups” (Gramsci 1971: 332-3; cf. Issa 
2007). Of course, as a processual movement towards the formation of such a bloc, 
there will necessarily exist a temporary divide as trained intellectual cadres continually 
interact with the popular sectors in order to mould a new form of counter-hegemonic 
‘common sense’. Yet the politico-territorial implications of this (in the context of food 
sovereignty) suggest a more molecular and multiple form of leadership, starting from 
the local and national levels, rather than through the formation of a singular ‘regional 
leader’. Through direct, local contact, the peasant revolutionary must form a “historic-
humanistic conception, without which he [sic] remains a ‘specialist’ and does not 
become a ‘leader’ (specialist-politician)” (Gramsci; in Davidson 2005: 9). Only 
through the consolidation of these many instances of direct popular-pedagogical 
struggles can the formation of an ‘organic peasantry’ occur at the regional scale. The 
next section will therefore examine one of Venezuela’s key sites of peasant 
internationalism, forged through the framework of the ALBA-TCP, and offering a 
nationally constituted hub for the Latin American region’s agrarian population.  
																																								 																				
45 The murder of the Honduran environmental activist and indigenous political organiser, Berta Cáceres, 
has been a rallying cry for peasant movements within LVC and ALBA, in pointing towards the 
continued class violence in the Latin American countryside and the impunity afforded to those 
responsible by the state (Correo del Orinico, 2016a).  
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5.2 Instituto Universitario Latinoamericano de Agroecología-Paulo Freire 
(IALA): ‘Encounters of Knowing’ and the Pedagogy of Food Sovereignty 
	
The Brazilian educational thinker and practitioner, Paulo Freire, has become one of 
the primary referents in the discussion of the connections between education and 
political liberation (Roberts, 2000; Dale and Hyslop-Margison, 2010). As he argues in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed ([1970] 2005), the foundational character of social 
struggle is the recuperation of humanism, and thus against the oppressive structures of 
dehumanization. A people’s “vocation” of humanization is dialectically confirmed and 
justified by the operation of oppressive, exploitative and violent socio-political 
relations (Freire, 2005: 43-4). One of the key challenges for a pedagogy of the 
oppressed, therefore, is to formulate modes of thinking and knowledge that will be 
able to “critically recognise” the causes of oppression, which in turn recognise the 
mutual dehumanization experienced by both the oppressed and the oppressors (ibid: 
47-8). Thus, the struggle of the oppressed carries within it not simply the liberation of 
this subaltern class, but of society as a whole.  
 These values, ideas and philosophy are clearly present within the educational 
policies and practices of Bolivarianismo, in both the Venezuelan and the wider ALBA 
context. The formation of the University Institute for Agroecology-Paulo Freire 
(Instituto Universitario Latinoamericano de Agroecología-Paulo Freire, IALA) 
represents a clear example of this philosophy in relation to the transformative struggle 
for food sovereignty. Though first conceived through encounters between social 
movements and the Venezuelan state, the creation of IALA was established through 
the radicalisation of Venezuela’s higher education policies, primarily through the 
promulgation of a 5-year plan for the reformation of higher education, with the explicit 
aim of guaranteeing “the participation of society in the creation, transformation and 
socialization of knowledge, [and] to contribute to overcoming the division between 
manual and intellectual labour…” (MPPEU, 2008). IALA now boasts a network of 
institutes from across the Latin American region (and within both member and non-
member states of ALBA), in Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua and 
Colombia (Snipstal, 2015; McCune et al., 2016; Chohan, 2017). In line with Freire’s 
liberation philosophy, this process of social transformation therefore seeks to 
overcome one of the primary axes of oppression within capitalist society – the division 
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between manual and intellectual labour – and in the process helping to form educated, 
confident and empowered individuals that are capable of forging new, multiple 
sovereignties beyond the confines of the centralised sovereign state. 
 
5.2.1 The Origins of IALA and the Contested Process of Institutional Formation 
The inception of IALA can be traced to a meeting among social movements and Hugo 
Chávez, convened in the Miraflores palace in 2004, in which social movement leaders 
pressed Chávez to break with transgenic seeds. As the dean of IALA, Miguel Angel 
Nuñez, explained to me: “At this point Chávez said to the movements, ‘ok, I’m going 
to break with transgenics, but I want the creation of a school for the peasantry, for all 
peasants of Latin America’” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016). Later, at the World 
Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2005, João Pedro Stedile of the Brazilian MST spoke 
with Chávez in order to finalise the founding document of the IALA school. “It spoke 
of the need to create a school in Venezuela, in order to train producers in the area of 
agroecology, as well as to produce seeds… So he signed the document, which was 
really a document of stages, the first being the arrival of the brigade from the MST, 
which came in the same year [2006]” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016).  
 Thus, from the outset IALA was conceived through the framework of ALBA, 
despite the fact that the formation of the school has not been officially marked within 
any ALBA declarations. Rather, the fundamental diplomatic and geopolitical lines of 
cooperation underscoring the establishment of IALA run directly through the 
“transnational organised society” component of ALBA’s multi-scalar structure (Muhr, 
2012b). Thus, the principal guideline for IALA’s existence refers to: 
“The Latin American and Caribbean integration for advancing towards 
the creation of the Great Fatherland [Patria Grande] signalled by our 
Liberator Simón Bolívar, upheld in the Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA) under the principles of solidarity, 
cooperation, complementarity, independence and equality among 
States, constitutes the new base upon which the government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela endorses and will endorse accords of 
cooperation with other countries, taking into account, the social 
movements as promoters of agroecology, defenders of the right to land, 
anti-imperialists and opponents of neoliberal globalization, of those 
Latin American and Caribbean nations with the aim of coordinating 
efforts for the formation of integral professionals in this area and to 
contribute to the integration of the Region” (Castellano et al, 2007: 
105). 
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On the other hand, the institutional hierarchy in which IALA is embedded begins from 
the Venezuelan Ministry of Education (rather than the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Lands), and thus does not share a direct institutional connection within the ALBA-
Food Grandnational (which is principally composed of the Council of Ministers of 
Agriculture) (ALBA-TCP, 2009b). In this way, the formation of IALA should be 
understood in the wider context of Chávez’s push to expand university education (see 
Ivancheva, 2016). As I was informed, IALA’s official inauguration in 2008 was 
facilitated by a Directive Committee, which managed operations for the first 4 years.  
From Miguel’s recollection, the problems associated with the original Directive was 
its basic incompatibility with the wider politico-legal terrain: 
“They took on relational methods that, up to a certain point, collided 
with administrative norms, with the laws of budgeting, more precisely 
the Organic Law of Management of Public Budgeting. So when the 
financing came, the projects were not executed. We have payments to 
be made to employees, and for all of the projects that we do, but this 
has to be done in legal terms, and under legal norms. It has to be put 
under responsible administration, or through allocation of a technical 
coordinator for a given project… There was then a demand from the 
Political-Pedagogical Committee, who had been going back to the 
black board on a weekly basis to map out all the things they wanted and 
needed, which had to be fulfilled, and this was a big part of the 
problem.” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016) 
What emerged from this initial period of IALA’s existence was a number of 
administrative problems that ultimately clashed with the values and orientation of the 
student body and workforce. Pressures finally came to a head in 2011, when the school 
was taken under occupation by the student body and some of the workers – all of 
whom were organised within the Political-Pedagogical Coordination committee 
(students) and the General Coordination committee (representing all members of the 
IALA space). According to their collective statement: 
“The failure to recognize and the disrespect towards collective efforts 
at constructing IALA, the disqualification of popular/collective 
decision-making bodies… the unjust and excluding treatment of 
workers at the institute, and the bureaucratization of efforts are just a 
few of the factors that have been creating contradictions within our 
university” (cited in IALA, 2011). 
As Miguel further explained, the final nail in the coffin of the old administration came 
with their summons to Caracas, to present to the ministry their budgets as a means to 
gauge the level of administrative spending and costs. With the arrival of Miguel and 
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his team came the implementation of a much tighter budgetary oversight process, 
which restored confidence to the Ministry of Education, and in turn granted an 
expanded budget for IALA over the years. The fundamental change in administrative 
direction enacted by Miguel and his team was through a more concerted focus on the 
socio-economic realities of the country, and in shaping the educational activities of 
the school around these realities: “Before, we had a slogan, ‘Educate in order to 
produce.’ But now we have, ‘Produce in order to educate’” (Interview, MA IALA, 
26.02.2016).  
 However, this change in governance structures, while adding a certain level of 
institutional efficiency, represents a relative tension between a state-led view of higher 
education and the more endogenous view produced from within IALA itself. And 
while Miguel did not view these tensions as a conflict between two models of 
administration, he noted that this was embedded within an ongoing process of 
negotiation with the ministerial level (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016). This 
underlying tension was expanded upon by one of the students in the following way: 
“Within the creation of its functioning organisational structure there has 
been a slight deterioration, in the sense that before there was a 
collective direction, or rather there was no sectarianism… This has 
made it very difficult to struggle against the same system of state 
education, and here they govern through a lot of norms and rules that 
are very different than before. When the institute was created the 
decisions were taken collectively by general assembly. Inside this space 
was a student council, organised by committees, which in turn had a 
core project [proyecto núcleo] of debate, a project of production. But 
this has changed towards integrated socio-productive projects. So 
IALA doesn’t have a people that truly know the struggle, or what was 
the originality that was created… There was much more political clarity 
from the people of the first cut [corte], they were much more 
committed, there was more education, more willingness to work and 
they felt much more committed to IALA… So inside the policies of the 
state in terms of the transformation of universities has come a 
deforming of the reality of IALA… Because IALA is a space where we 
prepare for this battle, here the idea is to be able to materialise true 
emancipatory education, where true equality of democratic 
participation exists. But this has been slightly broken through a lack of 
political clarity and willingness on behalf of those inside the Direction 
of IALA.” (Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016) 
This slow transformation of the institute has had a debilitating effect on subsequent 
generations of students, which according to the participant are less prepared politically 
and educationally to understand the true novelty of a radical pedagogical space and its 
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potential transformative impact. Thus, many current students have fallen into a passive 
acceptance of certain governance norms that ultimately undermine processes of social 
and organisational autonomy and independence (Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016). 
As a result, a significant number of current students are more narrowly focused, for 
example, private/social lives rather than with the practices and politics of agroecology: 
“here there is only a consciousness of words”, rather than a commitment to action 
(Interview, JL IALA, 24.02.2016). Whether in the more calculated testimony of 
Miguel, or of the student’s more decisive (and critical) comments above, clearly there 
is a yearning for more participatory (or at least, autonomously-driven) forms of 
educational practice.  
 
5.2.2 Contours of Critical/Plural Pedagog(ies) and the Values of IALA 
As some scholars have pointed out, the role and efficacy of ‘values’ has taken a central 
place in thinking through the prospects for building socialism in the 21st century 
(Harnecker Piñero, 2009; Lancaster and Sanyal, 2012; Sandbrook, 2014; Harnecker, 
2015: 180-1). In the context of IALA’s founding document, the emergence of key 
values similarly comes to the fore, which speaks of the need to “weave together” a 
form of “horizontal communication” into: 
“formative processes, where the relation of Other-I [alteridad-yo] 
should be recognised through the setting in practice of values, among 
which underline: responsible solidarity, co-participation, honesty, 
respect for one and the other; together with all of those, the principle of 
social justice, that is incorporated to an ethical reasoning and the 
exercise of criticism, subverting rationalisations and slanders 
[imposturas] of the manipulation in inter-personal relations” 
(Castellano et al., 2007: 23). 
As Miguel further explained to me: 
“When we talk about these formative processes, we are talking about 
‘learning how to be’, that has to do with eco-ethics. It has to establish 
values inside the realm of human relations, inside the relations of the 
collective, and relations with the universe; that is eco-ethics, that is 
what it is ‘to be.’” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016) 
This reference to ‘eco-ethics’ reflects wider concerns within notions of environmental 
and ecological justice, which stands in direct contrast to “[t]raditional ethical traits 
[that] focus on inter-human relationships and relations between humans and 
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supernatural phenomenon (spirits, gods)”, which have consequently “led to 
anthropocentric and geocentric models of our world – models that do not sufficiently 
acknowledge the realities around us” (Kinne, 2002: 88). Such an ‘ethical’ approach to 
agriculture and nature is itself already an immanent step towards building an 
alternative set of knowledge and techniques that potentially breaks the contradictory 
relationship between technology qua commons and the privitisation of society’s 
general intellect. 
As Miguel further explained, this form of being is conceptualised around two 
forms of ‘knowing’: conocer and saber. In English, the first of these terms refers more 
to a type of encountering (‘to get to know something’), while the second refers to the 
acquisition of knowledge (‘to know about something’). Hence, in combination, this 
process of educational becoming facilitates encounters of knowing: “In this way, you 
can learn to know [conocer] as well as learn to know [saber], and here lies the truth 
of agroecology” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016). As another student informed me, 
this form of knowledge acquisition, embodied in the student curriculum, assumes its 
double-meaning in the following way: 
“One is the popular/liberatory organisation that is under the principles 
of Freire, Rodriguez and Martí, and so focusing on liberatory 
organisation, and the other half is on agroecology as a project of life, a 
mode of production with a distinct vision, that searches for roots and 
adapting to specific advances, rather than being in the service of 
technologies already given to you.” (Interview, DM IALA, 24.02.2016) 
An early yet crucial example in this process of encounters of knowing was seen during 
the 1st Continental Encounter of Agroecology Trainers of LVC in the Americas, 
organised on the IALA campus in 2009 and established through a cooperative 
partnership between the LVC and the Venezuelan state. This ‘dialogue of knowledge’ 
(diálogo de saberes) – as it is more commonly known among LVC activists – 
facilitated a debate among the participants over issues of identity within the broader 
struggle for food sovereignty across the continent. As Martínez-Torres and Rosset 
(2014) note, this debate principally revolved around three relatively general 
categorisations of peasant life and the differences between them: ‘peasants’, 
‘indigenous’ and ‘rural proletarians’.  
As we can see from Table 5, each identity (as demonstrated by the diverse 
identities among participants of the Continental Encounter) roughly corresponds to a 
specific differentiation in how individuals relate to units of organisation (community,  
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Table 5: Peasant, indigenous and proletarian organizations, and agroecology 
	
   Source: Martinez-Torrez and Rosset (2014: 11). 
 
family-unit, collective), forms of knowledge transmission, types of struggles and 
relationships with agroecological practice. In most of my encounters with students and 
professors at IALA, the most common themes encountered tended to revolve around 
the peasant and indigenous identities. Particularly with respect to the latter, it was 
explained to me that the key cluster of ideas that animated the IALA project was the 
formation of a counter-hegemonic knowledge that resists many of the characteristic 
aspects of ‘modern’ Western thought, away from Euro-centric and anthropocentric 
models and towards a “planetary” mode of thought and a “holistic struggle” 
concerning diverse cultures, territories and ecologies (Interview, MA IALA, 
26.02.2016). As another student explained, IALA’s mode of identity formation does 
not necessarily draw a fine line between different epochs of thought within the history 
of Latin America, but rather combines the variegated insights between the 
‘cosmovisions’ of early indigenous communities as well as the more ‘modern’ Latin 
American thinkers, such as José Martí, Paulo Freire, Che Guevara and Chávez himself: 
“This is the ideal one searches for when navigating the colonial register 
that has been prevailing for the past 500 years, since the ‘discovery’ of 
the Americas, yet we were not discovered here in our own territory. So 
the principal teachings one receives here in IALA is that there already 
were civilizations and they were made and constructed by their 
inhabitants. This is the basis upon which IALA promotes a kind of 
dialogue of knowledge… It is not a question of becoming a professor 
and going to society with an attitude of imposition, like a technical 
engineer that knows what to do, but it is a question of being together 
Despite sometimes intense debate and even raised voices on a few occasions, the del-
egates to the encounter, and thus these knowledges, were able to dialog with each other, and
also with ‘scientifi ’ and ‘expert’ pinion in the form of technical staff and academic allies
who were invited, creating what Guiso (2000) calls a collective hermeneutics.
The meeting was able to come up with elements of a new vision of agroecology,
including a broad range of positions t be defended by LVC within this evolving frame-
work (i.e. ‘respect for the Mother Earth and Nature’), and those elements of other more
technocentric visions that were to be rejected (i.e. ‘the separation of human beings from
Nature’).12
Two issues could not be resolved, that of ‘agroecology as an instrument of struggle for
socialism’, and ‘the concept of scale in agroecological production’ (LVC 2013a, 20). The
issue of scale refers to the small family plot versus large collective settlement as different
utopian visions of the indigenous and proletarian organizations, respectively. The difficulty
in achieving consensus around the idea of socialism arose because some indigenous del-
egates felt that ‘already existing socialism’ had in the past not necessarily been hospitable
for indigenous people. In the words of an indigenous leader who participated in the encoun-
ter, responding to the words of a leader from a proletarian organization:
Your cosmovision of historical materialism is an interesting one, and we could learn a lot from
it. But first you must accept that is in fact a cosmovision, on among many, and that you can
also learn from our cosmovisions. If you accept that, we can have a horizontal dialog.13
He went on to say:
We might agree to the idea of socialism as a goal, but first we need a debate about what we
mean by socialism. Do we mean something like the communal and cooperative traditions of
indigenous peoples? In that case, we might agree. Or do we mea c rtain examples of socialism
in the past, where it did not go so well for us?
Table 1. Peasant, indigenous and proletarian organizations, and agroecology.
Identity
frame
Unit of
organization
Transmission of
knowledge Emblematic struggles
Sources of affinity
with agroecology
Indigenous Community Coded in cultural
traditions
Defense of territory and
construction of
autonomy
Indigenous
cosmovision and
care for the Mother
Earth
Peasant Family Experiential,
farmer-to-
farmer
Access to land, prices,
subsidies, credit
Lower production
costs, self-
provisioning
combined with
marketing
Proletarian Collective Classrooms and
technical
assistance
Land occupations,
strikes,
transformation of the
economic model
Socialist ideology,
dispute with Capital
12The full list of positions to be defended or rejection can be found in LVC (2013a, 19–24).
13Author’s notes from the encounter.
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with the people of the community, in dialogue, and in communication 
without end so that they are the ones who end up being the protagonists 
that guide the resolution to the problem, and to the construction of their 
own programs and projects.” (Interview, DM IALA, 24.02.2016) 
This sentiment clearly reflects the core outcome of the Continental Encounter held at 
IALA in 2009, in which various participants across the range of social identities had, 
after a vigorous and often contentious debate, agreed to a further Continental 
Encounter in Guatemala held in 2011 in order to further debate the differing visions 
over what “socialism” is suppoed to represent. In this way, the process of reciprocal 
communication between experts in agroecology and local communities fosters 
“consensus around emergences, and not merely a midpoint between binomials” 
(Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2014: 14). 
Despite these more nebular understandings of the institution’s basic 
philosophical precepts, it was clear that the central mission of IALA is to embed itself 
firmly within the project of Bolivarianismo as such. According to Miguel, the central 
values of IALA are entirely synonymous, and should be understood in light of, the 
preambular section of the Bolivarian Constitution (1999),46 as well as those pertaining 
to Articles 347 and 30548:  
“The project of IALA cannot be over and above, not somewhere below 
what is effectively conceived in the constitution… These dimensions 
have a substrate in those public documents outlining the revolutionary 
																																								 																				
46 The relevant preambular section establishes the overall effort towards the making of: 
“…a democratic, participatory and self-reliant, multi-ethnic and multicultural society in a just, federal 
and decentralized State that embodies the values of freedom, independence, peace, solidarity, the 
common good, the nation's territorial integrity, comity and the rule of law for this and future 
generations; guarantees the right to life, work, learning, education, social justice and equality, without 
discrimination or subordination of any kind; promotes peaceful cooperation among nations and furthers 
and strengthens Latin American integration in accordance with the principle of non-intervention and 
national self-determination of the people, the universal and indivisible guarantee of human rights, the 
democratization of international society, nuclear disarmament, ecological balance and environmental 
resources as the common and inalienable heritage of humanity” (RBV, 1999: 1). 
47 Article 3 states that: “Education and work are the fundamental processes for guaranteeing” the basic 
values of justice, peace and individual dignity (RBV, 1999: 1-2). 
48 Article 305 states that: 
“The State shall promote sustainable agriculture as the strategic basis for overall rural development, 
and consequently shall guarantee the population a secure food supply, defined as the sufficient and 
stable availability of food within the national sphere and timely and uninterrupted access to the same 
for consumers. A secure food supply must be achieved by developing and prioritizing internal 
agricultural and livestock production, understood as production deriving from the activities of 
agriculture, livestock, fishing and aquiculture. Food production is in the national interest and is 
fundamental to the economic and social development of the Nation. To this end, the State shall 
promulgate such financial, commercial, technological transfer, land tenancy, infrastructure, manpower 
training and other measures as may be necessary to achieve strategic levels of self-sufficiency…” 
(RBV, 1999: 70). 
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process that basically points towards the accelerated path in a new 
conception of public politics that has to do with food sovereignty...” 
(Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016) 
Here a potential tension arises in terms of how the institute perceives its role in 
fostering a ‘dialogue of knowledge’ between diverse visions of society and agriculture, 
and the more specific constitutional articles of the Bolivarian state. That said, it could 
be argued that the transposition between these to ‘binomials’ are more formal than 
real, insofar as the articles in question embody a sufficiently high level of generality 
that they could be easily interpreted within a vast array of different social identities 
and practices. Indeed, the constitutional laws to which IALA’s guidelines conform are 
not only of a general nature, but extend beyond the confines of the national 
constitution, including the associated understandings laid out in the General 
Guidelines of the Plan of Economic and Social Development (2007-2013), the Law of 
Science Technology and Innovation (specifically Articles 12 and 13), the Law of 
Lands and Agricultural Development (2001), Misión Alma Mater (2006), as well as 
those contained in the numerous declarations of the ALBA-TCP (see Castellano, 2007: 
15). Nevertheless, for Miguel, at least one crucial distinction stood out in the 
differentiation of what IALA potentially represents: 
“…none of these laws touches upon the development of work, the 
wealth of work as such, which is what we have seen in IALA, and is 
why we are defining IALA as an agroecosystem… Here there is a 
convergence between two strands: popular liberatory education, and the 
formation of a liberatory agroecology. And from here emerges the PFN; 
as we call them, ‘projects of learning.’” (Interview, MA IALA, 
26.02.2016) 
 
5.2.3 Learning as Territoriality: Pedagogy in the Community 
One of the central pedagogical components of IALA’s curriculum is its practical 
activities, teaching and rural collaborations beyond the university campus. Around 30-
40% of the students’ curriculum is taken up by productive activity inside the IALA 
encampment, while another 30% is conducted outside the campus with members of 
the surrounding community (the remainder is taken up by academic work). 
Community work is thus divided into two types of activity. Firstly, there is one day a 
week in which small group-teams go into the communities to visit local families in 
order to help them with their small lots (patios productivos), and orient them towards 
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new techniques and more efficient use of inputs. In contradistinction to other 
experiences these communities have had with other technical advisors, IALA’s 
pedagogical relations with these spaces do not stop at the level of a pure supply 
function (where communities simply ask advisors for tools, seeds and other means of 
production) but facilitates the exchange of knowledge, practice and critical debate over 
the socio-political dimensions of agroecology, which ultimately leads (in theory) to 
the formation of more independent and confident peasant farmers that are capable of 
taking hold of their own problem-solving processes (Interview, LG IALA, 
24.02.2016). In turn, these encounters help students to better understand their learning 
and knowledge about local ecological conditions and general peasant production. 
Secondly, students take a month out of their vacation time to live and work with a 
specific community (in any part of the country), as a means of putting this practice of 
knowledge exchange into a deeper and longer time-frame, with the possibility of 
further promoting and teaching the philosophy of agroecology among local users 
(Interview, DM IALA, 24.02.2016).  
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Vignette I: Taking Pedagogical Practice into the Community 
 
Photograph 1: Negotiating difficult terrain is part and parcel of agroecological pedagogy, and 
a principal indicator of the dedication exhibited by radical educators (Photos: Author, 
18.02.2016). 
	
The IALA bus dropped us off in the middle of the highway. A small team of five, we 
watched the bus drive away from what seemed like the middle of nowhere. In every 
direction, the horizon stretched into a seemingly endless expanse of green savannah. 
The only object of any note was an old oil pipeline, beginning at the edge of the 
highway and extending well into the sweltering plains. Before long, two members of 
the team had begun to mount the pipeline in an effort to use it as a makeshift footpath 
spanning some 400 meters… It soon dawned on me that this was our only access point 
into the community.  
 Having successfully negotiated our precarious entrance into the small family 
farm in which the class was to take place, we were greeted warmly by the entire family, 
spanning four generations. Already set up within the small patio space behind the 
house was a blackboard, work table and a circle of chairs. The participants that day 
were a mix of local residents, one from the Network of Free Associated Producers 
(Red de Productores Libres Asociados), a pair from the local communal council, and 
two small farmers from neighbouring plots. Our two teachers, a male and female IALA 
student, led the class, which revolved around the core components of agroecology as 
an inherently holistic praxis that encompasses 6 major dimensions (see Figure 8). The  
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Figure 8: Agroecology as a Holistic Practice. 
 
teachers emphasised the two-way process between ‘formación y formador’ (training 
and trainer), in which the production of knowledge circulates from both sides of the 
teacher-pupil relation. For instance, when talking of how to decide between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ pesticides, we were told that one cannot answer the question in advance, 
but must emerge from the specific ecological circumstances and local knowledges that 
inform a particular strategic decision.  
 At a broader level, our teachers underscored the importance of political 
practice as a crucial substrate of agro-ecological practice. From this perspective, it 
was said, ‘politics’ is more than just ‘the state’, but rather flows through a wider 
understanding of ‘convivencia’ (living together), and the everyday social relations 
that form the basic structure of small scale agriculture within a given social setting. 
Participants also spoke with the teachers of their own concerns, understandings and 
desires – all of which was recorded on a mobile phone carried by one of the teachers. 
The participants spoke of a variety of issues and topics: from the relative dearth of 
technical advisers, access to seeds, difficulties in securing property rights, as well as 
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Photograph 1, 2: Negotiating difficult terrain is part and parcel of agroecologial pedagogy, and a 
principle indicator of the dedication exhibited by radical educators (Photos: Author, 18.02.2016). 
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the everyday challenges of forging and maintaining cooperative forms of socio-
economic organisation – from collective production to distribution and marketing.  
 As part of the IALA philosophy of diálogo de saberes, the IALA teachers did 
not offer themselves or their institution as the panacea to such problems, but merely 
reflected upon their implications with participants, exploring strategic possibilities 
with them, and finally offering IALA’s space and teachings as potential sources of help 
to which the participants could always turn.  
 
*  *  * 
 
My glimpse into the praxis of community outreach and critical pedagogy that embeds 
itself within the everyday settings of those who are most affected by ‘academic’ topics 
offered crucial insights into these “projects of learning.” Disregarding the difficulty of 
the terrain and problems of geographic access, the IALA students approach their tasks 
with not only professionalism, but also love and dedication. Though this may seem a 
somewhat trivial observation, it can also offer key insights into how certain practices 
are able to penetrate ‘non-representational’ aspects of social relations, in expressing 
what speech cannot (Thrift, 2008). These emotional lines of force were reflected upon 
by the namesake of IALA, Paulo Freire, in the context of Che Guevara’s relationship 
with the popular classes: 
“It was, then, in dialogue with the peasants that Guevara’s 
revolutionary praxis became definitive. What Guevara did not say, 
perhaps due to humility, is that it was his own humility and capacity to 
love that made possible his communion with the people. And this 
indisputably dialogical communion became cooperation. Note that 
Guevara (who did not climb the Sierra Maestra with Fidel and his 
comrades as a frustrated youth in search of adventure) recognizes that 
his ‘communion with the people ceased to be a mere theory, to become 
an integral part of [himself]’” (Freire, 2005: 170-1, quoting Guevara). 
In this way, the contemporary practice of diálogo de saberes forms a key part of the 
revolutionary lineage from Guevara to Freire, and towards contemporary notions of 
mística (Issa, 2007), in which solidarity, commitment and, indeed, love form vital 
components to the formation of popular “communion” with the people, and through 
which the organic connection to popular sectors goes on to consolidate the 
revolutionary’s thought and praxis (Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016). With respect 
to Table 5 above, this communally ‘embedded’ classroom setting seems to conform to 
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the “proletarian” identity relative to the mode of knowledge transmission. In this 
context, and in distinction to ‘indigenous’ and ‘peasant’ identities, IALA’s 
pedagogical outreach contains the potential to infuse more collectivist settings among 
diverse participants in the service of building forms of self-sustainable peasant 
practices in conjunction with politico-ideological formation. 
 However, in somewhat more concrete terms (though certainly connected to the 
above considerations on practical commitment) other students noted the strategic 
necessity to radically expand such practices: “We need to start moving towards a form 
of production in the community that goes beyond one or two hectares, and we have 
not advanced very much in this respect with our community work, apart from our 
maestro professors” (Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016). It was thought that the scaling 
up of current practices could be better facilitated through the expansion of community 
work (beyond one day a week) as well as with the flow of people moving in the other 
direction – with local farmers visiting the IALA campus to get a first-hand glimpse of 
agroecology in action. This more expansive form of outreach would also be greatly 
aided through a closer collaboration with other government-led agricultural 
institutions that might help to cover more ‘ground’ (both literally and figuratively) 
(Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016). These processes thus highlight the formation of a 
rural political technology in which learning becomes its own form of territoriality. In 
other words, as Meek (2015) suggests, such pedagogical practices on the land amount 
to a place-based pedagogy tailored to the socio-ecological specificities of the actors 
involved, and in turn provides new directions in how individuals and groups interact 
with their lands and territories (cf. McCune, et al. 2016). Nevertheless, it is only 
through the successive multiplication of these spaces of radical agrarian praxis 
towards a national- (and regional-) popular scale that we can begin see the emergence 
of multiple sovereignties on a sufficiently consolidated basis. These considerations on 
the necessary scale of agroecology also crucially touch upon a key dimension of 
Venezuela’s agrarian transformation and the potential contradictions it must 
overcome.  
 
5.2.4 Can Agroecology Feed Venezuela? The Challenge of ‘Scaling-Up’ 
The above considerations touch heavily upon the continued debate within scholarly 
circles as to whether small-scale agriculture can attain sufficient scale in order to feed 
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the world’s population. While many within the FS literature champion the capacity of 
agroecology to meet this goal (e.g., Altieri and Nichols, 2008; Rosset, 2009 Altieri 
and Toledo, 2011; Martínez-Alier, 2011; McMichael, 2015; van der Ploeg, 2014), the 
debate is equally weighted among sceptics (of various degrees of rejectionism) that 
question whether low-input farming is capable of matching conventional yields (e.g., 
Dyer, 2004; Woodhouse, 2010; Purcell, 2013; Bernstein, 2014; Jansen, 2015). One of 
the main challenges in consolidating strong claims for the universalisation of agro-
ecological practices comes in the form of eco-geographical differentiation – the 
inherent variety that obtains within different productive territories – as well as the 
variable quantities of labour power that is exacted upon a given space of production 
(cf. Jansen, 2015). Hence, ecological conditions and labour supply represent radically 
uneven factors of production when viewed across a large number of geographical 
cases. More importantly, however, the political technologies inherent within food 
sovereignty – which at its core revolves around the method of agroecology – seek to 
shift our understanding of what productivity actually means. As Weis notes, such an 
understanding would begin to calculate measurable costs with respect to “GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions, soil erosion, toxicity, unhealthy food, violence and 
humanity’s overall footprint in the landscape and atmosphere” (2010: 334). 
Nevertheless, part of the challenge to fomenting this transformation in knowledge and 
ecological management hinges on the strength of agrarian social forces and their 
relative weight within the overall national economy (ibid: 335). Both of these points 
thus resonate strongly with the following insights gained from participants at the IALA 
institute.  
On the question of whether or not agroecology could feed a country like 
Venezuela, with few producers in the countryside and a highly urbanised population,49 
Miguel offered a cautious response: 
“Look, to say to you that the small producer could feed this country 
would be very difficult… it would be rash to say this. But I can say that 
there are figures in other Latin American countries that have ecological 
diversity, for instance Ecuador and Brazil, where 70% of the foods in 
the basic consumption basket are produced by familial peasant 
agriculture” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016) 
																																								 																				
49 Some 93% of the Venezuelan population live in urban centres (Lavelle, 2013: 140). 
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However, as I pointed out, the difference between Venezuela and other examples is 
the concerted lack of labour within the countryside, as well as the crippling 
disincentives towards agricultural production due to high inflation and a booming 
informal sector in urban areas. It was relayed to me that the obvious solution to this 
would be a return of the people to countryside in order to re-populate the productive 
spaces of the country. And yet, I mentioned that there has already been a government 
policy of exactly this name – ‘Vuelta al Campo’ (Return to the Countryside) – which 
has produced sub-standard results and contradictory outcomes: 
“Ok, but what other option do you have? Of course the people have 
become very distant from the countryside, quite brutally so. But what 
is the other option? Depend on the transnationals and the corporations? 
To continue dragging out the same problems, or look for a way out of 
these problems with very concrete progressive policies? Remember 
there are a lot of figures showing that agroecology can feed the world… 
Yes it is difficult to bring people back to the countryside… But you 
have two realities. Which reality could be easier to live with? We stay 
in the urbanized zones, with the associated problem of water, illnesses, 
insecurity and delinquency – or do we return to the countryside? I think 
that ultimately there has been a carelessness of the revolutionary 
process, of not finding a process of integral formation for the 
Venezuelan countryside, and to give a political response that requires 
an understanding of what the reality is right now… But in the end, there 
is no other option.” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016) 
Despite the hard line taken in this response, there is good reason to be sympathetic to 
the absolute need to re-populate the countryside, if not for the sake of relieving the 
demographic pressures that build up in Venezuela’s largest urban areas, particularly 
Caracas. Yet, in line with Miguel’s critique of “carelessness”, other authors have 
noted, the relative failure of the Vuelta al Campo initiative due to the “catch-22” of 
implementing both necessary infrastructural transformation for the sake of agricultural 
productivity, as well as the social and cultural shifts required for this type of activity 
to take off on a large scale (Page, 2010; Kappeler, 2013). As one participant explained, 
this contradiction similarly reinforces the tendency towards promotion of conventional 
farming inputs (Interview, JL IALA, 24.02.2016; cf. Enríquez and Newman, 2015: 
20). Hence, the strategic and spatial selectivity of the state remains trapped within 
circulation of oil rents that sustains urbanised life, as well as conventional 
technological packets oriented towards fragmented and scattered small-farmer groups.  
It was equally apparent that some of the concerns among participants were the 
relative paucity in state-led transformation of small-scale farming practices.  
	 	 169	
 
Figure 9: Economically Active Population (Rural) 
Source: Author’s calculation of annual averages, from Instituto Nacional Estedística. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Economically Active Population (Total/Rural) 
Source: Author’s calculation of annual averages, from Instituto Nacional Estedística. 
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More specifically, it was intimated that a particular form of fragmentation among 
farmers results from their continued integration in the wider circuits of 
commodification in terms of not only securing adequate capital (i.e., farming inputs) 
but also in terms of valorising their labour in the market. Strictures of agricultural life 
have thus adversely impacted on the size of the economically active population in 
agriculture (see Figure 9), which has shown a near-continuous decline since the onset 
of Venezuela’s economic crisis (2008), while the current figure sits at the same level 
as when Chávez first came to power (1998), all of which stands in contrast to a near-
continuous rise in the total proportion of economically active population nationally 
(Figure 10). Even at a more micro-foundational level, various complexities exist 
within the overall goal of extending the practice of agroecology.  
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Vignette II: Differentiation of Agro-ecological Practices 
 
Photograph 2: An IALA student converses with one of the school’s ‘maestro’ professors – 
peasant producers that teach part-time in the IALA curriculum. Use of government-provided 
tablets help students keep track of crop cycles and any contingent problems encountered with 
each yield (Photo: Author, 20.02.2016). 
 
On my second day out in the community I was accompanied by one of IALA’s 
Salvadorian students, who was taking me to visit a few residents in order to check on 
the progress of their crops. Our first stop was at the house of a ‘maestro’ who also 
happened to teach a course at IALA. We entered a four-hectare space containing a 
small house for the family of eight. Eager to show me the fruits of the family’s labour, 
the maestro led me and my companion towards the back of the house, which hosted 
two large beds of red and black beans. With a growth cycle of 34 and 39 days 
(respectively) these crops provided an important part of the family’s staple diet; in all, 
around 200kg of the beans were consumed by the family each year, while the 
remaining 300kg were either conserved for the next round of sowing, or marketed 
outside of the farm.  
Beyond this, underneath the extended canopies of mahogany surrounding the 
house, was a wide variety of crops and vegetation: Leucaena (whose seeds provide 
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protein-based animal fodder), Cedar trees, Neem trees (which produce neem-oil used 
for organic pesticides), Topocho (Venezuelan banana), plantains, avocados, and 
much more. The last two of these crops yield around 13 tons a year, with roughly half 
the produce consumed on site, while the other half is taken to market. As I was 
informed, the production process is virtually self-sustainable, with no external inputs 
needed. For this reason, the farm’s produce is always capable of maintaining the same 
nominal price (e.g., 5 tons of plantain is sold for 50,000Bs), without suffering the 
effects of cost-push inflation. This therefore provides consumers, which suffer 
continual falls in real purchasing power, with relatively cheaper food on a continued 
basis.  
 
*  *  * 
 
It was time to check on one of the neighbours who lived directly next to the maestro’s 
farm. The lady who greeted us was clearly glad to see her Salvadorian acquaintance, 
and welcomed the European newcomer into her 5-acre expanse. As she relayed to us, 
she had been suffering problems with pest control, resulting in some damage of her 
lettuce and bean crops. It was advised that she visit the maestro next door, in order to 
obtain either advice or inputs for organic pesticide. However, I was later told that the 
5 acres were in reality split into two halves: one half comprised the woman’s crops, 
grown organically in the methods of agroecology, and the other half by her husband 
who used traditional farming techniques, including the use of agro-chemical (toxic) 
pest repellents. While she informed me that her choice of agro-ecological practices 
was based on health and conservation issues, I also asked why her husband chose to 
produce conventionally: does he find it better for his yield? Is he not able to obtain 
the necessary inputs for agro-ecological production? To this I was merely told that 
there was no particular reason for it at all, “he’s just used to doing it that way.” 
 As my Salvadorian guide and I walked down the highway to our next 
destination (to visit another maestro-professor of IALA for lunch), I was curious to 
know his views on what the lady would be able to do in order to solve her pest 
problems. I asked whether she was well acquainted with the maestro-professor, and 
whether they spent much time talking to each other about farming techniques and 
methods. The response I received was instructive: “They don’t really communicate 
that much, at least not about agroecology. Very often, there is a certain fear about 
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losing control, or about inviting stronger competition, if one’s knowledge or 
techniques are disseminated. If they do talk, it won’t be about agriculture, but other 
things, mostly religion.” 
(Fieldnotes, Barinas, 25.02.2016) 
 
*  *  * 
 
The above vignette serves as just a small example of how agro-ecological practices 
become highly differentiated for a number of reasons. Though the above example can 
only rise to the level of an emblematic case, it nevertheless provides insight into some 
of the contradictory aspects of production that is encapsulated by the food sovereignty 
idea. Firstly, in contradistinction to some concerns that low-input farming cannot 
generate the necessary productivity in order to fetch an adequate return for farmers, 
the case of the maestro demonstrates that the virtual elimination of capital overheads 
militates against the compulsion to accumulate debt, or raise prices on consumers. 
Especially in the case of Venezuela, this form of price control (which does not 
represent any form of external price-subsidisation) is especially useful in which the 
system-wide phenomenon of price inflation continually eats away at the strength of 
the domestic market.  
 At the same time, the above example shows some of the (often obscure) 
reasons for the turn towards conventional agriculture. Despite my somewhat persistent 
enquiries, my interlocutor could not come up with any specific reason for the 
differentiation of agricultural practices within the same (family) farm; from her 
perspective, people were simply in the habit of producing in one way or another. The 
fact that cross-contamination from toxic inputs was not a problem for the differing yet 
adjacent plots probably contributed to the survival of this somewhat precarious 
mixture of production techniques. Yet the very fact that such divergent techniques 
exist within the same ‘household’ – which for many in the FS literature, as well as 
peasant activists themselves, represent an indivisible socio-economic unit – shows not 
only the existence of concrete divisions of labour within such units, but also concrete 
divisions of practices taking place within a single space of production.  
 Lastly, it should be noted that the relatively casual relationship between 
neighbours, each of which engage in farming and of an organic, agro-ecological form, 
represents very real pressures exerted by (even limited) integration into capitalist 
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markets. Again, while the minimal use of external inputs provides many benefits to 
both producers and consumers, the very fact that this production takes place under a 
relatively more favourable technique (which brings in efficiency through the reduction 
of capital costs) militates against its free dissemination to those whose structural 
position represents a potential competitive pressure on a limited market. In this 
respect, family farmers may “establish their commodity enterprises at the expense of 
their neighbours who are poorer farmers, unable to meet those costs or bear those risks 
and losing out to those who can” (Bernstein, 2010: 105). Hence, despite the overall 
goal to expand and intensify the philosophy and practice of agroecology, even partial 
integration into commodity relations places contradictory pressures upon such 
networks of solidarity and knowledge exchange, in which knowledge as such becomes 
a crucial factor of production and competitive advantage. This therefore comes to be 
a very serious (or at least potential) obstacle to the substantial ‘scaling up’ of agro-
ecological practice.  
 
5.2.5 From Transnationalism to Statism: On Food Sovereignty, the State and ALBA 
As can be expected from an educational-pedagogical institution that was born directly 
out of the LVC, the core notions and complex understandings embedded within the 
(multiple) ideas of food sovereignty emerged clearly from the various conversations I 
carried out across participants. As one student explained, FS is more than simply a 
body of declarations from social movements, but practices concretely internalised into 
territorial space that attempt to break down dependence on established technological 
packets and commodity relations (Interview, DM IALA, 24.02.2016). Such a 
perspective draws a sharp line between food sovereignty and food security, for within 
the former “is it more about the quality of the sovereign, which is the exercise from 
below to promote this practice by those still in the countryside…” (Interview, LG 
IALA, 24.02.2016). Yet in terms of moving beyond the helping hand of the state, in 
which citizens remain stationary in anticipation of state support, it was noted that the 
organisational prerequisite for the strengthening of the popular sectors has undergone 
a series of strains:  
 
“What we need is a unification of the diversity we have here in 
Venezuela. There are a lot of weaknesses in that a lot of social 
movements are created but they are not able to transcend this 
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fragmentation. One of the things that one must advance with is in making 
a true process of production from the base, based on self-consumption, 
autonomy and self-government… To continue depending on the 
government will achieve nothing.” (Interview, LG IALA, 24.02.2016)  
 
One of the central lines of tension emerging from this fragmentation was, according 
to another participant, the problem of the state itself, as an over-powering institution 
that more often than not isolates, rather than congeals, the field of social forces 
throughout the country: 
“One of the principal obstacles is corruption and another aspect in 
Venezuela which is very common is bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has 
unfortunately empowered the political institutions in Venezuela, which 
remember is a country that specialises in electoral politics and its 
discourses… I believe that the principal task should be to produce and 
resolve these problems with the food supply, but I also think that one 
of the battles should really be to retake and recuperate those principles 
that were engendered by the president [Chávez] because they have been 
totally lost, and they [bureaucrats] confuse us as a nation. That is why 
we see a lot of despair among the citizenry” (Interview, JL IALA, 
24.02.2016). 
There is clearly a palpable concern with the very material condensation of the state 
apparatus, spanning the entire gamut of institutional ensembles and discourses – from 
the complex bureaucracy to the discourses of representative democracy to which these 
institutions cohere. These comments maintain a sharp resonance with Poulantzas’ 
observations concerning the institutional specificity of the capitalist state in late 
modernity, in the context of authoritarian statism. Empirically, Poulantzas’ comments 
refer to those states within the European region (and primarily Western Europe), in 
which the role of plural parties and legislative branches of the state had lost power 
relative to the strengthened executive. Such conditions amounted to an effective “crisis 
of legitimation”, expressed through the expanded responsibilities and tasks taken on 
by the administration-bureaucracy, which “now bears the brunt of demands for 
legitimation, although it is less and less able to meet them” (Poulantzas, 2014: 245). 
As noted at the end of Chapter 4, however, the Bolivarian state is unique in displaying 
both authoritarian-statist characteristics (expanded power of the executive at the 
expense of other branches of the state and increased state participation in direct 
economic activities) and concrete innovations in a post-liberal political technology 
(primarily through the formation of vertical territoriality via the proliferation of 
popular democratic spaces). However, whether from the internalisation of curricular 
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design into the dominant ideological predilections of state administrations, to the 
broader array of state practices that tends towards the promotion of ‘food security’ 
rather than food sovereignty, we find a relative disorganisation of the popular classes, 
in contradiction with the stated aims and discursive orientations of the Bolivarian 
process. And yet, as with so many of the testimonies encountered, the above comment 
contains an unmistakable ideological centre-point based on an idealised notion (real 
or not) of Chávez as a transcendent individual; a pedagogical figure in which core 
principles become distilled, and through which future struggles become instantiated 
(cf. Michelutti, 2016).  
Coming finally to the question of ALBA itself, the idea and role of the regional 
institution carried a somewhat contradictory position within the conversations at IALA 
– between both a potential space of emancipation, as well as a distant object lacking a 
true presence within the school. At a more general level of understanding, a sharp 
distinction was drawn between the geopolitical relations among capitalist IFIs, which 
attach stringent conditionality with their lending, in contrast to ALBA agreements that 
respect and uphold the sovereignty of the participating states: “It’s important to 
understand that within this framework we can reduce the transfer of resources, because 
every country needs resources to develop, it needs capital, and it needs to be able to 
dispose of this capital” (Interview, MA IALA, 26.02.2016). In addition to these 
general comments, Miguel conceived of IALA as being an integral part of the 
Grandnational Project (GNP) for Education, one of several Grandnational Projects that 
were outlined in the first declaration for the formation of GNPs at the Fifth Summit in 
Tintorero (ALBA-TCP, 2007). 
However, for most of the students it was intimately understood that despite the 
resolutely socialist principles animating the ALBA project, “it does not have the 
capacity to resolve a problem as big as we have right now in terms of the oil price”, 
precisely because the very fate and function of the ALBA space is so heavily 
integrated into the world oil market (Interview, JL IALA, 24.02.2016). Beyond this 
wider concern with the structural limits of ALBA, it was also said that the 
‘transnational organised society’ aspects of ALBA – in terms of social movement 
organisation that had been at the heart of IALA’s founding – had receded into the 
background. Rather, IALA’s subsumption under the Ministry of Education has shifted 
the strategic rationale towards expanding Venezuelan students into its ranks, with a 
tighter focus on internal curricular formation, rather than transnational political 
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solidarity (Interview, EG IALA, 23.02.2016) – a necessary rationale in one respect, 
yet one that has adversely impacted on the inter- and trans-national quality of the 
school (Interview, DM IALA, 24.02.2016). Additionally, the very workload 
associated with the established curriculum (in terms of the amount of subjects and 
credits required to complete a degree) means that more practical connections to other 
institutional (productive ensembles) get lost: “students depend on this academic 
workload; during the day, night and weekend, they forget about ALBA, about 
Petrocaribe, about UNASUR and MERCOSUR” (Interview, AC IALA, 24.02.2016). 
As another professor told me, it is essential that IALA move past its overwhelming 
focus on curricular formation (as vitally important as this may be) in order to make 
stronger political connections with surrounding productive units like the ALBA 
factories, which could be target placements for outgoing graduates (Interview, EG 
IALA, 23.02.2016).  
Nevertheless, the very idea of ALBA was not lost on this generation of 
students, who all saw this regional institution as promoting a “new class of encounters” 
around “common themes, such as seeds, land, territory, so that one serves an approach 
that unifies us and allows us to meet as people, in order to push through legislation, 
and to exercise public policies as such. Public policies don’t have to come from above, 
but should emerge in light of the proposal that are born from the struggle of people in 
their communities, who know what is happening there” (Interview, DM IALA, 
24.02.2016). Thus, despite the relative slowdown in the transnational momentum that 
originally inspired and formed the IALA space, students and teachers were clear as to 
the fundamental axes of struggle around which their work revolved – and the presence 
of these interconnected terrains of struggle would forever ensure that, no matter how 
occluded, the function, philosophy and praxis of the IALA School would be dedicated 
to a regional agroecological revolution from below. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to reveal the various actors, strategies and struggles that go 
into the making of food sovereignty in Venezuela and within the wider ALBA context. 
As noted in Chapter 4, much of what takes place in Venezuela carries a significant 
impact on the fate of this post-hegemonic region, whether due to the fiscal capacity of 
Venezuela’s oil diplomacy, or on the (inter-related) question of the degree to which 
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Venezuelan agriculture can become more self-sufficient (thereby easing its fiscal 
burden through a reduced import budget). Thus, it is through the latter two components 
of the ALBA Grandnational Concept – endogenous development and the metabolic 
rift – that this (and the subsequent) chapter is framed. Additionally, the primary focus 
has been on the politics of food sovereignty, rather than an in-depth analysis of class 
differentiation in the Venezuela countryside or more technical arguments over 
agrarian techniques. Re-telling the insights, hopes, desires and frustrations among 
various social movements actors, as well as radical pedagogical practitioners, has 
sought to reveal “the development of practices of citizenship that enable people to 
demand and secure rights for themselves” (Dunford, 2015: 2, emphasis in original). 
These stories, vignettes and case studies thus provide a rich portrait of how the 
parameters of rights, territory and sovereignty undergo transformative change in the 
struggle for the agrarian commons.  
Thus, it was first of all necessary to trace the ways in which Venezuela’s drive 
for food sovereignty has been experienced, and in many ways led, by grassroots actors. 
From the testimonies of these actors, it is clear that agrarian social movements are 
slowly crystallising a truly post-liberal political technology, through the concerted 
struggle for new positive rights that do not merely request the intervention of state 
power but fundamentally traverse the entire strategic field of the state. Land 
occupations, self-organised networks of knowledge-exchange and solidarity-building, 
and finally to the partial occupation of institutional space (whether in the form of 
communal councils to the Presidential Councils of Popular Power), all constitute 
distinct ‘moments’ in the overall terrain of peasant struggle for a new food regime. 
Yet, as with all revolutionary processes, such practices are not free from contradictory 
forces.  
Relative lack of resources frustrates the necessary 
infrastructural/organisational investments (either in the form of various structures 
within the built environment to day-to-day expenses involved in everyday activism), 
while the challenge of scaling up small-holder, artisanal methods of production, whose 
material basis embodies the principles of food sovereignty and ecological resilience 
simultaneously lack the requisite power of economies of scale necessary for the 
general satisfaction of the nation’s food needs. And in relation to this latter aspect, 
larger spaces of production under the aegis of the state become concentrated sites of 
class struggle between committed revolutionary actors and those in high positions of 
	 	 179	
factory management, who are seemingly content with bad management practices, 
hierarchal structures of workplace relations and possible examples of corruption and 
fraud from within the ‘social economy’ itself. Here again, the struggle over the 
productive forces (and hence the material basis of counter-hegemonic space) is one 
that traverses simultaneously across already-existent resources – particularly land or 
production infrastructures – as well as those not-yet existent but clearly required for 
the adequate concretisation of food sovereignty and popular politics (particularly with 
respect to better transport facilities, irrigation systems, etc.) This latter array of social 
infrastructures is thus entirely dependent on state policy (through the investment of oil 
rents) and thus complicates the degree to which counter-hegemonic strategies from 
below may be able to affect the construction of new counter-spaces.  
Traversing the terrain of the state in the course of making new political 
technologies conducive to food sovereignty therefore implies more than simply a 
head-on confrontation with government bureaucracies, but within the broader space 
of struggle even within peasant movements. As is characteristic of the entire LVC 
movement, issues pertaining particularly to gendered relations of power loom large in 
the FS movement. More broadly, the LVC exhibits some differentiation between 
views on leadership, tactical issues and the nature and meaning of socialist 
transformation, each of which may carry greater or lesser significance for various 
nationally or locally constituted actors. The open-ended process of dialogue and 
knowledge exchange nevertheless offers a conducive atmosphere to the constant 
(re)negotiation of these strategic dimensions. 
 As a means of further exploring this latter consideration, the chapter offered a 
critical engagement with the University Institute for Agroecology, a concentrated 
example of collaboration between ALBA states and transnational agrarian 
movements. Here too, the aim has been to both articulate the deep values and 
discourses of this space of radical pedagogy with the particular challenges faced by 
the institute. The first years of IALA was very much reflective of its most basic 
principles – that of learning by doing – as the operational dynamics of school 
management and curricular formation became key areas of revision and re-design. Yet 
with this re-organisation came the further involvement of state agencies within the 
Ministry of Education, which consequently opens up possible tensions between the 
drive for political autonomy and state-led management.  
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By and large, however, the basic values of IALA shine through in its everyday 
work, in both the campus and the wider communities. The general practice of 
encounters of knowledge (or, diálogo de saberes, as it is more commonly known), 
form the foundational constellation of principles with which IALA’s students engage 
with the surrounding agrarian communities in their radical pedagogical praxis. Yet as 
is so often the case with issues of food sovereignty, it was recognised that these forms 
of praxis must be significantly scaled-up in order to both extend the transformative 
potential of liberatory education as well as the raw productive power of combining 
and enlarging cooperative forms of production within and between various local farms 
(cf. McCune et al. 2014: 32; Agarwal, 2014: 1261).  
 These challenges were thus fully acknowledged by interview participants in 
IALA, in so far as the Bolivarian state has remained somewhat limited in its substantial 
promotion of agroecological practice. Both the prevalence of an urbanised population 
and the extensive presence of the state throughout the social fabric come together to 
paradoxically limit the full potential of grassroots autonomy and self-directed planning 
in the realm of food sovereignty, thus resulting in the mere reproduction of food 
security. Yet for these actors, the struggle continues, both within Venezuela and the 
larger ALBA space. And despite the relative recession of IALA’s transnational 
flavour, the values of ALBA continue to inspire and inform the praxis of 
agroecological pedagogy and political organisation.  
 What remains somewhat of a lacuna in all of these discussions within IALA is 
the relative silence on wider connections between agroecology and the larger spaces 
of agricultural production, particularly in the processing sectors. There was no real 
hostility to the use of high technology in the production of food, albeit used with due 
consideration to both ecological and labour concerns, yet it would seem that IALA is 
relatively confined to networking at the small farmer level. This does not, however, 
necessarily undermine the rationale for its existence; indeed, this is the primary 
function of the institute. But it does leave a gap in our understanding of the broader 
networks of agrarian production that take place under the auspices of ALBA.  
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6 The Political Economy of ALBA: 
Class Struggle Behind the Factory Gates 
 
This chapter will offer an in-depth qualitative analysis of the Empresas Mixtas 
Socialistas del ALBA-Arroz network of factories within the federated state of 
Portuguesa, Venezuela. Through first-hand interviews with workers at both the 
coordinator and factory-floor level, the proceeding case study aims to shed light on 
the political economy of ALBA’s Grandnational Enterprises, and the ways in which 
structural-macroeconomic forces and class strategies impact on the function and status 
of these spaces of production. As we will come to see, the specific factory regimes 
present within the ALBA-Arroz network are somewhat sui generis, albeit embodying 
a complex mix of politico-institutional features present in factory regimes typical of 
both capitalist and bureaucratic-statist political systems. The following interview 
analysis is therefore conducted across 5 of the 7 sites of the ALBA-Arroz network 
(Píritu I, Píritu II, Píritu III, Agua Blanca, Payara).50 The analysis will proceed through 
thematic sections, rather than a site-by-site review, given that many of the same 
questions (albeit within a semi-structured interview process) effectively yielded many 
of the same answers. Each site conducted at least two sets of interviews, one with the 
worker coordinators (i.e., those considered as a ‘worker’, though in a coordinating role 
for the entire workforce of the plant mediating between workers and upper 
management), and the other with a group interview conducted among lower level 
workers (from a range of different roles).51 Thus, references designating only location 
(e.g., Píritu I, Payara) refer to interviews with the coordinators, while those designating 
‘workers’ are among the lower levels of the workforce.  
 
6.1 Venezuela’s Empresas Mixtas Socialistas del ALBA factories: Origins and 
Challenges 
As we saw in Chapter 4, ALBA’s Empresas Mixtas Socialistas del ALBA (EMSAs) 
first took form on 24 January 2007 through the signing of a Cuban-Venezuelan letter 
of intent. In terms of the EMSAs dedicated to the production of rice (Empresas Mixtas 
																																								 																				
50 Two of the 7 sites are located in Guárico state, which were not incorporated into this study due to 
logistical difficulties and time constraints. 
51 For Píritu I and II, follow up interviews were conducted with the worker coordinators. 
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Socialistas del ALBA-Arroz), the first steps were taken through a bi-national survey 
and investigation, carried out by a Cuban team of 7, and two Venezuelan participants, 
into the possible locations for the establishment of these plants. It was later signed into 
Venezuelan law on 16 July 2007, and finalized on 22 November 2007 (Gaceta Oficial 
38.726, 2007a; Gaceta Oficial, 38.828, 2007b). The first installations of these firms 
came in 2008, with the Unidad Primaria de Producción Socialista (UPPS) ‘Río 
Guárico’, as well as the Píritu I and Payara plants, located in the states of Guárico and 
Portugesa. The latter two installations together comprise a potential production 
capacity of around 80 tons of processed rice per day with a workforce of 85 employees, 
and with technology acquired through a joint agreement with Brazil (Depablos, 2009).  
In 2009, the Bolivarian state expropriated the “Santa Ana Parabolizado” plant, 
also in the state of Portuguesa, owned by the US agro-industrial firm Cargill. 
According to the results of government inspections, Cargill had been found in 
“violation” of price control regulations, through the modification of its rice products 
(i.e., switching from Type-1 white rice, to pre-cooked rice), as well as for failing to 
mark its packaging with regulated prices, and the discovery of 18,000 tons of regulated 
white rice sitting in its warehouses (Suggett, 2009c). From this strategic move came 
ALBA-Arroz’s central productive unit, Píritu II.  
In 2010, these entities were transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Lands to the authority of the Venezuelan Food Corporation (CVAL), under the 
rationale that:  
“it is essential for the policies of agro-industry and agriculture to 
establish a system of functional centralisation for the organisation of 
State led guarantees of food security and sovereignty, as well as the just 
satisfaction of the needs of the people in order to improve production 
of those products of primary necessity and of a strategic character” 
(Gaceta Oficial 39.494, 2010b).  
It was envisaged that under the auspices of CVAL the entire “food chain” – from 
primary production to processing to distribution and consumption – would fall under 
the “model of socialist management” (ibid: 14). Institutionally speaking, the flow of 
goods thus emerges entirely under the auspices of CVAL, which may spontaneously 
order certain factories to redirect supplies of consumer goods to particular strategic 
outlets within the PDVAL or MERCAL networks (Interview, Píritu II, 11.05.2016). 
As of 2015, ALBA-Arroz maintained an operating budget of Bs 86,478,742, the 
highest of all the EMSAs (MPPAL, 2015: 42). 
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 The emergence of the EMSA’s follow the footsteps of Venezuela’s wider push 
towards the formation of Socialist Production Units (SPUs), which numbered between 
1,000-3,000 by 2009. SPU’s are thus oriented around three central goals: provision of 
above-average wages, locally sourced inputs from surrounding territory, and sale of 
goods at below-market prices (Larrabure, 2013: 183-4). All EMSAs follow these 
general protocols, as the following analysis will show. And yet, there exist numerous 
tensions and struggles in the development of Venezuela’s ‘social economy’.  
 
6.2 Losing in Order to Win? Class Struggles and Systemic Contradictions of the 
Social Economy  
On 8th of April, an article published in Portuguesa’s local newspaper, Ultima Hora, 
reported that the central ALBA-Arroz site, Píritu II, had been taken under occupation 
by the workforce the day before, ejecting then acting President of ALBA-Arroz, 
Arturo Aponte, and demanding the re-activation of production at the plant, which had 
reportedly sunk below 80% capacity. Among other complaints from the ALBA 
workers’ union representative, Tirso García, were the lack of raw material inputs from 
the local countryside, neglect of factory machinery and the lack of transport facilities 
for the workforce (Palencia, 2016). The ALBA union had called upon the minister of 
Agriculture and Lands, Wilmar Castro Soteldo, to enter negotiations with the workers 
to rectify the situation. As indicated by the secretary of the ALBA union, Héctor 
López, these deficiencies had also caused a complete paralysis in the supply of rice to 
the local communal councils (Hurtado, 2016). This manifestation of worker militancy 
offered two central opportunities to the pursuit of this research, for it had (firstly) 
presented a remarkably rare instance of class struggle taking place specifically within 
the ALBA-initiated production sites,52 and (secondly) seemingly excised the singular 
obstacle to gaining access to ALBA’s production sites (senior management). Eager to 
learn more about the circumstances of the workers’ dispute, and the current strategies 
they have for solving these problems, I headed to the factories before it was too late 
(and before a new president of ALBA-Arroz had been designated).  
As I sat down with the coordinator at the Píritu II plant, it was immediately 
clear that the problems affecting the ALBA factories stem from the same systemic 
																																								 																				
52 The only other major centre of worker struggle I am aware of is in ALBA’s fish processing plant, La 
Gaviota (see, Azzellini, 2015).  
	 	 184	
mechanisms afflicting the entire country, albeit in myriad forms: “Last year the 
country accumulated almost $200,000,000 through petroleum rent, and in this year, it 
gained not even $35,000,000” (Interview, Píritu II, 11.05.2016).53 However, the true 
source of the problem emerged through the course of the conversation, which fell 
mostly to aspects of the price structure: 
 “A kilo of paddy, which is shelled rice, was bought at 17Bs from the 
direct producer… But for us to produce a kilo of finished rice, we need 
two kilos of paddy. So that comes to 34Bs. And yet, we were selling at 
25Bs, which is the regulated price… So we are simply working under 
a loss. We have to pay for man-hours, packing material, electricity and 
gasoline, not to mention maintaining the machinery… It’s as if 
something costs 10 Euros to produce, and you sell it at 5.” (Interview, 
Píritu II, 11.05.2016) 
Compounding this difficulty is the rate of inflation, which adds considerable costs to 
the price of inputs. For instance, at the Píritu I plant, the cost of maintaining the 
industrial rubber roller used during the hulling process had been 30,000Bs five months 
previously, whereas today it would be 170,000Bs. However, these sums are (for the 
time being) relatively small; as I was told, the main concern is the restoration of the 
milling equipment, which had been badly worn out, yet could be solved for a relatively 
small sum (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016). What remained the central concern was 
the rate of inflation that created major problems in terms of crafting production plans; 
the time it takes to analyse the necessary values for a given purchase often undermines 
the very same process, as by the time a solution is obtained, the values no longer hold 
(Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2016).  
 Interwoven with these problems were wider issues with national infrastructure, 
particularly in the area of electricity. Since 2002, the state has taken on more and more 
of the nation’s electricity generation operations, now standing at 90 percent (Massabié, 
2008: 193). As a consequence of government regulatory rules, virtually all state-run 
energy entities operate without profits, due mainly to increased energy consumption 
along with subsidized prices to consumers, leading to the transfer of billions of dollars 
in ground rent to maintain the system. Yet chronic under-investment has incurred a 
																																								 																				
53 The figures cited in this participant’s testimony are, in fact, quite off the mark. In 2015, the value of 
Venezuela’s petroleum exports amounted to $35 billion, while for 2016, the figure dropped to $25 
billion (OPEC, 2017: 20). I would argue that the wild discrepancy between the numbers cited in the 
testimony – positing a difference between 200 and 35 – merely reflects, in discursive form, the social 
strain experience by Venezuelans due to the objective drop in oil revenues.  
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marked increase in power failures, from 8 in 1994 to 84 in 2005 (ibid: 196). The Guri 
hydroelectric dam, which generates around 70 percent of the country’s electricity is 
also highly vulnerable to drought conditions, with the last major drought-induced 
reduction in 2002-3. However, with another severe drought during the summer of 
2016, the Guri facility experienced a major drop off in supply, which led to emergency 
measures of nation-wide rationing (Koerner, 2016a). As a result, virtually every 
business sector – from manufacturing to retail – became subject to closures and 
planned downtime. The Píritu I plant reported an average of 4 hours per day in 
downtime due to electricity shortages (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2015). Thus, the 
operational capacity of the factories has taken a severe hit, reducing production 
capacity from 1.3m kilos to 300-400 kilos per month (Interview Píritu II, 11.05.2016).  
 The workers’ occupation therefore approximates one of the primary steps in 
the longer struggle towards a type of labour-centered development, at least in terms of 
(temporarily) seizing productive infrastructures, which in itself resembles a nascent 
form of counter-space. Nevertheless, the specific labour relations prevailing within the 
factory are a far cry from those officially promoted by the ALBA region, in terms of 
socialisation in the means of production. Thus, organisational practices and 
bureaucratic structures continue to frustrate the smooth operation of this strategic set 
of production units.  
 
6.3 Despotic Power in the Social Economy 
The presence of a large, multi-layered bureaucracy seemed to represent a major 
bottleneck in terms of how information is exchanged, and the efficiency with which 
decisions could be taken: 
 “What remains one of the biggest problems in the first place is 
communication, because we are managing information here that varies 
a great deal from the information that they have above. For example, 
they will be thinking that we are producing at 80 or 90% capacity, 
whereas we are more like 10%... Until recently the ‘situation room’ in 
the Republic of Venezuela didn’t know anything. I even spoke to a 
friend of mine who works in these circles, and they haven’t been to 
these sites since 2012… As far as the situation room is concerned, we 
don’t exist.” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016)  
For some, the problem became rooted in a certain pattern of governmental organisation 
and policy management, in which functional administration became subject to 
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pressures of personal clientelism: “The question is whether the process completes as 
it should, and that there is no favouritism or nepotism, or because you know a minister 
which means that the plants are always reported as ‘perfect’” (Interview, Píritu III 
workers, 30.06.2016). Yet issues of communication were also found wanting inside 
the factories themselves, whereby management structures typical of capitalist firms 
tended to dominate the day to day operations of the plants. For some, this amounted 
to a sub-optimal form of workplace organisation:  
“Let’s say a person assigned to sweeping picks up a screw from the 
floor, a screw that should have been attached to a fixture above, this 
person knows the problem, and so the screw could be replaced so that 
it doesn’t cause more damage. But if you don’t talk to people, not even 
the person that sweeps the floor, how are you going to know about the 
fallen screw? Structurally speaking, in terms of this company, this is 
where we are administratively.” (Interview, Píritu II workers, 
28.06.2016) 
This points towards the strategic necessity of including all workers into a more fluid 
space of communication and strategic planning. Even for the supervisory strata of 
workers, this rigidity at the top of the firm is quite debilitating: “When you are a 
president you have to talk with the workers, with the commune [comuna], with the 
people, because you work in a socialist company, and you have to have this conviction 
because you’re a socialist.” As I was later told, the previous president was 
“egocentric”: “he was a despot, and we are not accustomed to working in this way” 
(Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016). Instead of approaching problems through the 
utilization of the living labour force that attains its knowledge through the everyday 
experiences of daily production, the perceived problems experienced by the ALBA-
Arroz network are ‘solved’ through the simple rotation of personnel at the top level of 
management, particularly the presidency. To the workforce, this appears as nothing 
less than the operation of bureaucracy, inefficient planning, and often outright 
corruption and fraud: “there is a very famous saying here: ‘No me des, ponme donde 
hay’ [Don’t give it to me, put me where it is]” (Interview, Píritu II workers, 28 June 
2016).54  
 This aspect of bureaucracy and its potentially adverse impact on socio-
economic planning also pertained to the specific transformation of the firms under the 
																																								 																				
54 The above translation represents a more precise reflection of the Spanish phrase quoted. However, in 
the context of the conversation the fuller meaning would translate to something like: “Don’t just give 
me stolen funds, put me at the source and I can steal it for myself.” 
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ALBA accord (transforming them into Socialist Mixed Enterprises). As I was told by 
other workers this led to a diminishment of overall capacity to satisfy needs under 
already tight macro-economic conditions. In terms of the Píritu III plant (used for 
storing and the preliminary conditioning of raw product):  
 “We used to receive anything: cereals, corn, rice, whatever comes, we 
were ready and we could process all of it, but they passed us on to 
ALBA Arroz, and they limited us, that you have to be pure rice, where 
right now Venezuela is passing through a huge crisis that we cannot put 
a limit on what we do. Already we have shortages of flour, of pasta, 
sugar, of everything. We cannot be married to just one product; we have 
to be open to everything. There are peasants that are producing corn, 
there’s corn in the fields, and there is a paralyzed plant that is capable 
of receiving corn. Why don’t we receive corn? Bureaucracy!” 
(Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2016) 
The eventual narrowing from a multi-product capacity to merely the processing of rice 
paddy represented a marked contradiction of overall plant utilization, which as I was 
informed could be returned to its previous status merely through the simple process of 
switching sieves and filters for sifting particular grains (Interview, Píritu III workers, 
30.06.2016). There was therefore a perceptible level of uncertainty as to the next stage 
of ALBA-Arroz, and to whether these bottlenecks would be sufficiently dealt with: 
“I don’t know how this president [of the factory] is going to do. We 
have proposed to lend services to other clients, that they will transfer 
us to another ministry, or even transfer the company to the workers 
because we know how to work and to generate our own investments 
necessary to pay our workforce without being dependent on any 
ministry. So far they have told us nothing, and we continue to wait, and 
even looking for clients in the meantime so that we get enough product 
to carry on… without having to wait for the government to pay for 
everything. That would be one way, that they give us the opportunity 
to generate our own investments by means of simply working the plant 
as such…The knowledge that we have, the practical skills that we have, 
knowing how to manage practically everything. This is the key.” 
(Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2016) 
This last aspect was particularly central to how the philosophy of ALBA – with its 
focus on a social economy organised by the popular sectors, i.e. self-management – is 
capable of emerging from the current struggles taking places within its centres of 
production. Yet it is strikingly clear that, despite the purported aims of ALBA’s 
political economic model, the further entrenchment of factory despotism, and the 
separation between manual and intellectual labour, considerably thwarts any attempt 
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towards a substantial move towards worker power and a new model of production 
based around self-management.   
 
6.4 Self-Management Deflected: The Struggle Against Statism 
The issue of self-management (autogestión) was a topic I was particularly keen to 
broach, and eager to understand more about the status of this potential form of socio-
economic organisation and ownership, a form that is at least rhetorically promoted by 
the ALBA accords of 2012. In my conversation with the coordinator at the Píritu I 
plant, I asked whether ALBA-Arroz had ever been organised under such a worker-led 
regime; the answer was quite straightforward: “No, never. We are completely 
centralised” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016). Nevertheless, it was firmly believed that 
the workforce possessed the functional capacity to undertake the transition towards 
self-management: 
“The point is that everyone already knows what to do. There is no need 
for someone to come from the outside and tell me what to do, and I 
certainly don’t have to go with a whip to supervisors telling them what 
to do with their work teams. Here, everyone works within their area, 
with conviction and in order to get the job done… So I think that if they 
were to put us in a position of self-management, I think we would have 
the capacity to do it.” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016) 
Other workers were quick to highlight the potential benefits that might come from 
moving beyond an over-centralised form of economic management: 
“I think that if there is help from the top, from the ministry or even the 
presidency in order to elevate this company monetarily, at least to 
guarantee inputs, I think it could work; if there is direct help from 
above, without all of these bureaucratic levels that paralyzes you, but a 
direct line where you might say, ‘Look we need the raw material’, and 
it is simply guaranteed to you.” (Interview, Píritu I workers, ".06.2016) 
The general understanding of the degree of self-management capacity was also shared 
among other workers, below the level of the coordinator segment of the workforce: 
“Chávez used to say, ‘you don’t have to wait for me to tell you what to 
do, if you already know what to do’… I mean you don’t have to be 
someone from NASA to fix a machine.” (Interview, Píritu III workers, 
30.06.2016) 
“We know that this company does not move without the workers. The 
workers are those that operate this plant, without the workers the 
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machinery doesn’t move, the equipment doesn’t move, but we still need 
a management structure inside this plant, to maintain an order.” 
(Interview, Píritu I workers, 29.06.2016) 
Throughout out these discussions, however, it became clear that the immediate change 
in the relations of production, and in the structure of ownership and control over the 
plant, was not the top priority for those working at the ALBA-Arroz factories: “In this 
moment we are not looking to be self-managing, but in the long term it certainly could 
be” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016). Instead, the severity of the crisis and the intense 
desire to bring the factory back into production seemed to top all other considerations. 
If anything, the main priority seemed to revolve around the acquisition of competent 
management personnel, those with specific training and knowledge in the area of rice 
production, rather than the imposition of “military men” (Interview, Píritu I workers, 
29.06.2016). Coordinators at the Píritu I plant had similar conclusions about the 
strategic necessity of acquiring high-level personnel with the necessary skills and 
knowledge: 
“The presidents that come here, none of them come with the same 
preparation, nor do they know much about processing rice… So, the 
presidents are not so clear about how the system really works, as they 
are administrative types, like management is, as is the industrialisation 
department. They don’t have knowledge of this, and a lot of them come 
because the know someone, because they have influence with some 
ministry, or the president of CVAL.” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016)   
However, the more pressing issue of how any transition towards a substantial form of 
self-management might come about proved to be the most worrisome for the majority 
of participants.  
“There was a time when Chávez said, ‘you are going to be the owners 
of these companies, so that your work becomes self-sustainable’, but 
what we have now is another protocol, from above, ministers, vice-
presidents; this is the fear that exists. Perhaps they believe that things 
are going to change from Chavista to opposition, this is the internal 
political conflict…” (Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2016) 
Thus, “internal conflict” appeared as a form of political uncertainty within a period of 
severe social crisis, in which high-level state managers supposedly retreated into 
trench-like positions of defence, rather than pressing forward in the movement towards 
a genuinely ‘social economy’. For others, however, the question boiled down to issues 
of pure power struggle: 
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“They won’t allow it [transition towards self-management] because 
those that control will not relinquish it. Even though they are 
asphyxiating you and strangling you, and they know that what they are 
doing to you is bad, they are not going to let go of you, because it’s 
about power. When one has power, it’s very difficult to let it go. We 
imagine that what you suggest is an alternative, because we have 
suggested the same ourselves. But do you believe that those above are 
going to say: ‘I’m going to give 300 million Bs to the workers at ALBA 
Arroz and that they shall administer, buy the raw material, pay wages, 
that they will have this company there, and I will do nothing here’? You 
know that this is not going to happen, because you are talking about 
losing control, and losing power.” (Interview, Píritu II workers, 28 June 
2016) 
Curious as to this potentially fatal end to the future of self-management, I asked 
whether there is anything they (as workers) can do to remedy the situation, or even 
struggle against recalcitrant forces that may stand in the way of this development:  
 
“We have tried, but what do they send us? National Guard, SEBIN, PTJ, 
CICPC, police”55 
 
Against you? 
 
“Of course.” 
 
So what can you do? 
 
“Cry.” 
 
Do you think there is any way Chávez’s dream can be saved from below? 
“We can achieve this change inside a new structure of socialism; it is 
possible. But they will have to change the oxygen; they will have to 
admit that they were wrong and rectify their mistakes; or we are going 
to do what you are talking about, we are going to create a type of self-
management, something that should be autonomous, to begin to capture 
ideas, but something that is true” (Interview, Píritu II workers, 28 June 
2016). 
																																								 																				
55 It should be noted that this worker’s reference to the deployment of state violence against workers, 
although unverifiable in the context of the ALBA factories, is a continuing problem within Fifth 
Republic (see Janicke, 2008). 
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The above conversations pointed to a number of positions assumed by the 
consciousness and orientation of the workforce towards issues of self-management, as 
the necessary material ingredient in the substantial transition towards the social 
economy. Firstly, the immediacy of their crisis – the paralysis of production in the 
context of general mal-distribution of food – promoted an immediate desire to get the 
company back to capacity, whether under older management structures or not. 
Secondly, in the medium (or long) term, aspects of self-management were viewed as 
not only desirable from the consideration of operational efficiency but also as a 
centrally organic component of Bolivarianismo, to which all participants expressed a 
firm attachment. Indeed, this affective expression towards the political terrain of social 
transformation was more often shown to be positive when talking about the ideas and 
philosophy, indeed, the “teachings” of a pedagogical figure in the form of Chávez, 
rather than with the contemporary political class as such. The latter, in contrast, were 
often the target of the most severe criticism, which led to the third major component 
of the discussions about self-management – that its future potential was seriously 
hindered by the struggles for power going on inside the state apparatus itself, and 
throughout the political terrain of chavismo.  
 
6.5 Food Sovereignty Scales Up: Opportunities and Challenges of Industrialism 
Given the nature of these factories, formed under the auspices of ALBA and therefore 
theoretically in line with its mandate to secure food sovereignty for the peoples of the 
host country (in this case Venezuela), I was curious to understand more about how the 
workforce understood this concept and how it impacted upon the ways they 
approached their overall strategies. Many of the immediate answers were more 
strongly aligned to the paradigm of food security, rather than food sovereignty per se, 
for instance, “assuring that the people have access to food, and to try and bring it to 
them directly, without the use of intermediaries (Interview Píritu III, 30.16.2016); or: 
“To guarantee every Venezuelan or every family their food, that no one 
is left out, from the poorest to the richest, and that there is a distribution 
to all without exception, and that this food comes at a just price, or a 
real price – a just price for the Venezuelan, which should also be a just 
price for the industry” (Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016) 
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Yet it was also made abundantly clear that this urge to satisfy the food supply and food 
needs of the country would not come about solely through the use of state-led 
industrial enclaves scattered throughout a vast countryside to the exclusion of other 
rural actors. Rather, a dynamic integration between them constituted the key driving 
force towards the making of a truly independent food sovereignty regime:  
“I think that in this part of the process [i.e. industrial plants] it should 
not be doing 100% of the process. I think that it is to the small producers 
where they [the government] have to come and say: ‘continue as you 
are, continue the struggle, we’re going to continue helping you, we will 
finance whatever shortfalls you have, whether its technical assistance 
or whatever. Why did you stop farming those lands? Instead you should 
increase the amount of lands you produce.’ Here for me is where the 
ultimate foundation lies, in stopping the importation of food, and thus 
where lies the triumph of food sovereignty and food security of the 
country – in the countryside. The plants, those that process, are merely 
a fixture, because if the fields don’t bring me raw material, what am I 
going to process? It is here, in the countryside, in the fields, where the 
true strength of food sovereignty consists, in partnership with the small, 
medium and large producers.” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016) 
As the coordinator further explained to me, there are abundant channels of investment 
through which the strengthening of the countryside might be realised, through the 
provision of credits, tools, technical assistance and legal support. Via this partnership, 
it is thought that a bilateral contract would then emerge between peasant and state, 
where (for example) credits given would be returned through payments in kind: 
“Before the revolution, it was the same but this time through the private 
firms. However, according to government studies, the private sector did 
not cover every producer, but rather favoured the large producers, with 
the small peasantry left out… So what was Chávez’s vision? To try to 
capture all of those people that could sow any type of crop for the 
struggle for food sovereignty. As comandante Chávez put it, ‘Come to 
me and we can work together’ [Ven a mí que tengo flor]. That was the 
vision, to help the small and large producers, and to bring them to the 
state industries, through the state, with the expectation that those in 
receipt of government help would in turn sell their product to the same 
people.” (Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016)56 
As it turned out, the major bottleneck in the smooth functioning of the ALBA-Arroz 
network derived from the lack of raw materials supplied from the surrounding fields. 
																																								 																				
56 The expectation of a contractually reciprocal relationship between peasant and state was sought as a 
way out of the common problem in which direct producers would receive state aid in order to complete 
a harvest, and simply sell their product to the private sector (Interview, Agua Blanca workers, 
30.06.2016).  
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I wondered initially whether this was due to the traditional problem of urban flight, 
and whether there was enough labour in the countryside capable of supplying the 
requisite industrial capacity. However, I was firmly told that the agricultural labour 
force had not moved at all, and are still producing their plots as normal, even if under 
varying conditions of difficulty (Interview, Payara workers, 30.06.2016). In one 
respect, the constricted price structure within which direct producers from Portuguesa 
must operate (in terms of fixed, state mandated farm-gate prices coupled with 
inflationary input costs) incentivises switching out of rice production, and dedicating 
more land to non-regulated products in order to cross-subsidize their remaining losses 
from rice (Purcell, 2017: 309). As such, production during 2014-2015 took a 
precipitous decline (see Figure 11). Given falling rice volumes, peasants may also seek 
higher unit prices for their output in order to cover their losses, often resulting in a 
switch towards the private sector: 
 “The problem is the private companies buy the paddy [raw material] 
for 100Bs [per kilo], whereas we buy it for 70. And to whom are the 
producers going to sell? To whoever is willing to give them more. 
Sometimes they even buy it for 120Bs, just to engage in dirty 
competition, buying at 120 so they can sell it to the people at 400.” 
(Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016) 
Yet while falling land area under cultivation is a major problem, it is not the only cause 
of falling output. While Purcell (2017: 309) takes surface area (hectares, ha/s) as a 
proxy for output levels, on closer inspection of Figure 12, even if surface area and 
output are mostly positively correlated, this is not always the case. For 2008-2009 and 
2011-2012, total hectares under use for rice production increased by 738ha/s and 
5,493ha/s (respectively), while total yield decreased by 116,693tns and 24,184tns 
(respectively). These sporadic negative correlations would therefore have to be 
explained by a number of other factors, which may be partly shaped by the specific 
materiality of the crop in question. Unlike corn (maíz), the production of rice remains 
prone to a number of complications that may adversely impact crop development, such 
as weeds, viruses, bacteria, fungi, and a large variety of underbrush, many of which 
are resistant to chemicals due to the rapid rate of genetic mutation (Interview, Píritu 
II, 11.05.2016).57 Interestingly, and somewhat inconsistently with the general  
																																								 																				
57 The material resilience of corn probably helps to partly explain why production levels have seen a 
secular increase for the past 15 years, as in Figure 11. 
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   Figure 11: Production volumes (metric tons) of Rice, Corn, Sorghum 
   Source: FEDEAGRO  
	
 
 
   Figure 12: Ratios of surface area (hectares) to yield (metric tons) of rice production. 
   Source: FEDEAGRO 
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approach to food sovereignty, the use of transgenics was invoked by one participant 
as a potential solution to these myriad problems in the process of rice cultivation: “We 
have laws against transgenics, though transgenics are not necessarily bad, you just 
have to know how to use them” (Interview, Píritu II, 11.05.2016). Nevertheless, the 
main concern with such techniques is rather the pattern of ownership and control over 
their distribution, not necessarily the agro-ecological impact: 
 “Our agriculture is very depressed. This is because everything that is 
brought to the process is imported, the chemicals, seeds, transgenics… 
The problem is that Monsanto manages the Roundup molecule, and has 
a strain of soy that is resistant to Roundup. They manage the monopoly, 
and this company has effectively monopolised the economy of the 
country.” (Interview, Píritu II, 11.05.2016)  
It was understood that the problem of foreign monopolization was considerably 
aggravated by the overall structure of agrarian production in Venezuela, which was 
contrasted sharply with other agrarian based societies: 
“I had the opportunity to be in Haiti, in Cuba and in Iran, with the state, 
and there it is different. There they have better productivity but more 
people working per hectare. There everything is by hand. Here in 
Venezuela everything is industrialised and mechanised. In Iran, 
practically everything is manually produced, one or two people per 
hectare. It’s a rice that is distinctly natural and without chemical inputs. 
In Venezuela it is different. We have been introduced to a lot of things; 
at most our ancestors managed rice in a much cleaner way. Here there 
have been problems of compactification… which has degraded the 
soil… A lot of producers have changed to corn, that have changed to 
sugar cane, or even live-stocking, simply because of costs, even though 
Venezuela has the advantage of having two production periods per 
year, one during the dry and one during the rainy season.” (Interview, 
Píritu II, 11.05.2016) 
Thus, Venezuela’s highly industrialised form of agrarian production makes it 
considerably more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global markets and foreign firms 
related to agro-industrial inputs and biotech, in clear distinction to more labour-
intensive methods found elsewhere. The path dependence of Venezuela’s production 
practices was well understood, and that the peasantry could not immediately switch 
out of more conventional farming practices: 
“You might say to the small producer, ‘we’re going to stop using agro-
chemicals’. But the producer comes from a very old culture that has 
been applying these inputs for decades. So you could say, ‘we’re going 
to substitute chemicals for agro-ecological inputs’, but the producer 
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will say, ‘well, let’s do a test and see the result’. The thing is, they prefer 
quick results. In the case of insecticides and other chemicals that are 
stronger the producers can see the results, above all in economic 
savings… To incentivise these practices will take time, but it can be 
done. You can incentivise it by saying that ecologically there is less 
damage to the environment, it’s going to have better strength in 
germination for the crops, the food grown will be cleaner, and you can 
suggest this to the producer because they are primarily the ones who 
will be consuming their own food. It’s very much an iterative process, 
little by little. But people put into practice only that which accords to 
their circumstances, to the way they are living.” (Interview, Píritu I 
workers, 29.06.2016) 
As with many of the participant responses found at the IALA School, the ALBA 
factory workers were well aware of the major challenges faced in the transition 
towards a viable food sovereignty model. Older industrial practices, as well as the 
entrenched methods of production adopted by the peasantry, represent two inter-
locking obstacles towards the re-organisation of the entire production chain, from the 
acquisition of agro-ecologically based inputs to the contradictory dynamics inherent 
in facilitating adequate levels and prices of raw product through the transfer of ground 
rent. Overcoming such obstacles thus requires the concerted cooperation between 
those working throughout the social economy, in both the factory and field.  
 
6.6 Factory Points and Communal Circles: The Political Economy of chavismo 
As well as assessing the immediate problems facing the ALBA-Arroz network, and 
the ways in which the current patterns and contradictions of rice farming in Venezuela 
converged or diverged with the overall goals of food sovereignty, much of the 
conversations meandered around more general considerations of politics and 
economics, which provided some insight into the overall political consciousness of the 
interviewees, and the concomitant solutions and strategic orientations that were 
informed by these understandings. A significant number of participants continued to 
express support for the state and the public sector, despite the enormity of the problems 
faced by the workforce: 
“I voted for Maduro, I voted for PSUV to the AN, and I’m not going to 
sign anything against my revolutionary compañeros. That’s not my 
form of being. I have clear and precise guidelines, I know towards 
where I should be going. Sadly, there are things in the government, as 
with all governments, which are proving to be very difficult problems, 
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or at least precise problems… However, there has not been a coup 
because there are a lot of Venezuelans that are conscious, that the 
government is trying to do the most it can to reassure food for the 
people. They are trying to find alternatives. The problem is we don’t 
have leadership. Maduro is trying but it is costing him a lot.” 
(Interview, Píritu II, 11.05.2016) 
Clearly the affective content underlying this discourse shows a positive orientation 
towards the political class, even if expressed in a highly qualified form. Yet these 
sentiments were not merely expressed through feelings of loyalty to the state or the 
associated political parties constituent of it, but also through the organic connections 
established throughout the wider communal space of Bolivarianismo; for instance, in 
the ‘Point and Circle’ initiative, “an idea bequeathed to us by our president Hugo 
Chávez Frias, to be closer to the people and to help them in any way we can” 
(Interview, Píritu III, 30.6.2016). This conception of socio-spatial change was 
envisioned by Chávez as a means of transforming the social landscape in the service 
of building socialism, though without necessarily “expropriating” the private sector in 
its entirety (i.e., manufacturing, medical services, education etc.). Rather, the emphasis 
is placed upon specific locales (e.g., a state-run factory) which act as springboards for 
the molecular process of transforming the values, consciousness and practices of the 
surrounding social spaces and their associated activities (whether economic, political 
or otherwise). One example of this strategy was seen during my conversation with the 
coordinator at the Payara plant, periodically checking his watch, and seemingly in 
anticipation of another meeting: 
“Right now I am waiting for the communal council because they are 
managing 30 tons of rice for the town of Payara. And that’s what we 
are doing, we are bringing the vanguard in direct contact with the 
people: company to people, communities, peasant councils, community 
councils, and communes. This is the alliance we have that helps 
guarantee food sovereignty and to combat the economic war that has 
befallen this country.” (Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016) 
Despite the utility of this Point and Circle strategy, there were no illusions as to the 
scale of the problems that afflicted this process of socialisation, particularly in the 
views of lower levels of the workforce. As one group expressed to me: 
“Since about 2013, we’ve seen a diminishment in this type of political 
formation. We don’t know if this was lost by those that were in the 
company as such, those who lead, but it was degenerating, and in turn 
this had a bearing on the community because when we started in 2007 
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the presence of the plant and the workers towards the communities was 
protagonistic; it helped for instance towards a nutritional census, and it 
helped us to estimate what the community needed in terms of food 
supply… But even before the onset of the economic situation we have 
now, we had stopped seeing this help of the government towards the 
communities, and this disinterest was seen many times in the ways in 
which communities started to look at us with suspicion, because we had 
stopped helping them, and so the community had started to feel 
mistreated. A lot of times the community said: ‘Before they gave us a 
bag of food and now they don’t need us, they are already in power’.” 
(Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2013) 
Somewhat more ambiguous were the precise sources of these problems. At a very 
general level, it was expressed that there was a certain amount of (perhaps almost 
inevitable) contradictions, or at least complications, involved in such comprehensive 
transformations: 
“There are always internal problems, there will always be 
organisational problems, at least in the world of industrial management 
– there are always ideas, necessities, but beyond that, it’s an 
organisational problem embedded in this transformation for the future. 
There is a model crafted through the ministry of food or through CVAL 
that they are giving to ALBA Arroz in order to improve it, but any 
industrial change of this sort generates fear, uncertainty, mistrust, but 
you have to see it from the point of view of the economy as a whole.” 
(Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016) 
Upon elaboration of this point, it soon became clear that what was at stake was not 
necessarily the structural transformation of socio-economic parameters for the sake of 
re-adjusting the coordinates of economic activity, but the overall socio-cultural 
attitudes and practices of the population at large – a sentiment that emerged clearly 
from the following interaction: 
 
“What happens is that there is a culture here, where no one is accustomed to 
gaining 30% or 20%, but rather everyone is seeking 100% gain. Have you ever 
eaten an empenada?” 
 
Sure. 
 
“How much do you pay for it?” 
 
About 300Bs 
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“And how much is a kilo of flour?” 
 
No idea 
“A kilo of flour is 180Bs and an empanada they sell you is around 200-
300. You know how many empenadas you can get out of a kilo of flour? 
Almost 20? This is the problem that we have, of consciousness – that 
we are not accustomed, like those developing countries that profit some 
given percent, like 20 or 30, but here no. Here everyone wants to profit 
150%. Or take another example, a tomato; ask here how much a tomato 
is, they are going to say to you 600Bs, but go to Acarigua and its 800. 
There is just no uniformity of prices; everyone manages the price 
differently. So there is no equilibrium among prices in this economy 
and that has an impact on inflation … No one has had the consciousness 
to adapt to profiting only a certain percent… so this is one of the wars 
that the government is battling. To battle this inflation we should make 
30% the maximum margin for foreign companies.” (Interview, Payara, 
06.07.2016) 
I ask him about what role the difference in exchange rate makes, and what should be 
done about it, to which he merely replied that this was the work of “the economists”, 
in order to find a solution, “not that this social group or that social group wins, but that 
everyone wins”. In relation to this last point, the coordinator also referred to 
governmental measures in early 2016 that opened up a wider space of participation for 
the private sector in the management of economic problems. While the existence of a 
“tactical alliance” between the government and certain allied-fractions of Venezuelan 
capital had been in place since the oil lockout in 2002-2003 (Marín and Ellner, 2015), 
the Maduro administration has placed a renewed impetus on the formation of new 
tactical alliances with the private sector in order to battle the nation-wide economic 
crisis. In February of 2016, Maduro had appointed Miguel Pérez Abad, a former 
businessman and ex-president of the business lobby FEDEINDUSTRIA (representing 
small and medium sized firms), to the Vice-Presidency for Productive Economy, 
replacing the left-wing political economist Luis Salas (Koerner, 2016b).58 Since then, 
Abad noted that more than 90% of the private sector had been in dialogue with the 
government, carried out through weekly meetings at the National Economic Council 
(Lorca, 2016). One prominent and recent example in the state of Portuguesa (surely in 
																																								 																				
58 Abad had been a long-time business ally of chavismo, and whose replacement of Salas was most 
likely a highly coordinated affair. Just a few months before Salas’ exit from his post, he was reported 
as saying that there existed “honest” business people in Venezuela with which the government could 
work, such as Abad (Correo del Orinoco, 2016b). 
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the mind of my interview participant in Payara) was the establishment of a partnership 
between local private producers and the Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y 
Producción (Local Provision and Production Committees) to supply more than 250 
tons of food. As the Secretary for Food Security and Sovereignty in Portuguesa, 
Akalapeizime Castro, explained, the alliance was based upon the participation of 
“responsible businessmen that receive raw material from the Corporation of 
Agricultural Supply and Service (CASA), and in turn dispatches us part of their final 
product” (cited in AVN, 2016). In addition, such moves have recently recorded a 
striking level of support from the public, with 75% of Venezuelans holding a 
favourable view of the government’s dialogue with the private sector (Alavarado, 
2016), and 74% approval of a common strategy of price setting with private businesses 
(Correo del Orinico, 2016c). In relation to this socio-political context, it was explained 
to me that: 
“It’s not only us that has problems in the area of rice, the private 
companies have felt it and have lowered production margins – I have 
friends in the private companies; we have shared ideas and we will 
solve the problem together, not only the state… If we come together 
and don’t lose perspective we are going to be able to have a better 
country… He who thinks that he is simply harming the state [by 
engaging in hoarding or price speculation] is in fact harming the entire 
country, and we are all the country…. Obviously we have to work with 
a supply and demand, but we are going to work with the supply and 
demand where everyone wins, win-win, where the business man wins 
and the consumer wins, through the 30%  [profit] cap, which would be 
my recommendation – because there is no real price, it turns into a 
speculative price, and then you have mega inflation which simply 
misaligns the whole economy.” (Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016) 
The above clearly refers to the 2011 Law for the Control of Fair Costs, Prices and 
Profits, updated in 2013 that stipulates a 30% profit cap for companies across the board 
(Robertson, 2013; 2014). For my participant, this policy was not so much a line in the 
sand for the cooperation of the private sector, but rather the basis through which 
cooperative relations and economic health would go hand in hand: 
“I think that in the medium term this is going to get solved but not only 
through the state, but also through the private sector which has to help 
and collaborate, and that shares ideas and thoughts so that we might 
grow as a company… we need to manage supply and demand but that 
we also compete in the same area on the basis of the quality of the 
product, not to compete on price, because when we compete on price, 
we affect the whole collective, we affect our food. We have to respect 
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the rules of the game, that this percentage [of profit margin] is 
maintained and that we solve things internally. If one has to form a 
structure of costs, we’re going to do it together. You’re not going to 
make one, and I make another. We do it together; we’re going to work 
and construct this country together, through free thought. You can 
think, everyone can, but in maintaining the rules, and knowing that 
there is a state that assures these things… I assure you that there [UK] 
the rules are followed, ‘rules’ in the economic sense; there are standards 
of prices or a policy that reflects your country, I believe that no one is 
going to violate that. Even if you are against the State, you should not 
want that economy to fail. We always have to look at the wellbeing of 
the collective, we cannot have individualist thought; we have to think 
in the collective so that the country can prosper.” (Interview, Payara, 
06.07.2016) 
As can be seen from these comments, quite apart from the somewhat scattered musings 
on economic strategy, the emerging sentiment was clearly oriented around the faith in 
state-led management in conjunction with other (private sector) actors in the service 
of collective wellbeing, which is entirely in line with ALBA’s general principles 
concerning a ‘mixed economy’ composed of various forms of property (cf. Aponte-
García, 2011). Nevertheless, there is a raft of tensions and complexities involved in 
such cross-class collaboration, particularly in light of Venezuela’s unique systemic 
crisis. At the most general level, the above comments seem to indicate a type of ‘native 
bourgeoisie’ perspective – a political outlook characteristic of the post-war ISI 
development model, in which a forward-looking capitalist class would (in the words 
of the coordinator, above), “look at the wellbeing of the collective”. And yet, as 
Chibber (2005: 162) points out, “State managers… laboured under the impression that, 
since their agenda was devoted to strengthening national capitalism, it would elicit the 
support of national capitalists.” Such an impression, as Chibber further notes, was 
quite unwarranted, given that the systemic conditions under which Latin American 
firms operated (tight domestic markets and monopoly positions) militated against 
innovation and upgrading, which thus led to a stagnant rate of accumulation. By and 
large, it was precisely because the state did not (or could not) directly intervene into 
the investment/production decisions of national firms that the latter so easily 
maintained rules of reproduction that ultimately served their own narrow interest.  
 It would seem that the Venezuelan state is, perhaps out of tactical desperation, 
leaning more heavily towards the participation of the private sector in kick-staring 
production. Indeed, as Abad noted in May 2017 (this time as head of the Banco 
Bicentenario, one of Venezuela’s leading public banks), the 1999 constitution, as well 
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as the (currently proposed) new Constituent Assembly (2017), guarantees the right to 
private property in the means of production, “as an instrument of democracy” (cited 
in Noticia al Dia, 2017). However, the standoff between the state and domestic capital 
remains. As Abad noted elsewhere, “In 2016 practically not a single dollar was given 
to the private sector, they are working with their own effort” (cited in Marco, 2017). 
This drop off in the rate of appropriate of ground rent (mediated by an over-valued 
currency) is largely the result of a raft of corrupt practices carried out by the private 
sector, including expatriation of ground rent, overseas asset purchasing, and outright 
fraud through ghost imports, which (in conjunction with a lower absolute volume of 
oil rents) disincentivises the constant transferral of rent to capital (cf. Dachevsky and 
Kornblihtt, 2016; Yaffee, 2015). Thus, whether in the form of individual 
appropriations of state-mediated ground rent, or whether (as we saw in the previous 
section) investment decisions are guided by differential price movements rather than 
producing for key consumables (e.g., rice), capitalists pursue merely the accumulation 
of capital (through whatever means) rather than production for the ‘public good’.  
On average, workers displayed a higher propensity for such scepticism, 
particularly blaming the state and associated political functionaries or leaders: 
“The truth is I don’t believe him [Maduro], that things are not so bad, 
because of this situation we have… he says: ‘Be calm, we are not going 
hungry.’ But we are going hungry, the Venezuelan is going through 
hunger and crisis, and no one speaks of what comes. The only thing that 
we are waiting for is for God to come. He who commands is God, and 
it is he who gives and takes away… But we continue struggling and 
hoping for what will come. Those that stay are our children that are 
living in difficult times. It’s difficult, but we are struggling on.” 
(Interview, Píritu II workers, 28 June, 2016) 
As I was further told, these aspects become significantly aggravated through the 
ossification of political discourse, and the concomitant inability to adapt to political 
circumstances: 
“If you analyse this system, but look at the discourse, it’s always the 
same: economic war, los gringos, the invasion, imperialism, and people 
dying of hunger. So this has to do with what I’m saying. The system 
can change, but we have to change the ideas, to generate new ideas, our 
form of thought, and our form of evolving. Because right now, this 
country is something else – you cannot keep people entrapped in the 
same discourse we’ve had for 10 years, because we’re living in a 
different reality. You cannot pretend that the people are with you 
because you gave them a bag of food, with a litre of oil, some flour, 
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beans and butter – this is not supplying the people. You have to find 
alternatives so that Venezuelans can dress themselves. Venezuelans 
have the same clothes they’ve had for the last 11 years!” (Interview, 
Píritu II workers, 28 June, 2016) 
More strikingly still, lower level workers at the Payara plant did not share the optimism 
expressed by their coordinator concerning the strategic partnership with the private 
sector: 
“Even with the salaries that we have, our wages aren’t enough. And so 
there is not enough to cover all of the demand that there is. Despite 
everything the government wanted to do, that is to say, to sell to the 
people at a just and economical price, we simply don’t have enough 
companies created for this particular system because they created some 
but the majority of the companies are capitalist, at least the companies 
operating at the national level.” (Interview, Payara workers, 
01.07.2016) 
Thus, views on the nature and ultimate resolution of the country’s economic woes 
clearly varied among participants, specifically between whether the private sector 
could be relied upon in terms of bringing about a just and economical price to the 
population. For the workers at Payara, state-led firms (such as those within the ALBA 
network) represented something of a qualitative alternative or even rival to capitalist 
enterprises, with the corollary that only with the balance of economic forces in favour 
of the public sector would the way be open to a lasting resolution to the current crisis. 
These sentiments thus seem to correspond to the complications (outlined above) with 
respect to relying on the native bourgeoisie; given their particular outlook with respect 
to augmenting the firm’s capital, the summation of many such instances of capitalist 
‘rationality’ cannot amount to a coordinated form of national endogenous 
development. From the workers’ perspective, only a relative dominance of state-led 
firms operating with calibrated levels of profit needed for firm survival and 
investments funds could break the economic deadlock.   
Generally speaking, however, it becomes clear that the entire array of preceding 
problems and contradictions afflicting the ALBA factories imparts a series of ruptures 
across the entire terrain of rights, territory and (food) sovereignty. For with the 
statisation of property rights – as against the implementation of worker control – in 
combination with the specific accumulation regime and hegemonic project 
constitutive of the ‘social economy’ (price subsidisation at the consumer, rather than 
production, end of the chain) had merely re-created a territorial ‘grid’ separating the 
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factory and wider communal spaces, which together aim to become concentrically 
integrated circles of production, supply, and distribution. In this way, sovereignty 
remains concentrated within the bureaucratic landlord state, rather than within a 
multiplied terrain of cooperative spaces.  
 
6.7 From Occupation to Re-Normalisation: The Uncertain Fate of ALBA-Arroz 
At the time of my visits to the ALBA factories, the workers’ union, Unión Socialista 
Bolivariana de Trabajadores de Arroz del Alba, was in negotiations with the president 
of CVAL and other officials. As one of the union voceros (shop stewards) noted, it 
was important for all the workers to maintain constant contact across all factory sites, 
“so we can speak with one voice.” Yet there was also a level of pragmatism involved 
in their strategies: “our demands have to be something more or less equilibrated, and 
what you ask should be according with the reality of the company and the reality of 
the country, because neither can it be that we go and ask for something below what is 
necessary in order to satisfy the workforce” (Interview, Píritu I, 13.05.2016). One 
particular aspect was the establishment of a new price structure: 
“Rice at the competitive price is almost 470Bs. So we have petitioned 
CVAL to increase the price to at least 130Bs, for us to be able to be 
profitable, and to be sustainable as a company. The problem is that the 
costs vary a lot, for example packing bags used to cost 8Bs and now 
they cost around 120Bs… and you can’t maintain a company like this, 
because when we have to invest in certain services, like fixing the 
boilers, this costs millions. And you have to do this every 6 months, 
and if you don’t you’re going to seriously damage your machinery.” 
(Interview Píritu II, 11.05.2016) 
However, the main item of negotiation revolved around returning the factory to 
operational status, which legally requires the appointment of a company president. But 
given the early stages of this negotiation, the future remained unclear: 
“What’s been happening is that they have been naming top 
administrators that last for about a year, then they bring other 
administrators, who then leave after a year, then comes in yet another 
administrator, who lasted only two months, because we kicked him out. 
The state as such is making a restructuring of these types of companies; 
we are currently in a moment of transition with the bosses of the 
administration of CVAL, the workers and the Ministry of Work… We 
are in a transitory stage to see what will happen and what will change, 
if they change the name, if they will close it down, all conjectures that 
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one can’t be sure of because still nothing has been finally established.” 
(Interview Píritu II, 11.05.2016) 
Given the centrality of the Píritu II plant, the fact that it was one of two factories (along 
with Píritu I) that was officially under occupation, and thus effectively led the ALBA-
Arroz workers through the process of struggle (and negotiation) against (and with) the 
state, I was curious to know more about their progress in these talks. The following 
month I returned to the plant. Having read the most recently published price 
regulations from SUNDDE (at which the maximum selling price for White Rice grade 
1 was now 120Bs) I wondered whether this re-adjustment had fully taken on board 
their grievances that were surely aired during the negotiation process with CVAL and 
other high-level officials. After all, two kilos of rice paddy costs 140Bs, which already 
puts the cost of production above the new (higher) sale price. Does this not simply 
reproduce the same problem that was so strenuously pointed out during my first 
meeting? “Yes, we are losing, but this company was not created to gain” (Interview, 
Píritu II, 21.07.2016). Somewhat taken aback by the seemingly straightforward 
answer, I enquired as to whether this does not threaten once again the sustainability of 
the company: 
“Sure, but what is the sustainability that should be inside this company? 
To look for an alternative product to sell. Remember that white rice, 
table rice, has something that is called sub-product. And those products 
also are commercialised because they sell as concentrated foods, so you 
compensate one thing for another; the price that you are losing with 
packaged rice, you are compensating it with the sub-product or you 
compensate it like we are producing rice crackers… but we cannot 
close the percentage of the people which is at 120Bs, because this 
company was created with this objective: to be self-sustainable but 
never at the detriment of the people in the street.” (Interview, Píritu II, 
21.07.2016) 
It was not made entirely clear whether or not the sum of derivative products and their 
sale was enough to offset the losses incurred through the sale of white rice, as I was 
told that hard data were off limits. It is plausible to assume that the company may well 
be operating at an absolute loss, given the voracity of protestation I experienced from 
our first interview, during which time it was likely the factory was also selling 
derivative products. What remains central, however, is the remarkable change of tone 
between the first and second interview, which is most likely due to the process of 
negotiation with the government, a ‘normalisation’ of factory protocol (arrival of a 
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new ALBA president – also a military man – whom I met quite unexpectedly during 
our second interview), and the concurrent re-orientation of subjective disposition 
towards the larger state apparatus. As I shook his hand for the last time, and walked 
out of the factory, I wondered whether or not the workers’ struggle had all been in 
vain, for in the end, it appeared as if the nature and operation of the ALBA-Arroz 
factories had merely assumed the same form as it had the day before the occupation.  
 
6.8 Reprise and Review: The Politics of Production in ALBA 
The following subsections will seek to bring into a type of analytical coherence the 
findings of the above case study. To do so, we will focus on two levels of analysis. 
From a micro-foundational perspective, we will enquire into exactly what type of 
factory regime prevails under the ALBA-Arroz factories, and the politics of 
production that emerges from them. Secondly, we will enquire into the broader macro-
economic dynamics that shape and impact upon the internal political struggles of these 
factories.  
 
Between Hegemonic and Bureaucratic Factory Regimes 
How, then, can we attempt to understand the form, rationale, strategies and 
subjectivities of the workers at the ALBA-Arroz factories? This is by no means an 
easy task, as the breadth and variety of the ‘sociology of work’ or ‘labour studies’ 
literature would suggest (see e.g., Cornfield and Hodson, 2002; Taylor, 2011). 
However, in order to elaborate some preliminary conclusions regarding the above 
analysis, I draw upon Michael Burawoy’s taxonomy of labour struggles under 
different political regimes. One of the guiding questions of his study asks exactly 
“[w]hat determines the short-term, everyday interests [of workers], and how shall 
these turn into labour’s long-term, imputed or fundamental, interests?” (Burawoy, 
1985: 28). In many ways sharing Poulantzas’ conception of the social formation, “[t]he 
productive process must itself be seen as an inseparable combination of its economic, 
political and ideological aspects”, though ultimately dominated by the economic 
moment in which the relations of production prevail (Burawoy, 1985: 24-5). 
We can therefore approach specific forms of institutionalized production 
relations with reference to Burawoy’s distinction between particular types of 
“despotism”. As we saw in Chapter 2 with Marx’s notion of “factory despotism”, the 
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relation between capital and labour is characterized primarily by the absolute 
dependence of labour to capital, insufficiently low wages (thus hampering the process 
of realisation from surplus value into profit), and therefore the emergence of over-
production and under-consumption. Thus, under this early era of ‘competitive 
capitalism’ in the 19th century, it is (as Marx often pointed out) the “[a]narchy in the 
market [that] leads to the despotism in the factory” (Burawoy, 1985: 124). However, 
with the growth of firm size (and the corresponding contraction in the number of 
firms), market competition eased while the organization of work became highly 
mechanized. Thus, the added leverage enjoyed by workers meant that capital could no 
longer coerce work-effort, but had to persuade labour to perform its tasks. Thus, the 
transition from factory despotism to “hegemonic regime” inside the factory was 
mediated through the institutionalization of collective bargaining (unions), added 
social security, and increased state intervention into the struggles between labour and 
capital (ibid: 124-6). In this way, despite the variations among despotic regimes and 
hegemonic regimes across space and time, their analytical distinction consists in the 
“unity/separation of the reproduction of labour power and capitalist production” (ibid: 
127).59 
 The final typology emerges within the context of “state socialism”. For 
Burawoy, there are of course different types of socialism, not simply those of the statist 
variety as found in the former Soviet bloc. All such socialisms are marked by “fusing 
production politics with state politics”; further differentiation emerges between 
socialism “from below” in which the “guiding forces come from organs of producers 
in a… collective self-management” system. Thus, socialism “from above” emerges 
from the central organs of the state, or “state socialism” (ibid: 158). A primary 
characteristic of state socialism of the Soviet type is the absence of coercive market 
pressures (competition), which are mediated through price signals; rather, “the plan 
guides the flow of inputs and outputs of production. The planners represent a class of 
teleological – that is, purposeful – redistributors” (ibid: 159). The firm therefore faces 
																																								 																				
59 There another typology of the hegemonic regime, corresponding to the most recent structural 
transformation of capital over the last 30 years. The increasing internationalization of capital and its 
increased mechanization or mobility thus subordinates labour far more than under the Fordist 
hegemonic regimes, in the form of a type of “hegemonic despotism”: “where labour used to be granted 
concessions on the basis of the expansion of profits, it now makes concessions on the basis of… the 
rate of profit that might be earned elsewhere” (ibid: 150). 
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soft budgets, relaxed by state support, rather than hard budgets induced by market 
competition.  
Finally, it is necessary to enquire into the types of class struggles that emerge 
under state socialism. Under capitalism, the relative separation of the economic from 
the political is primarily marked by the relative obscurity of exploitation; i.e. 
exploitation perfectly coincides with production, and is thus masked by it (through the 
‘equality’ of exchange in the form of a money-wage). This predisposes workers in 
capitalism to both hitch their fortunes to that of the firm, and direct their struggles 
within the confines of the firm, rather than across the political field of struggle as a 
whole. Under state socialism, wages do not emerge from profits, but from state 
discretion while appropriation and distribution emerge from state dictates – hence, 
workers must be coerced into producing surplus through flexibilisation of the labour 
process (systems of compensation corresponding directly to work-effort) (ibid: 195). 
In this way, “enterprise struggles are immediately struggles against the state” (ibid: 
196). As a corollary, the subjective disposition of workers in the former corresponds 
to an individualized bond under the hegemony of capital rather than within the 
common class; under the latter, class identity prevails, posed against a relatively 
antagonistic class of bureaucratic planners who conceive the plan, while the former 
executes the plan, and thus reproducing the separation between manual and intellectual 
labour. In Burawoy’s estimation, these conditions of state socialist factory regimes 
also tend towards the development of worker consciousness towards the interests of 
self-management; for both the weak organic integration (hegemony) with the 
exploiting class, and the general lack of confidence in the teleological power of central 
planners, predisposes workers to seize factory operations entirely. Thus, “[t]heir 
hostility to the ‘bureaucracy’ is exacerbated by their knowledge that the supposed 
conceivers do not appear to conceive anything, this function being actually carried out 
by the direct producers” (ibid: 197). One finds from this model that the emergence of 
socialism from below is more likely to appear under conditions of “bureaucratic 
despotism”, rather from within the confines of capitalist hegemony. 
 The above differentiation of Burawoy’s categories is necessary for our 
purposes precisely because the characteristics of the factory regime found within the 
ALBA-Arroz network do not correspond in a neat one-to-one fashion with any given 
model, but rather resembles a complex mix of elements from each. In many ways, the 
factory regimes found within the above case study strongly point towards a type of 
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‘bureaucratic despotism’: factory operations are mediated through central planning 
rather than through competition and the movement of price signals; the conception of 
work plans are formulated from above (at the state level in terms of product mix and 
price formation); the broader economic environment is also constrained by supply 
squeezes, in which various types of inputs are generally scarce and thereby adding a 
level of uncertainty into the shop floor itself; while the form of class struggle that took 
place behind the factory gates penetrated the entire strategic field of the state, and in 
turn ensnaring higher levels of the state bureaucracy into the process of dispute 
settlement. However, there are other aspects that conform to the type of ‘hegemonic 
regimes’ found in advanced capitalism: the reproduction of labour is attained through 
a set of stable wages (due to institutionalized bargaining rules, workers were still paid 
even during moments of down-time and for the period of occupation itself); while the 
general outcomes of the workers’ struggle did not (as was the case with Burawoy’s 
studies of the command economies in Poland and Hungary) turn towards the 
immediate seizure of the means of production and a new system of self-management. 
In terms of this latter aspect, workers tended to display a higher loyalty to the survival 
of the firm itself, more commonly found within capitalist firms. The combination of 
these (somewhat contradictory) elements amounts to a factory regime and form of 
worker subjectivity and agency that combines relative job security and loyalty to the 
firm that is mediated not through the labour-capital relation by a labour-state relation.  
 One could therefore surmise that worker loyalty to the status-quo of the factory 
regime – seeking simply to return the factory to its normal functions, which in any 
case would require a new factory president (despite the ire that this layer of factory 
power drew from the workforce) – reflects merely the narrow self-interest of labour 
attempting to reproduce itself. However, and despite the relative impossibility of 
verifying this conclusion ‘objectively’, I would offer a somewhat different take. 
Undoubtedly the issue of job security looms large – particularly given the general 
problem of consumer price inflation and the tendency for public sector workers to 
enjoy periodic wage increases from the state as a means of defending workers’ 
purchasing power – yet the continuous exhibition of positive affect towards the general 
social values and philosophy of Bolivarianismo suggests that the workforce maintain 
a strong internalization of broader political goals that are principally marked by the 
production for society (rather than mere accumulation of capital). This is not to say 
that ALBA-Arroz workers are slavish automatons to state ideology; what was equally 
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clear from the chapter’s findings is that, as is common in regimes of bureaucratic 
despotism, the workforce constantly bemoaned the complete lack of understanding on 
behalf of state planners, which were characterized by poor knowledge of the 
production process, insufficiently politically minded, and generally tainted by 
corruption. And while possibilities towards self-management were present in the 
minds of the participants, this strategic push was side-lined given that broader power 
structures would be quite unwilling to devolve power to the workforce, while at the 
same time, resuming production for the immediate needs of the community took 
priority. In sum, saving the factory impacted both on the reproduction of worker 
security and the broader political goals held among them in terms of fulfilling their 
roles in the social economy. 
 And yet, in addition to Burawoy’s suggestive model, these contradictions were 
precisely those identified by Poulantzas in his review of the Western capitalist states 
of the late 1970s. As Poulantzas described it, the “transformed form” of the state – in 
terms of its enhanced role in economic functions – becomes inscribed within a number 
of techniques aimed at recalibrating the popular classes towards a given set of policy 
goals. Yet it also opens up the state to a host of contradictory dynamics: “through its 
expansion, the State does not become more powerful, but on the contrary more 
dependent, with regard to the economy”, which thus results in the “‘overpolitcization’ 
of the actions of the State” (Poulantzas, 2014: 169). In this way, “the contemporary 
state is caught in its own trap… the State can go neither backwards nor forwards… At 
one and the same time, it is driven to do both too much (crisis-inducing intervention) 
and too little (being unable to affect the deep causes of crises)” (ibid: 191). The major 
difference between the Western European variety and the contemporary state in 
Venezuela is that this transformed form is not induced through a falling rate of profit, 
but rather directly from the social mandate laid down by the accumulation strategy of 
endogenous development, yet under conditions of rentier-induced inflationary 
pressures. The presence of a specific form of systemic crisis (in the rate of inflation) 
has similarly caught the Bolivarian state into a deep trap.  
 The statisation of industry further entrenches this stasis, for the subsumption 
of capital under the state does not fundamentally alter capitalist relations of 
production, but rather results in a form of state capitalism (ibid: 193), wherein the 
division between manual and intellectual labour remains. Only in the face of a true 
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modification in the relations of production and the state apparatus” (ibid: 175). For 
Poulantzas, these marked shifts towards state capitalism would most likely occur in 
social formations that lack a substantial “native bourgeoisie”, with state capital linked 
into the imperialist chain, or, “in countries that have undergone upheavals in a failed 
or aborted process of transition to socialism” (ibid: 193). Avoiding a “failed” transition 
process therefore requires a more fundamental reorganisation of the economic 
apparatus of the state (even before the question of the relations of production and 
social division of labour are put on the table), so that the economic interventions of a 
left government, and the transition process more broadly, may “retain a socialist 
character” (ibid: 195). Venezuela seems to fit these prognostications only somewhat, 
insofar as it still retains a relatively dominant native bourgeoisie (particularly the 
import sectors), yet exhibits what can be seen (at least in the case of ALBA’s 
productive infrastructures) as an aborted process of socialist transition, insofar as the 
persisting gap between the rhetoric of ALBA’s politico-economic philosophy and the 
concrete social relations between workers and the bureaucratic state. The first step on 
a renewed path to a socialist transition would surely centre on the reorganisation of 
the economic apparatus containing the ALBA-Arroz network, by simply severing the 
factories from their institutional straightjackets, imputing them with operational 
autonomy, switching the target of oil rents towards developing the productive forces, 
which may then provide the greatest opportunity and scope for the workforce to decide 
on day to day operational objectives as a necessary step towards self-management.   
Nevertheless, some days before my departure from Venezuela, it emerged that, 
according Juan Vicente Perdomo, one of the specialist engineers at the ALBA-Arroz 
factory in Guárico, the workers’ vocero had filed a law-suit against the state over the 
transparency of a procedure pertaining to a possible transferal or shut-down of the 
factory. As Perdomo claims, the state has not negotiated or included the workers in 
this process, thus violating Articles 92 and 142 of the Organic Law of Work (Carrillo, 
2016). It would appear as if the issue of worker security is therefore a most pressing 
concern at this stage; given the level of bureaucratic secrecy permeating the state, it is 
quite possible that workers in other factories in Portuguesa are also looking on with 
some trepidation. Furthermore, should the ALBA-Arroz factories go into liquidation, 
it is more than likely that these productive infrastructures would revert to private 
ownership, which would further entrench the aborted process of socialist transition.  
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Ground Rent and Soft Budgets 
Venezuela’s current economic crisis is, by all accounts, largely the result of the drop 
in world oil prices beginning around 2014. As such, the issue of ground rent, as a 
portion of surplus value captured by ‘landlord states’ (Hellinger, 2017) through the 
valorisation of their national wealth in the global market, becomes a key driver in the 
pursuit of national development policy. As Thomas Purcell notes, the mobilization of 
ground rent as the primary mediator in the establishment of “egalitarian exchange and 
social property relations” has tended to undermine deeper transformations concerning 
“the way production is organized, both technically and socially” (Purcell, 2013: 162). 
In relation to the ALBA-TCP, a similar conclusion is drawn with respect to the 
structural limits of the Grandnational Enterprises, which “reproduce the same 
normative and voluntarist logic of initiatives in Venezuela – such as social production 
companies… – whose explicitly stated aim is to satisfy social needs by producing use-
values outside the ‘logic’ of capital accumulation” (Purcell, 2016: 117-8).  
We can therefore see many of these contradictory dynamics at work in the 
above analysis of the ALBA-Arroz network. As a guiding strategic selectivity of the 
‘social economy’, the provision of subsidized goods represents one of the cornerstones 
of Bolivarian politics in contemporary Venezuela, as a form of socializing the products 
of society in the spirit of egalitarianism, “so that no one is left out, from the poorest to 
the richest” (Interview, Payara, 06.07.2016). Yet in creating a cost-structure that leads 
to a permanent loss with each unit of production, these enterprises are therefore 
vulnerable to variations in the volume of ground rent available via a series of socio-
economic forces emanating from outside the state’s frontiers – in the form of surplus-
value formation and purchasing power from across the oil-consuming world – and thus 
severely hampering the drive towards endogenous development. Paradoxically, the 
manner in which oil rent, and the permanent presence of soft budgets, underwrites the 
process of endogenous development simultaneously undermines this very 
endogeneity. The contradictory mix of the Bolivarian accumulation regime and 
hegemonic project – understood as stagnant or declining investment in the productive 
forces, and the maintenance of political support via subsidisation of consumption (cf. 
Kornblihtt, 2015) – ultimately reproduces the dependency relationship that Latin 
America has for so long been battling against.  
 However, it is also clear that the use of petroleum as a material foundation for 
the development and creation of new productive infrastructures need not necessarily 
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lead to the failure of endogenous development as such, so long as they are couched 
within a sufficiently dynamic range of strategies and modes of organization. One 
problem noted above is the political move towards the fragmentation of productive 
activities across the ALBA-Food Grandnational, via the creation of specific entities 
dedicated to one particular strategic product (rice, legumes, pork, etc.). In the case of 
Píritu III, the eventual narrowing from a multi-product capacity to merely the 
processing of rice represented a marked contradiction of overall plant utilization, 
which could be returned to its previous status merely through switching of sieves and 
filters for sifting particular grains (Interview, Píritu III workers, 30.06.2016). Thus, 
while it is obviously necessary to segment agrarian production according to the 
material capacities of a firm or sector (one cannot process rice in a pig farm), under-
utilization of plant capacity may emerge as a form of “plan fetishism” (Burawoy, 
1985), wherein politics outdoes socio-economic strategy. 
Thus, it would seem that endogenous development might in fact reach the goals 
inherent to it, if only these voices from the shop floor could make a substantial impact 
on the management of the social economy. Yet at the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that any given strategy, whether formed from above or below, would 
have to deal with the broader systemic pressures that emanate from the general rate of 
inflation, which constantly thwarts any attempt at rationally organizing production and 
consumption levels; in other words, even if the workers were able to set the price at 
some marginal level above the cost-price of production (at least in order to accrue re-
investable surplus), it is likely that this might lead to a cost-push inflationary spiral 
that includes consumer prices, and thus ultimately negating the entire project of 
egalitarian distribution and endogenous development. Perhaps the only way in which 
such a disaster could be avoided would be through the systematic socialization in the 
entire national infrastructure, from production to circulation. As various radical 
intellectuals inside Venezuela argue, subsuming finance and commercial sectors under 
public ownership (the latter concerned with imports and internal circulation of goods 
in the national market) would break the stranglehold that certain fractions of 
Venezuelan capital hold over the wider economy, and thus potentially subvert 
inflationary pressures by calibrating production, prices and consumption through a 
socially oriented plan guided by self-organised popular worker collectives (see Yaffe, 
2015). Yet problematically, state personnel have been equally implicated in the 
hoarding and contraband sale of goods for the sake of accruing surplus profits, though 
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for individual, rather than corporate (company) gain (Aporrea, 2016; Prensa, 2016). 
In light of these challenges, Purcell offers a potential route out of this developmental 
impasse: 
“if the [ALBA] project could move to concentrate ground-rent at the 
scale necessary to put ALBA-TCP on a par with world market levels of 
productivity, but under a social form of regional state-control that 
redistributes and re-invests to meet the political and social goals of 
ALBA-TCP, then something other than an integration of 
‘underdeveloped’ landlord states dressed up in ideological platitudes 
could emerge” (Purcell, 2016: 118). 
But as is clear from the various levels of corruption, incompetence, state-bureaucratic 
confusion and relative disempowerment among workers struggling under the ALBA 
umbrella, redirecting economic resources and investment towards the true 
consolidation of the social economy and endogenous development will not come about 
merely through the transition towards regional state-control, but through the transition 
towards popular class control affected by strategic alliances between various subaltern 
actors within and beyond the factory gates. Under such conditions, it would be possible 
to begin the long road to socialist transition, by breaking down the divide between 
manual and intellectual labour, instituting and socialising property rights, which in 
turn lays the ground work for the re-territorialisation of 
production/distribution/consumption as is adequate to the general struggle for food 
sovereignty.   
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis has offered a comprehensive account of the international regional 
organization of ALBA in the context of its stated aim to institute a ‘food sovereignty’ 
regime. It is, therefore, primarily intended as a contribution to the first generation of 
ALBA studies, by way of offering an in-depth analysis (from both the macro- and 
micro-foundational levels) of the actors, processes and challenges encountered on the 
long road to food sovereignty. As a multidimensional struggle, food sovereignty 
engenders the call for a democratisation in the world’s food regime, in which those at 
the helm of production become politically empowered with respect to ownership and 
control of the agrarian commons, and with strategic decision-making powers over said 
resources. Thus, the present study has been equally wide-ranging, by offering a series 
of case studies among agrarian social movements, spaces of radical pedagogical 
practice, and worker struggles. In order to articulate the living experiences of these 
actors, I employed a tripartite schema that aims to capture the complex dynamics of 
struggle throughout the terrain of society, namely, through the lens of rights, territory 
and sovereignty. Such a vantage point helps reveal the inherently uneven process of 
instituting food sovereignty in ALBA. For while the status of food sovereignty within 
this regional institution is far from making real headway into a qualitatively new food 
regime, it has also witnessed very real transformations in the form of agrarian rights, 
territorial practices, and nascent forms of popular sovereignty.  
 Given the conceptual pallet with which I have sketched the variegated terrain 
of struggle, this thesis has primarily been focused on the politics of food sovereignty, 
and the attendant class conflicts and differential powers that inform the making of a 
new, yet embattled, food regime. We have also seen how the politics of ALBA, and 
its discursive content of Bolivarianismo, have strongly shaped the developmental 
pathways of rights, territory and sovereignty, particularly with respect to the 
distinctive political technology constitutive of ‘post-liberalism’. As such, the 
concomitant indicators of agrarian development and production patterns – principally 
examined in the context of Venezuela – have demonstrated that the lacklustre progress 
in attaining a food sovereignty regime points towards the internal contradictions 
within the Bolivarian state form. Speaking in 2014, president Maduro claimed that 
“national unity is the magic formula to continue walking the path of the 21st century” 
(cited in, El Universal, 2014a). It would seem, then, that the legacy of Venezuela’s 
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magical state appears to be ever-present within the very same struggle that seeks its 
dissolution. In order to trace the main findings of the research, the following will 
readdress the three research questions shaping the thesis. 
 
(1) The transformation from the dominance of capitalist agriculture to a more 
socially just mode of agrarian production has been an explicit component of 
the Bolivarian turn, and a central concern for the politics of Food Sovereignty. 
Yet it is difficult to see much progress of such a transformation at the 
specifically region-wide scale. While intra-ALBA trade in food goods has 
shown marked growth, this dimension tells us little about overcoming the 
social logic of capitalism (dominated by exchange-value and the accumulation 
of capital for its own sake), based not on exchange relations but production 
relations. As such, social transformation – even while aided by international 
and transnational linkages and solidarities – must take place in territorially 
specific spaces (be they spaces of production, communities or nations). The 
favoured scale for such a transformation is undoubtedly the sovereign-state, 
imbued with the knowledge/power that enables capitalist relations of 
production to endure. At this point, only Venezuela has taken notable steps to 
implement a ‘social economy’ and food sovereignty regime (cf. McKay et al., 
2014), quite unlike the other two largest ALBA members (Bolivia and 
Ecuador), which have substantially reproduced traditional patterns of capitalist 
agriculture (Henderson, 2016; Webber, 2017). ALBA’s regional space, at least 
in terms of agrarian policy, resembles merely an aggregation of states rather 
than a consolidated bloc forging a unified agricultural policy. And while 
various international agreements have been made (particularly with respect to 
Grandnational Enterprises), it is difficult to ascertain the precise status of the 
various bi-lateral agreements established by ALBA members (short of 
conducting location-specific fieldwork). Venezuela was therefore a crucial test 
case, given the number of ALBA-brokered projects and production sites 
residing within its territory.  
Yet even in Venezuela, the move towards consolidating food 
sovereignty and the social economy contains its own complexities. By and 
large, untangling these complexities can be achieved by deconstructing the 
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‘strategic selectivities’ constitutive of the Bolivarian state. Thus, as 
characteristic of an ‘oil nation’ and ‘landlord state’, the mobilization of social 
wealth in the form of ground rent provides a material basis for the development 
of the productive forces – including new modes of knowledge and agrarian 
practice – as well as the source for establishing a substantial level of social 
security for the popular sectors. And yet, it is precisely in favouring the latter 
policy at the expense of the former that has led to a contradictory situation in 
which higher social security and purchasing power throughout the population 
leads to new demand-pressures that cannot be met without the expanded 
production of basic goods.  
In this way, while Venezuela has clearly sought to affect a positive 
rights regime with respect to the social guarantee to food, this approach to the 
social economy is distorted towards consumption at the expense of production, 
thus leaving in place the central mechanisms of dependence in the form of 
global oil prices and state largesse. Consequently, the two central components 
of the food sovereignty model, in the form of ‘endogenous development’ and 
‘labour-centred development’ have been unevenly implemented, with the latter 
aspect showing little sign of progress in ALBA’s spaces of industrial 
production (though perhaps more so in the case of IALA, based on the 
democratisation of agroecological knowledge), while the former remains 
ensnared by an over-reliance on oil rent circulation in order to paper over the 
limits of an underinvested productive foundation. Additionally, and as a result 
of this contradiction, the strategically limited use of oil revenues merely 
exacerbates the ‘export-or-die’ compulsion from which ALBA is attempting 
to extricate itself. The above contradictions have therefore seriously hampered 
the effort to implement a far-reaching food sovereignty regime, leading instead 
to a state-capitalist rentier economy, with a fragmented peasantry undergoing 
enormous strains in resource procurement and sustainable marketing channels, 
as well as a working class subsumed under a bureaucratic factory regime.  
 
(2) While such macro-level contradictions may be readily identified, their 
interpretation remains obscure without enquiring into the social agents at the 
helm of these dynamics and their sources of agency and capacity for action. At 
the regional scale, the ALBA bloc remains relatively overdetermined by the 
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magnitude of ground rent available for funding specific policies, a material 
basis that is equally central to the transformation of the Venezuelan state itself. 
This has certainly provided ample room for manoeuvre for the Venezuelan 
state and its personnel, by providing enormous levels of social spending on the 
popular classes, as well as experimentation with new forms of rights and 
territoriality (autonomy and decentralization). What makes these new spaces 
of popular politics so vibrant is the manner in which radical social forces 
breathe life into them through myriad strategies of popular collaboration and 
independent initiative. Very often, such forces are adept at creating facts on 
the ground – a de facto set of popular political technologies – that later become 
enshrined in national law.  
Workers at the ALBA factories exhibit the classic forms of structural 
power in their workplaces, through collective strategies of resistance (strikes 
and occupations), though with somewhat short-term goals with respect to 
merely re-activating production along the same organisational path. Workers 
within the ALBA-Arroz factories thus represent an often-unacknowledged 
component of food sovereignty politics, in terms of operating intermediary 
spaces of production that are capable of scaling up the mass of raw-material 
generated by peasant production. Yet like peasant actors, the ALBA workers’ 
strategic power and agency become substantially deflected, and subsumed, 
under the hegemony of the Bolivarian state, often to detrimental effect. The 
systemic challenges facing these factories, as well as the social economy in 
general, thus tends to sever and disorganise what would be organic lines of 
connection and cooperation – from the ‘point and circle’ philosophy linking 
spaces of production and reproduction together, to the broader networks of 
peasant production, industrial processing and publically planned distribution. 
More often than not, these diverse agencies (from above and below) come into 
relative conflict, which can be traced to the contradictory forms of strategic 
and spatial selectivity of the Bolivarian state and the push for autonomous yet 
interconnected spaces of popular democracy from below. In other words, the 
overdetermination of oil rent in combination with a set of policies designed to 
increase social welfare tend to side-line more strategic considerations in terms 
of consolidating peasant and working class power within community- and 
production-spaces. 
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(3) The broad socio-political substratum of agent-strategy convergence around the 
Bolivarian ideal and the ALBA regional space can be concretely traced to the 
generalized revolt against neoliberal discipline beginning in the 1980s, a 
common denominator that similarly sutures together transnational peasant 
movements and the wider ALBA bloc. Yet it is equally clear that the entire 
regional space is riddled with cracks and fissures. Again, the Council of Social 
Movements is more symbolic than real (despite the continued support among 
social movement actors for the ALBA initiative); peasant movements in 
Venezuela may experience fragmentation around class or gender lines (either 
through the formation of small landholders satisfied with limited land reform, 
chauvinist elements in peasant communities that inhibit a fuller role for women 
in the countryside, or relative class differentiation and competitive pressures), 
as well as confronted by a Janus-faced state apparatus, at once ally and enemy 
(depending on the institutional branch in question and the specific 
conjuncture); the dissemination of new knowledge in the IALA institute 
remains delimited by the socio-spatial realities of the country (over-
urbanisation and the concomitant dependence upon the transfer of ground rent 
for urban dwellers, as well as the diminishment of transnationalisation of the 
institute); while ALBA workers are unable to utilize their full capacities of 
knowledge/power (and consequently the full production capacity of the 
factory) due to a contradictory development model based more around 
consumption than production. The precise reasons for such divergences are of 
course complex, yet they can be traced back to the specific institutional 
materiality of the Bolivarian state – embodying a hybrid form of a centralized, 
bureaucratic ‘landlord state’ that simultaneously (if not unevenly) forges new 
spaces of grassroots democracy and empowerment in partnership with social 
forces from below.  
 
7.1 What Kind of Post-Hegemonic Region is ALBA? 
In approaching the project of food sovereignty within the ALBA space, the thesis 
offered a class analysis of this initiative as a means of overcoming both the black-box 
tendency of state-centric analyses and the overtly voluntarist and discursive approach 
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of Thomas Muhr. As such, I proposed a critical problem-solving theory methodology 
that takes seriously (rather than glossing over) the real contradictions, tensions and 
struggles permeating the ALBA project. In doing so, this middle-range methodology 
seeks to navigate between the more traditional ‘problem-solving’ approaches found in 
realist IR theory and state-centric accounts of regionalism, with the more critical-
discursive neo-Gramscian approach that too often becomes ensnared by the 
statements, proclamations and institutional documentation underwriting the ALBA 
space. As Christopher Absell notes in perhaps the most comprehensive account of the 
first generation of ALBA scholarship, the past 10 years of research has provided an 
extensive yet descriptive account of ALBA’s principles, philosophies and policy 
initiatives. Thus, there is a great need to “confront the discourse of official 
documentation with the observable practice of reality” (Absell, forthcoming). And in 
the case of ALBA’s central productivist institutions – the Grandnational Enterprises – 
there is in effect no transparency with respect to the operation and core status of these 
infrastructures. For these reasons, I have therefore drawn upon extensive interview 
data with key participants in both agrarian social movements and workers within the 
ALBA factories. As noted above, by critically engaging with these actors’ 
perspectives, experiences and hopes, I aim to bring greater attention to the critical lines 
of convergence and divergence permeating the ALBA project, and in turn providing 
important insights into the troubled future of ‘Socialism in the 21st Century’.  
 As a preliminary conclusion, then, we might ask: what kind of a post-
hegemonic region is ALBA? In many ways, this answer cannot really emerge from a 
pure theory of regionalism. One could argue, in fact, that the only true theory of 
regionalism – functionalism – died on the back of the great variation that occurred 
throughout the world’s international regions. For precisely this reason, perhaps the 
most promising route to understanding these supra-national institutions is through a 
comparative approach, which brings into focus what functionalism cannot: variation 
in institutional design and their political effects (Acharya and Johnston, 2007). 
However, while not discounting this methodological approach, I have opted for a 
different angle, emphasizing the creative and often differentiated agential strategies 
pursued by various actors in the face of common structural pressures (Knafo, 2010). 
Even when we look at the emergence of the European Union – the birthplace of 
functionalist theory – its various twists and turns (let alone the social origins of the 
institution itself) cannot truly be known outside of the various class compositions, 
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struggles and elite strategies aimed at both counter-acting radical social forces and the 
re-establishment of European accumulation and geopolitical re-normalisation (Cocks, 
1980). In short, while the comparative method is useful, it is not the only one. I have, 
then, attempted to understand and explain the rise, evolution and status of the ALBA 
regional institution from within the parameters of its own states and social forces.  
Nevertheless, and in line with a critical IR approach adopted here, it was first 
of all necessary to contextualise the history of international regionalism in order to 
grasp the specificity of post-war geopolitics, and the historical legacies out of which 
the ALBA region was itself emerging. Thus, unlike many studies of ALBA, Chapter 
3 sought to help presage the question of what kind of region ALBA really is by 
delineating the geopolitical pressures emanating from the evolving global food 
regime, which becomes refracted time and again through the regionalisation of world 
politics. The Poulantzian frame offered by Jessop, in tandem with other insights from 
a Marxian theory of social space, offers a window into the changing dynamics of 
regionalism in Latin America – from ISI developmentalism to neoliberal discipline. 
The contradictions of capitalist development pushed subaltern classes to contest their 
continued subsumption under the dominance of Atlantic capital, and forced the 
reorganisation of hegemony on behalf of dominant classes. Thus, the new hegemonic 
project congealed within the idea of ALBA sought to more fully bring the practice of 
sovereign politics under the control of the nation, and in turn re-politicise the regime 
of civil and political rights through a decentralised territorial regime.  
In this way, ALBA represents a highly unique post-hegemonic region, one that 
is deeply committed at a discursive level to the principles of social justice and popular 
empowerment, yet refracted through a statisation of welfarist policy making. Hence, 
the specific accumulation regime and hegemonic project permeating the ALBA space 
– namely, mobilisation of state-generated resource rents embedded within various yet 
unevenly extended modes of popular participation – does give space for more 
substantial political agency for previously disenfranchised groups, yet often trapped 
within the nation-state grid. The overriding geopolitical logic of ALBA, as the re-
assertion and preservation of national sovereignty operationalised through loose, non-
legally binding forms of ad-hoc diplomatic negotiation, thus serves to reproduce the 
power of the bureaucratic sovereign state as the privileged space and site of political 
struggle. In light of these conclusions, I would argue that there certainly exists a type 
of ‘transnational organized society’ (as Muhr describes it) – in which La Vía 
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Campesina and its attendant institutions (like the IALA school) represent important 
examples – but that its organic integration into a ‘state-in-revolution’ (or even a 
region-in-revolution) remains quite displaced. In other words, once we recall that the 
key to capitalist (state) power is not simply the formal separation between state/civil 
society (politics/economics) but the relative disorganization of the popular classes 
maintained through exclusion from the realms of knowledge/expertise, then it would 
seem that not only is there much work to do with respect to radicalizing this ‘post-
hegemonic region’, but that this work will continue to focus on working in and against 
the sovereign state.  
 
7.2 The Terrifyingly Real Effect of the Bolivarian State 
With these broad conclusions in mind, and with a focus on ‘real world problems’ (but 
from the perspective of the underdog), I sought for the appropriate theoretical frame 
with which to capture the various themes, actors and power relations that slowly 
emerged throughout the fieldwork. Realising that so much of what constitutes ALBA’s 
food sovereignty project essentially resides within the frontiers of Venezuela, as well 
as the fact that the very philosophy of political economy underwriting the ALBA 
project predisposes the political economy of this regional space to maintain a relative 
focus on the national scale, it seemed apparent that a more critical theory route into 
the post-liberal state was the necessary strategy.  
 I therefore turned to the Marxian state theory of Nicos Poulantzas, particularly 
his last work State, Power, Socialism (SPS). Though seemingly an arbitrary choice – 
particularly given Poulantzas’ more extensive work on class analysis and political 
power in earlier volumes, as well as the somewhat unfinished and speculative nature 
of SPS – there are several core components to this volume that stand out as exemplary 
tools for both the analysis of ALBA’s post-hegemonic regionalism, and the wider 
understanding of the problems and prospects of food sovereignty as a counter-
hegemonic food regime. Nevertheless, the analysis was also supplemented by 
reference to subsequent generations of neo-Poulantzian scholarship, as well as 
considerations on the politics of space itself, in order to reveal the complex contours 
of social change and class struggle.   
 This then led to my examination of food sovereignty through three thematic 
lenses: rights, territory and sovereignty. Each of these elements was chosen due to 
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what I perceived to be their continually recurrent presence throughout FS discourse 
and practice. More importantly, I believe, it is through these inter-connected angles 
that we can better understand the real challenges faced by FS protagonists, who seek 
nothing more than a substantial transformation in the social relations of power in both 
the countryside and society at large. In this way, reading these components 
sociologically led to the formula of rights + territory = sovereignty, which reveals the 
ways in which struggles over each component has a determinate effect on the others.   
And yet, this conceptual formula is not necessarily transhistorical; despite the 
presence of bounded communities, divided by frontiers of various kinds over the ages, 
national sovereignty is something unique, an historically specific institution born from 
the ashes of feudalism (Hinsley, 1986; Elden, 2013). Here, the dynamics of politics or 
ideology are not the central mediators for the reproduction of the modern social 
formation. ‘Economics’ (in a narrow sense) effectively emerges as a structure of social 
relations that is capable (formally speaking) of reproducing itself; hence, the apparent 
separation of politics from economics, the spectacular ascendance of abstract 
formalism, calculation and scientific discourse, and the depersonalization of the 
sovereign state. Yet only by penetrating the ‘pristine’ realm of the economy do we 
find its secret lodged between real individuals in the process of production: the class 
of direct producers possessing only their bodies, and a class of owners that turn their 
factories into their own miniature fiefs. Starting from this level of analysis – the 
relations of production shaping structures of ownership/control, and the social division 
of labour as its result – thus overcomes the fetishised view of the state/civil society 
dichotomy to reveal the interpenetration of economics with politics, in both the factory 
and the sovereign state. For the monopolization of the means of knowledge constitutes 
the common denominator between capitalist power and state power, even though in 
one we find a monopoly of the means of production, and with the other a monopoly 
of the means of coercion.  
 In this way, the struggle for a new regime of rights, modes of knowledge and 
forms of territorialisation, comprising three of the fundamental areas of contention for 
peasant movements in La Vía Campesina, thus congeal around the double 
confrontation against landed capital and the bureaucratic state. This is not to suggest 
that the Bolivarian state is simply masked in a progressive discourse while continuing 
to act as a bourgeois state. Indeed, the continued dedication to the Bolivarian project 
(and state) exhibited by social movements, peasant groups, and the working class 
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itself, demonstrates clearly the inherently fragmented nature of the state apparatus, 
which by its own form establishes differential class alliances across the entire strategic 
terrain of struggle. Only by tracking this contested terrain do the key parameters of 
accumulation regime, hegemonic project and the strategic and spatial selectivities that 
unite them make themselves entirely apparent. It is precisely form this structural 
differentiation of the state apparatus that radical social forces can be with/in/against 
the state simultaneously, even if the lines of battle are constantly redrawn as a result 
of multiple struggles across its strategic terrain.  
 In terms of the political economy of ALBA itself, the lines of struggle become 
even more prominent. Again, this must be understood not as an organic outgrowth of 
ALBA’s own principles, but rather the regional normative framework refracted by the 
domestic contradictions permeating Venezuelan society. In the case of the ALBA-
Arroz factories, we can further observe the contradictory embodiment of working class 
values adhering to the Bolivarian ideal, yet struggling against the Bolivarian state. 
This again serves to illustrate the ‘terrifyingly real’ effect of state power, which from 
the perspective of its own institutional materiality creates a set of practices and logics 
that often diverge from its normative formalism. In other words, the struggle for the 
social economy cannot take place through the mere repetition of Bolivarian ideals; for 
as one of the ALBA workers lamented, change will only come about through “a 
change in the oxygen” – through the formation of new ideas that emerge through new 
material institutions. It is equally important to critically analyse the concrete strategies 
of workings class fractions within the social economy, lest we impute them with a 
potentially misplaced ‘revolutionary’ current. For what these workers sought was not 
the reorganization in the relations of production (though they did not discount it), but 
rather than re-normalisation of factory operations, even if this goal remained couched 
within Bolivarian discourse. Thus, it is clear that struggles within the social economy, 
by their very nature, become struggles within and against the state: the politics of 
production and the production of politics become one and the same. And if the road 
to food sovereignty necessarily embodies a transformative process towards the 
fundamental reorganisation and socialisation of rights, territory and sovereignty, then 
it is arguably true to say that this road necessarily leads through the domain of socialist 
transformation. 
What, then, are the prospects for the democratic road to socialism, and indeed a 
more socialised food regime? As we have seen from both Poulantzas’ own theoretical 
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commitments, as well as the complexities involved in the empirical findings of this 
thesis, one cannot prejudge this question through clever theoretical formulations. 
Poulantzas’ wager was, after all, given on the back of his suspicion of statism, from 
both the bourgeois and communist angles. The hegemony of parliamentary democracy 
and the dangers of dual power each produced within Poulantzas’ thought a scepticism 
of past practices that inevitably reproduced the power of the state. If we therefore view 
the Bolivarian road to socialism as one approximating a democratic variant, what does 
the continuing power of the state bureaucracy tell us about the prospects of Socialism 
in the 21st century? This question constitutes, in a sense, the outer frontier of the thesis, 
the answer to which would require an entire thesis in its own right. But it is a question 
that revolutionaries and critical scholars cannot ignore, and which (I hope) will be 
further explored in the future.  
 
7.3 Avenues of Further Research 
In terms of potential avenues of further research, there is of course much to be learned 
with respect to the intersection between struggles for food sovereignty inside the 
ALBA’s post-hegemonic region. Firstly, with reference to the promise of comparative 
analysis, it would be useful to compare and contrast the ways in which food 
sovereignty, as a philosophy and practice, emerge within, and become contested 
through, other Latin American regional organisations. A promising route would be to 
examine the relative presence or absence of food sovereignty discourse within 
MERCOSUR, particularly given the spatial overlap between the geopolitical centre of 
this regional space (Brazil) and one of LVC’s most militant peasant groups (MST). 
Gaining a better handle on the ‘how and why’ of food sovereignty’s success or failure 
across regional cases would provide greater scope of understanding with respect to the 
various opportunity structures faced by agrarian social movements within and across 
regional organisations. Additionally, and in line with the comparative method, it 
would be equally useful to compare cases of state-led food sovereignty policies within 
the ALBA bloc itself. Though some preliminary work has already been done in this 
regard (McKay et al., 2014), a more concerted ‘horizontal’ analysis to intra-ALBA 
food sovereignty politics would provide much needed contextualisation to the more 
‘vertical’ (intra-national) case studies as with the present thesis. 
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 From a similar angle, further field investigations should take place with respect 
to working class organization across the ALBA space. It is apparent that there is 
currently no umbrella labour union that integrates all workers integrated into all 
ALBA-related worksites or sectors. Further conversations with key stakeholders 
(workers across ALBA countries) as well as elite interviews (with the relevant 
ministers comprising nationally constituted economic institutions) would surely 
expand our understanding of labour politics within what is ostensibly a regional space 
dedicated to the ‘social economy’ and ‘labour-centred development’. 
 Finally, a series of potential questions might be posed in terms of what the fate 
of Socialism in the 21st Century spells for the current conjuncture of revolutionary 
politics elsewhere. While the struggle for food sovereignty opens one set of debates 
over the nature of socio-political change, the broader dynamics of Venezuela and the 
ALBA provide ample food for thought over the resurgence of the political right within 
the Latin American continent, not to mention the wider turn to what somewhat have 
called ‘global Trumpism’. The task ahead, as indicated in the Introduction of the 
thesis, pivots on a measured abandonment of monotonic evaluation of revolutionary 
struggles, in order to reveal the inherent crises and contradictions that afflict any 
substantial project to transform society. It is therefore hoped that the substance of this 
thesis has provided some contribution towards a measure of soul-searching, if not for 
the sake of turning our dreams of a better future into a present reality.  
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